

三國同盟と日米戰



松尾樹明著

● It is a Japanese book written for the Japanese people and published in Tokyo in October 1940 under the ægis of the Government. The original title is *The Three-Power Alliance and a U.S.-Japanese War*. The author is Liaison Intelligence Officer for the Japanese Foreign Office and Admiralty. He is also Publicity Chief of the Black Dragon Society (a fanatical, Fascist military group).

● The translator is the Washington representative of the Sino-Korean People's League, an anti-Japanese secret society of Korean patriots, with a highly organized intelligence service. Valuable information has frequently been passed on by Mr Haan to U.S. Government Departments.

● A copy of the original Japanese book was 'acquired' by the translator from a Los Angeles hotel room of two Japanese Army officers (of whom he had advance information), who had come to the West Coast for propaganda among the Japanese-Americans.

● The book sets out in detail the Japanese strategic plan. December 1941 is laid down as a zero month. The attacks on Pearl Harbour, Guam, Wake, and Midway Islands, and the Philippines have followed according to schedule. Action between the two fleets is discussed: the Nipponese expect to defeat the U.S. Fleet utterly.

● It shows the Japanese attitude to Singapore and Hong Kong and takes for granted Anglo-American action.


● It gives the complete programme of the war even to the percentage losses the Japs expect to sustain in each major action and anticipates the bombing of Tokyo, the Japanese occupation of Hawaii, and the closing of the Panama Canal.



HOW JAPAN PLANS TO WIN

Putnam

March '52.



HOW JAPAN PLANS TO WIN

by

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of the Japanese Naval Intelligence

translated by

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
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COMPLETE CONFORMITY WITH THE
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TRANSLATOR'S NOTE

HOW *Japan Plans to Win* was first published in Tokyo in October of 1940 under the title of *The Three-Power Alliance and a United States-Japanese War*. The author is an intelligence officer in liaison between the Japanese Foreign Office and the Admiralty; he is also, and more significantly, a high official of the Black Dragon Society, a religious-political organization of militarists which has had a behind-the-scenes influence of growing importance in the development of recent Japanese policy. The purpose of the book was twofold: to stiffen mass support for a Japanese show-down with the United States; and to bring mass pressure to bear upon those members of the Admiralty who still considered a war with the United States suicidal. The present book is an unabridged translation of that work.

The book came into my hands as Washington representative of the Sino-Korean Peoples' League, an anti-Japanese secret society with agents all over Japan, the mandated islands, Formosa, and our own West Coast. From one of my agents in Japan I received word some time ago that two Japanese officers, both members of the Black Dragon Society, were on their way to California to do propaganda work among the Japanese-Americans of the West Coast. I was further informed that they were bringing with them a kind of Japanese *Mein Kampf*, which had been used to stimulate morale at home with some effect. I went at once to the Coast, and was able to secure a copy of the book, which I thereupon undertook to translate, and which is herewith published in English for the first time.

Grateful acknowledgment is hereby made to Mr Sang Ryup Park and other friends for their help in the translation. If, in spite of the patient efforts of these friends, I have failed to do justice to the author, Kinoaki Matsuo, I hope he will forgive me.

I owe grateful thanks, also, to Senator Guy M. Gillette, who has been very sympathetic and understanding, and who has advised me on the problem of presenting this book to the American public in the interests of National Defence.

KILSOO K. HAAN

AUTHOR'S PREFACE

THE Japan-Germany-Italy Three-Power Alliance is different in nature from any other alliance heretofore effected, for the scope of its dependence, instead of being limited to the three signatory countries, has room to embrace within it all countries the world over ; it expresses a desire for co-operation, instead of one for conquest, within the respective Co-prosperity Spheres. Therefore, the present alliance is not at all aggressive in nature, its intention being to prevent the spread of the world war, thereby bringing about peace as speedily as possible.

If, however, there is any country which is afraid of the shadow of this alliance, it is mainly due to misunderstanding on her part of the spirit of the pact. And this fact should not make us conceited.

It goes without saying that the conclusion of the Three-Power Alliance has created a tremendous ripple throughout the world. The magnificent line-up of the Alliance and its declared purpose do not leave any room for any other power to make any open criticism of it. But it is not hard for anyone to imagine that those countries eager to maintain the Old Order of the world will hereafter be engaged in propaganda manœuvres against the Alliance and even resort to their time-honoured measure, economic pressure, and that as a result we will, in reality, come into conflict with them. We do not fear any kind of difficulty which will confront us ; we have only one mind, to fulfil the Imperial will that we go forward inexorably, in a spirit of co-operation and unity, to cope with the difficulties confronting us.

The United States policy towards the Three-Power Alliance, while at one time a rather moderate and conciliatory attempt to make a just estimate of the situation, suddenly turned in respect to Japan to preparations for war. For example, the United States Government is strengthening its economic pressure on Japan, as well as its aid to China, while the idea of obtaining the British territories in the Pacific is raising its head ; and it is also reported that the great naval construction plan is being speeded up. Certainly these are proof positive of the present

tendency of the United States Government. This reality deserves our attention.

There is no room to doubt that with the completion of the great United States naval construction plan insecurity on the Pacific will be greatly increased. Therefore, there is something essentially incompatible and irreconcilable between Japan and the United States. The United States advance to Asia, which is based on her political creeds—the Monroe Doctrine and the Open Door—has especially hindered the development of our country, thereby cutting off the means of our existence. It is, therefore, feared that on completion of the great United States armament expansion, United States-Japanese relations will be all the more complicated and strained. We do not, on purpose, intend to make trouble in the Pacific ; our paramount mission is rather to bring about a permanent peace throughout the Far East. To our regret, however, it is hard to deny that United States antagonism resulting from the formation of the Three-Power Alliance has a tendency towards war, step by step.

Once the outbreak of war unfortunately becomes inevitable, the war will involve one country versus many countries, or many countries versus many countries. Indeed, nobody can guarantee in what direction the war will expand. It goes without saying that Japan will leave no stone unturned to avoid the outbreak of a situation disadvantageous to her. But inasmuch as changes in the international situation are far from predictable, it cannot be guaranteed that international pressure will not exceed the limit of Japan's patience. That is to say, Japan should always make the greatest possible preparations to overcome the worst.

The best way for Japan to nip in the bud the aforementioned possible danger, preserve the peace and security of the state, and put into execution her national policy for the establishment of the Far East Co-prosperity Sphere, is, among other things, to unite the spirit of the nation, both materially and mentally. The new political system of assisting the throne should be realized ; the interior of the country should be strengthened by avoiding selfish interests and friction ; co-operation between Japan, Manchukuo, and China should be strengthened ; the group of democratic countries should be defied

through the Japan-Germany-Italy Three-Power Alliance ; maximum national defence should be speeded up with a view to making those who have ambitions in any part of Asia realize the fact that by pursuance of their ambitions they will be confronted with serious danger ; and for this purpose we need the help of our diplomatic activities. Thus we may be able to overcome our paramount national difficulty without staining our sword with blood, and this is also a demonstration of the secret of our military virtue. At the same time herein lies our confidence in our national defence. War is a bloody path, a last resort.

Although it can be said that by concluding the Japan-Germany-Italy Three-Power Alliance Japan has moved forward a powerful step towards the construction of a new world order, our country should not be blindly happy about the formation of the alliance when we raise the following considerations : How many difficulties will confront Japan in the future in her attempt to accomplish this great mission for the construction of a new world order ? Has the United States, after all, any reason for confidence, in consideration of the situation on both the Atlantic and the Pacific ? The tripartite alliance will hereby show its silent power. Indeed, the time has come for us to make a great decision, to combine one hundred million souls as one and go forward towards the completion of our great work based on the Imperial will.

This book has, therefore, been written with this object in mind, and special attention and care have been used in the selection of the materials. Emphasis has been laid on simplification and clarity by the omission of all statistics involving our side.

In conclusion I express my profound appreciation to the intelligence bureau of the Navy Department, the Naiyushukai of the Suikosha, and the editorial department of the Umi-to-Sora-sha, for their valuable instructions in connexion with the publication of this book, and to Mr Masaichi Okamoto, of the Kasumigaseki Publishing Company.

KINOAKI MATSUO

*In the middle of the autumn
of the 2600th year of the
foundation of the Japanese
Empire (1940)*

JAPANESE PUBLISHERS' NOTE

MR KINOAKI MATSUO, the author of this book, is a well-known student of Japanese-American problems. His book entitled *The Crisis of the League of Nations and a United States-Japanese War*, which was published at the time of Japan's withdrawal from the League of Nations, was enthusiastically received by the reading public. Upon the aggravation of the United States-Japanese problems the author wrote this book dealing with the results of his extensive and thorough study, and it was published two months after the formation of the Three-Power Alliance.

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CHAPTER I

THE GRAVITY OF THE UNITED STATES-JAPANESE CRISIS

I. THE CHINA INCIDENT AND THE UNITED STATES

NOW Japan and the United States are pregnant with crisis in the Pacific! Indeed, the crisis is such that one cannot help but watch it with bated breath.

To entertain a wishful hope that the United States attitude towards Japan will take a favourable turn is tantamount to expecting the sun to rise in the west. As a matter of fact, it has gradually become obvious that it is quite vain to expect a change in the United States attitude. At the time of the outbreak of the China Incident the United States indulged in playing with inconsistent words such as the Open Door and Equal Opportunity, but nowadays, having stopped accusing Japan of being a violator of the treaties, she has devoted herself to wielding her economic power by means of economic sanctions against Japan. This action deserves attention. The progress of the Second European War and the fast-developing situation showing that the odds are clearly against England have put spurs to the establishment of United States Imperialism. Consequently, Pacific problems have been examined by the United States from new angles, and her attitude towards Japan, which used to be unsteady and unsettled, has now become clearer.

In all probability, what concerns the United States is not so much movements on the European continent as the problem of the fate of Eastern and Southern Asia. To speak more concretely, she is interested in establishing a sphere of influence comprising China and the South Seas (including the Dutch East Indies and India). This is allied to England's scheme for self-existence after her defeat in Europe. Thus, the object of the Anglo-American scheme cannot be anything else but Japan herself. It is quite understandable that the wind has become severe.

According to those who advocate United States-Japanese friendship, the relationship between Japan and the United States since the visit of Commodore Perry to Japan has been as close as that between brothers or between relatives. But what was the attitude of Japanese and American statesmen, and that of the nations themselves, before and after 1931, the year the London Treaty was concluded?

What was the attitude maintained by our American brothers towards Japan at the Conference? Did they not point to Japan as America's inevitable enemy, holding that without obtaining a fighting strength superior to Japan's by 16.67 per cent. the United States could not smash Japan? In fact, they argued on that occasion as though a United States-Japanese war would immediately break out. It is really amusing to realize that this sort of argument represents, according to the advocates of United States-Japanese friendship, the friendship of our American brothers.

Then what is the actual situation of United States-Japanese relations to-day? Ostensibly, relations between Japan and the United States may look friendly, but it should be remembered that this seeming friendliness between the two countries is similar to a friendship which has been formed at a coffee-shop or at a social club; it is by no means formed on a solid basis. A sure evidence of this fact is the speech delivered by Rear-Admiral Yarnell, former Commander-in-Chief of the United States Asiatic Fleet, before the members of the United States Second Naval District Association in August 1940, the subject of his speech being the necessity of America's speeding up her national defence in consideration of the prevailing world situation. In the course of the speech Rear-Admiral Yarnell, cleverly quoting the Führer and Mr Yosuke Matsuoka, declared that what had been said by Führer Hitler and Mr Matsuoka was proof positive of the scheme of the totalitarian countries to dominate the world. Referring to Far Eastern problems he expressed strong views, insisting on knocking Japan to pieces by aiding China to the last. Particularly, with regard to the Singapore Naval Base issue, he gave the impression that United States naval authorities were entertaining a hope of reaching an understanding with England for the lease of the Singapore Naval Base, as they have already leased all the British islands in the Caribbean Sea, as well as

Newfoundland. This speech thus aroused keen interest in all quarters. The portion of it which was withheld from the public claims especially close attention, for Rear-Admiral Yarnell hinted that the best way to preserve peace not only in Asia but also throughout the world is to cause Japan always to be engaged in skirmishes with the Soviet Union like the Nomohan Affair, thereby restraining the Soviet Union. The gist of Rear-Admiral Yarnell's anti-Japanese speech (he is now a full-fledged Admiral) is as follows :

The outcome of the European war and the China Incident will immediately determine whether or not the United States will be able to exist in the future as a State. At this time the United States should aid England and China with everything that she has. Nothing should be spared by the United States to overthrow the two great totalitarian countries in the Far East and Western Europe. Otherwise, the world will return to the age of darkness owing to Germany and Japan.

The United States is able to send to England aeroplanes, destroyers, and other war vessels. And it will also be possible for her to abolish the Johnson Act so as to enable her to supply freely foodstuffs and arms and ammunition of which England is in need. If at this time England and the United States combine their fleets, the combined fleet will be able to demolish the Japanese and German fleets and thus restore international relations to normal. But this should be put into execution without loss of time ; otherwise it will be too late.

If Germany defeats England, the United States will inevitably spend most of her income for several years to come for the strengthening of national defence. The lending of the United States destroyers to England is evidence that America's sympathy lies not with Japan but with England, and that her intention is to restrain Japan effectively.

On the other hand, with regard to aid to China it will be possible for the United States to cause the interruption of Japan's acquisition of war materials from other countries, and she must insist upon keeping open the Burma Road to the last, and establish as much

credit for Chungking as possible. Furthermore, America, by acquiring the Singapore Naval Base, will be able to strengthen her Asiatic fleet.

Apparently America's intention seems to be that the United States and England take a positive and joint policy in regard to the Pacific problem by means of their joint aid to China, their joint oppression of Japan, and their joint war operations. Despite the fact that even England herself consented to Japan's demand that she cease giving aid to Chiang Kai-shek and close the Burma Road, the United States at once expressed herself against this measure taken by England, for the reason that it obstructed her commerce. Shortly after this, the United States adopted a licence system on the export of oil and scrap-iron. Not only that, but now isn't she even threatening to go the length of putting a ban on the export of these things? Also the fact that a ban has been put on the export of aeroplane petrol outside the Western Hemisphere is sufficient to show that England and the United States are carrying on joint action in the Far East. It is well known to everybody that this joint action is characteristically demonstrated by the friction between all countries concerned in their conversations regarding measures for dealing with the problem of the garrison at the Shanghai International Concession, following the withdrawal of British soldiers from China.

It is not merely Rear-Admiral Yarnell who saw the importance of the Singapore Naval Base: Mr Roy Howard on his arrival in Singapore after his inspection trip through the Dutch East Indies laid stress on the importance of the Singapore Naval Base to national defence of England and the United States. Admiral Stirling emphasized that Singapore and Hong Kong are indispensable to the complete organization of United States national defence. Thus, the rumour is already beginning to circulate among people in general that Singapore may be leased to the United States. This situation is nothing but the development of the Anglo-United States Far Eastern co-operative policy in connexion with England's aid to China, this being parallel with the great United States armament expansion, which is being steadily carried on.

In the face of this clearly antagonistic attitude on the part of the United States towards Japan, can the pro-Americans still insist that the United States and Japan are in a brotherly relationship? Frankly, towards those pro-American people who represent the upper class of our country I cannot help but entertain deep suspicion, and I even shudder at them.

So long as Japan is aiming at establishing the Far Eastern Co-prosperity Sphere which is indispensable to her existence, she should determine fearlessly and bravely to break through all obstacles which are the result of Anglo-United States joint action; for this purpose she must go forward towards the realization of a great armed force—a great navy as well as a great army.

I frankly declare: America, the democratic country, is Japan's enemy.

2. THE STRUGGLE FOR THE PACIFIC

Indeed, America's uncompromising attitude towards Japan is unbearably tyrannical. Up to the time of the Shanghai and Manchuria incidents, America's attitude had not exceeded a degree of lukewarmness, as is evidenced by Admiral Henry Wiley, then Commander-in-Chief of the United States combined fleet, who insisted: "The United States should decide as to whether it should withdraw from the western part of the Pacific by giving up her commercial rights to Japan or assume an antagonistic attitude towards Japan by making war preparations; she is now confronted with an extremely grave period." But her attitude towards Japan to-day is entirely different from this sort of lukewarmness.

At this time, when in the present European war Germany is reaping an abundant harvest, the United States has carried out her plan to speed up her great armament expansion, and has brought stricter pressure to bear upon Japan. On one hand, since abrogating the United States-Japanese commerce and navigation treaty, the United States has taken steps to strengthen her military provisions not only in the Eastern Pacific but also in the Western Pacific, the sphere of Japan's influence; a powerful squadron of the United States fleet

has been stationed in Hawaii to be on the alert, and arms and ammunition as well as war funds have been sent to Chungking. All this makes one feel as though Japan and the United States were already engaged in warfare in the Western Pacific.

Shall war break out, after all, between Japan and the United States, or not? In discussing this question we should avoid sticking to a foolhardy formalism of argument. Our argument should above all rely upon a sound judgment based on reality and observed results.

The name itself of the Pacific Ocean signifies a permanent state of peace, and more than half of the responsibility for peace in this ocean is imposed upon Japan. Notwithstanding this and also that the Pacific is an immovable and sacred ocean, the United States, ever since the present European war broke out, has been assuming an attitude which seems to imply that the Pacific Ocean is America's. On top of this, the United States has been carrying out in rapid succession all sorts of anti-Japanese measures, placing an embargo on the export of important materials to Japan, executing her great military preparations and armament expansion, the unprecedented scale of which is enough to startle all the powers of the world and even Mars himself. This is really a serious state of affairs.

"That's America's business; not Japan's." So may say our pro-Americans. But the present chief of the United States Naval Strategy Section has clearly declared that all the measures just referred to are nothing but preparations on the part of the United States for a resort to anti-Japanese offensive strategy. As a matter of fact, this statement is a great problem which deserves our prudent deliberation.

The United States for many years has been proclaiming the Monroe Doctrine and insisting on the Open Door; Roosevelt, for instance, even went the length of declaring on oath that he would not resort to war in order to enforce these policies. In spite of this pledge, the United States herself, on the one hand, has tightly closed the door in Central America and in the Caribbean Sea, while on the other, she is advocating opportunism, that is, the Open Door and Equal Opportunity, so far as her interests in China are concerned. In point of fact, she is putting forth strenuous efforts to plant her interests and rights firmly in China, by the constant exercise of strict guard

and surveillance against Japan, the country which has the closest relationship with China and which cannot enjoy even a single day of peace if her close connexion with her is interrupted. If anything is not satisfactory to her, the United States issues statements or submits protests. Indeed, the United States is an arrogant and discourteous country which adopts all kinds of tricks and methods to seize Japan's pure, vested rights and interests for her own use by goading China.

For this reason, Japan and the United States have been confronted with various difficult problems in the past. However, Japan's vested rights and interests in China have not been obtained overnight, as America thinks, by resort to strategies, and Japan's prosperity and ruin as well as her existence will be determined by the ups and downs of her vested rights and interests in China. In other words, it is absolutely impossible for Japan to give up all her rights and interests even if she hurts the feelings of Mr America. Instead, she is determined not to spare any kind of sacrifice, with the object of preserving her vested rights and interests.

The reason the United States is thus attempting to cross Japan is because she does not understand the significance of Japan's insistence upon the establishment of the New Order in the Far East. In other words, the United States is so indifferent to the establishment of the New Order throughout the world that she misunderstands Japan, as though the latter were attempting to trample underfoot the traditional Open Door policy of the United States, as well as her democratic principles.

The truth is that the entire Japanese nation is now standing up to take part in the establishment of the Far Eastern Co-prosperity Sphere under the new system, and this is feared by the United States. It is really as great a miracle as has been seen since the beginning of the history of mankind. Thus, the American type or the English type of colonial policy under the Old Order is on the verge of complete extirpation. The foreign type of colonial policy is represented by a trinity—production, navigation, and colonization; the chief object of colonization is to exploit markets, acquire raw materials, and develop bases of operations. As a result all the raw materials needed at home

are bought for the cheapest price, and the manufactured goods made out of these raw materials are sold for a high price. At the same time, dock business and other camouflaged public undertakings have been started. This kind of policy has directly contributed to the development of the industry necessary for the maintenance of the bases, but it has tended to hinder general industrial development. Consequently, all those regions colonized by England and the United States not only in the Orient but also in the Occident have been completely exploited, thus inevitably reducing the inhabitants to a state of abject poverty.

This is the so-called "Old Order" of the world. And that which has risen in protest to this Old Order is the so-called "New Order" of the world.

Then what is the object of the New Order? It aims at setting up a system for mutual existence of nations in which one is not exploited by others or vice versa.

The entire Oriental race should be combined as one man, and should organize a co-operative body in which an attempt should be made to realize self-sufficiency. And in interracial commercial transactions, if a system of exchange based on barter is adopted, there shall no longer exist such a hateful thing as self-enrichment at the expense of other races. . . . But this is great anguish to America, which is the country of dollar diplomacy under the mask of democracy.

What is the United States, after all? She herself was born out of the New Order. Who are the ancestors of the American people? They are those who could no longer submit blindly to the maladministration of their home government, and thus started to colonize the New World. Within a century and several tens of years after the inception of colonization, industry and navigation on the new American continent had developed so remarkably that the power of the New World threatened to surpass that of the mother country—England.

England immediately brought pressure to bear upon her colony in the New World, and against this the colonial people indignantly rose and fought their mother country, finally winning the war. As a matter of fact, the United States was indebted for her birth to the rivalry between the Old and New Orders of the World. Therefore she should go forward towards the New Order to the last, as she has

a vast territory with abundance of natural resources. It is clearly a contradiction that the United States should stubbornly oppose the establishment of the New Order in the Far East while opposing the maintenance of the Old Order in Europe. If it is true that America is poling in the same stream as England, there is nothing for it but to believe that America's inclination to mind other men's business is hereditary and common.

But it must be remembered that Japan's insistence upon the establishment of the New Order does not imply an attempt to exclude United States development in the Orient. Perhaps the Door in the Orient, viewed in the light of the Old Order, may have already been closed as America says, but the Door in the Orient, especially in China, viewed in the light of the New Order, has opened more widely than ever.

In spite of this, there is every indication that the United States will stick to the bitter end to her position maintained heretofore—the Open Door under the Old Order.

For the purpose of solving this dilemma by means of force, the United States has put into execution her plan for a greater navy, thus reinforcing the so-called Pacific control line connecting Hawaii, Guam, and the Philippines. The fact that this line traverses the Western Pacific claims the keenest attention of Japan, for she will have to maintain sea supremacy in the Western Pacific. In fact, Japan is now confronted with a crisis unprecedented since the beginning of her history.

We have no desire to challenge others to battle. But every hope for a friendly relationship with the United States is already closed. To-day, when friction between Japan and the United States has become more and more acute, and disputes between them have piled one on top of another, the Japanese nation is not psychologically on the alert against the United States, and is unconscious of the nature of United States-Japanese problems; this condition is like exposing the fate of the Empire of Japan to the jaws of a wolf. At this juncture, when United States-Japanese relations are approaching an unprecedented crisis and when the United States continually antagonizes Japan, will it not be inevitable for her to strike back at the challenger?

3. THE SECOND WORLD WAR AND THE UNITED STATES

Under the stimulus of the present European war Japan has begun to feel particularly the necessity of advancing southward ; the Dutch East Indies, French Indo-China, and other South Sea islands have therefore witnessed Japan's vigorous southward movement.

This southward advance on the part of Japan has naturally given rise to a rivalry with the United States which has been assuming more serious proportions day by day. As a matter of fact there is no room for dispute that the United States too is gradually making preparations to concentrate her naval power in the Western Pacific. But it must be remembered that Japan has for long been preparing a navy which has sufficient power to hold Sea Supremacy in the Pacific ; the *raison d'être* of the Japanese Navy is that no country be allowed to lay even a single finger upon Japan's Sea Supremacy. It is, however, much to be regretted that this *raison d'être* of the Japanese Navy is now threatened with extinction.

Therefore, Japan should be fully prepared against the great United States naval construction and armament expansion, so as to maintain her unassailable position.

Furthermore, now that America's aid to England has already encroached upon the sphere of her neutrality, it is quite inevitable that the Japanese nation should have reacted strongly to the lease to the United States of the British naval and air bases in the Western Hemisphere, the lease of the fifty United States destroyers to England, and United States-Canadian joint defence.

Ostensibly, the United States has not yet participated in the present European War, but in reality she is at war by sixty or seventy per cent. Herein lies the dexterity and astuteness of United States diplomacy, does it not ?

Rumours are now in circulation that England and the United States have already concluded a military alliance. If so, it is merely the realization of what has been expected and inevitable in view of the development of relations between the two countries.

It is doubtful whether the alliance between England and the United

States would make its appearance in such a clear form as that of Germany and Italy. Be that as it may, it now becomes clear that in the event either of the two countries—England or the United States—fights Japan, the two countries will have to stand together.

The United States has leased eighteen bases from England. This is a circumstance which should be attentively observed, though it pertains to the Atlantic. This problem should by no means be overlooked, especially by Japan. The islands under British domination, from Newfoundland down to the Caribbean Sea, are ideal bases of operations for the Navy and Air-force. For the United States their existence on the Atlantic has been like an ugly lump on one's head.

In the event Japan is forced to fight England, she should lose no time in resorting to force in order to smash to pieces the air bases on these islands, as well as the bases for submarines and even for the British light cruiser squadron. Even if the United States were engaged in war with any other European country, with England neutral, she has been clearly aware that the islands referred to would prove a considerable obstacle to her Atlantic war operations.

Now England has, of her own accord, consented to lend to the United States all her Atlantic territories in that part of the Western Hemisphere for ninety-nine years to come, and in compensation for this lease the United States has transferred fifty destroyers to England.

The meaning of "ninety-nine years" is not simply a number of years totalling ninety-nine, but according to political vocabulary "ninety-nine years" is interpreted as "permanently." Also, when the price of the leased British territories is compared with that of the fifty United States destroyers, everyone can see clearly that the United States has made a great profit in this deal, for the destroyers transferred to England are old, superannuated ships, in tatters, and were almost out of use. In fact, within half a month after they are put to service, they will surely be at a standstill on the sea owing to constant engine trouble.

Thus the United States has obtained the British territories; and this is her first step towards completion of defensive measures embracing the entire Americas in addition to her realization of the United States-Canadian joint-defence plan. In other words, in the event the United

States, in accordance with her long-cherished desire, completes armament provisions from Newfoundland to the islands located along the Gulf of Mexico and the Caribbean Sea, there will be arrayed against the European continent a powerfully linked fortress position comprising the whole of North and Central America, as well as the northern part of South America.

Then the United States will be able to advance across the Pacific without any worry, and do away with Japan.

In point of fact, the acquisition by the United States of the British territories in the Western Atlantic for ninety-nine years, or for a semi-permanent period, is really a remarkable event from the standpoint of national defence and grand strategy. To speak more definitely, the acquisition of these possessions has had the following results for the United States :

1. The acquisition of Trinidad has rendered the Panama Canal impregnable, thus removing an obstacle to the United States plan for Atlantic and Pacific war operations.
2. At this time when the speed of aeroplanes and their capacity for endurance flight in relation to land and sea power have greatly been increased, the leased British possessions will make a significant contribution to the defence of the United States mainland.
3. As a result of the retreat of British influence from the Western Hemisphere, Canada, which has been economically dependent upon the United States, will hereafter have to increase her military and political dependence upon the United States.
4. If the scope of the lease of the British possessions is extended farther along the Atlantic to South America, the United States will be able to acquire the Falkland Islands and South Georgia Island, thus obtaining, in the first place, security in her commerce and navigation with South America. In the second place, this measure will accelerate communication and cement the connexion between the North and South Americas. Thus Latin America, which has heretofore been economically dependent upon Europe, will be subjected to the control of the United States.

5. By acquiring the following islands—Newfoundland, Labrador [*sic*], Jamaica, Bermuda, Barbados, Trinidad, the Bahamas, the Windward, and the Leeward—the United States has already obtained a sound mortgage for the British war debt, which amounts \$5,650,000,000—especially for that part which will remain unpaid when England is defeated by Germany as a result of the present European war.

As shown above, the net profit made by the United States out of her acquisition of the British possessions is really remarkable, and Japan should be strictly on the alert in view of the effect this will have upon the Pacific.

For the sake of reference let us briefly examine some of the islands leased to the United States :

Newfoundland

This is a big island covering an area of 42,734 square miles ; it is located east of Canada across the Gulf of Saint Lawrence. In 1583 this island was declared by a Briton, Humphrey Gilbert, to be a British possession.

For a time it was transferred to France, and it was not until 1855 that England took complete possession of it, establishing a responsible government ruled over by a Governor-General. The population is about 280,000, and there are prosperous fishery and paper industries.

Bermuda

These islands are located on the Atlantic about halfway between the West Indies and Nova Scotia ; they consist of about 360 islands, with the exception of twenty uninhabited. But it may be noted that these islands have strong harbours and bays, useful as naval bases ; moreover, they are playing an important rôle as the landing-place for the Atlantic Clipper and as bases for the air-force. The population is 28,000 ; the entire area is nineteen square miles.

Bahama Islands

These islands are a group of the West Indies. Discovered by Columbus in 1492, they were transferred to England in 1783, and

England has held them ever since. The islands cover an area of 4404 square miles with a population of 62,000.

Jamaica

This is a large island of the West Indies, covering an area of 4450 square miles, and located eighty miles south-west of Cuba. The climate is mild and the entire island is dense with forests. In agriculture sweet-potato cultivation is prosperous. This island was discovered by Columbus in 1494 and incorporated into the British territories in 1665. Since then it has been under the rule of a British Governor-General. The population is 860,000, of whom 15,000 are whites. Railway facilities and other cultural provisions are perfect, and the political system is based on sound constitutional administration.

Saint Lucia

This is the biggest island among all the Windward Islands ; it covers an area of 233 square miles with a population of 59,000. Coal is produced on this island.

Trinidad

This island is located in the southernmost part of the West Indies, adjoining Venezuela, South America. It covers an area of 1862 square miles. The climate is tropical ; the island is rich in the production of cocoa, coffee, and sugar. Oil, also, is being produced. This island was also discovered by Columbus in 1498, and was transferred to England from Spain in 1802. The population is over 413,000.

Antigua

This island was also discovered by Columbus in 1498, being one of the West Indies ; it covers an area of 108 square miles. The entire island is fertile, with fine harbours, including that of Saint John. On this island is located the government of the Leeward Islands. The population is 31,000.

British Guiana

This is located on the continent of South America, facing the Atlantic on the north, its south boundary adjoining Brazil, its west Venezuela, and its east Dutch Guiana. This is a British colony covering an area of 89,480 square miles. This is the place the name of which is dear to stamp collectors because the world's most valuable stamps were issued here. It is rich in diamonds, gold, and various other mineral resources. In 1928 a constitution was enacted and a colonial government under a Governor-General established. Since then the place has been under British rule [*sic*]. There is a population of 298,000.

Indeed, the acquisition by the United States of these British possessions deserves keen attention. For by this the United States has made an epoch-making advance towards carrying out the Monroe Doctrine, which aims at acquiring hegemony over the American continents. At the same time, it is evidence of her attempt to strengthen her surveillance even over the Pacific. Therefore, the importance of the situation can by no means be minimized.

But for Japan there is nothing to be rejoiced over or worried about, no matter what kind of situation may arise, so long as it affects only the Atlantic. For it is only the Pacific that will determine Japan's life and death.

If, therefore, the Pacific witnesses things like those which have occurred on the Atlantic—that is, if the Star-spangled Banner is raised on the piers of Hong Kong or Singapore—Japan should absolutely not allow it, for the sake of her existence. It is not thought England and the United States, immensely conceited though they are, would dare to indulge in such mischief, playing with fire; and we, the Japanese nation, pray that such a thing will not happen. But the actual fact betrays our hope. For there is ever danger that even the tranquil Pacific will be unexpectedly disturbed by a devil's hands. In fact, it is persistently reported that arrangements have been made by England to lease to the United States her possessions, Canton and Enderbury Islands in the Southern Pacific, for use as United States air-bases.

4. THE UNITED STATES AND CANADA

It is reported that England has made arrangements to lease to the United States the two islands of Canton and Enderbury in the Southern Pacific so that the United States may conquer Japan within fifty years. And the period of the lease is to be extended if occasion demands.

These two islands of Canton and Enderbury are among the Phoenix Islands in the Southern Pacific, their location being north-east of the Fiji Islands. They are under the rule of the Western Pacific High Commissioner, and as air bases they have strategic importance. Insignificant though they are, their existence will prove to be a fearful menace in the Pacific when they are converted into air bases.

This is not all. It is worthy of note, more than anything else, that Cocos Island, off Costa Rica, has been leased to the United States.

That is to say, it is understood that President Guardia of Costa Rica has leased Cocos Island to the United States for the construction of air bases with the object of defending the water regions adjacent to the western part of the Panama Canal. This is not a trivial matter, either. Cocos Island is a volcanic island on the Pacific about three hundred miles west of the Panama Canal, and its military value for the defence of the Panama Canal is as great as that of the Galapagos Islands, Ecuador. In this way the United States is busily engaged in making defensive preparations for all the Pacific islands as well as for all other areas leading to Panama. The question, then, is : Why is the United States carrying out such futile measures to strengthen her defence, after all ? It is only because of her supreme desire for "the conquest of Japan." What else could it be ?

Some time ago the *Seattle Star*, an American paper, in an article entitled "Formidable Japan," spoke to the following effect :

The Sino-Japanese dispute is of great significance for all the countries bordering the Pacific. Senator Louis remarked that the present dispute would result in the concentration of strong power on the other side of the Pacific opposite the United States. In fact, it is not improbable that there would appear a Japanese-Soviet

Alliance or a Sino-Japanese Alliance. At any rate, it is quite certain that any country which emerges victorious from the present conflict will become powerful. That country, that is Japan, will then attempt to swallow the Philippines, Hawaii, and Alaska. But America and Canada are countries of the white race; therefore, the aggressive Orientals should on no account be allowed to set foot, even a single step, on the soil of these continents. In order to make preparations to meet this menace, strict preparedness along the Pacific should be exercised.

As shown above it is obvious that the United States has gone mad in her attitude to the present European war and the China Incident, assuming that a United States-Japanese war is going to break out in the next moment. What a flurried and stupid article it is!

It is not too much to say that a Japanese-Soviet Alliance is not suitable to the position of Japan, and Japan does not even expect such an event. Anything like formation of an alliance between Japan and the Soviet Union, as suggested in the aforementioned article, is a silly and utterly groundless conjecture. Basically, Japan is not in the slightest degree so war-conscious as to desire a United States-Japanese war.

Furthermore, the speculation that the Philippines, Hawaii, and Alaska would be eventually swallowed up by Japan is nothing but a hysterical notion of the United States. It is the duty of the United States to take all measures for the defence of her territories along the Pacific Coast; but if the object of her defence is to prevent the Philippines, Hawaii, and Alaska from being swallowed up, it really does annoy and confound Japan—the assumed enemy of the United States.

Would Japan actually attempt to swallow up Hawaii, the Philippines, and Alaska, as the United States fears?

Any layman is aware that Hawaii is more than thirty-four hundred nautical miles from Japan, and it thus takes ten days to cover the distance between Hawaii and Japan. More than that, Hawaii is a very inconvenient place. If Hawaii welcomes Japanese immigrants and takes care of them, Japan will appreciate it and be content. Japan has not a single intention, even “as little as a needle’s point,” to occupy

Hawaii. Even if Hawaii were given to Japan free of charge it would be merely a burden, though its military importance may be excepted.

On the other hand, Alaska is a barren and arctic region which is not suitable to a race like the Japanese, brought up in warm regions ; great difficulty is being experienced by the Japanese Government in persuading people to emigrate even to Manchukuo, which is considered a far more habitable place than Alaska. This explains why Alaska is not for the Japanese.

The Philippine Islands were once a paradise for the Philippine natives, were they not ? It is America herself that skilfully wrested the islands from Spain as a result of her war with the latter. But Japan, whose present cause is just, has no ambitions whatsoever to occupy the Philippine Islands.

Japan is a country entirely different from the aggressive United States. For her history to date has not even a single page showing that she has encroached upon other countries. For example, Formosa is nothing but a souvenir of Japan's victory in her war with China.

The United States, on the contrary, occupied the Philippines as a result of her war with Spain, and Hawaii fell into her hands as the result of a promise that the islands would be restored to independence. Also the United States threateningly purchased Alaska from Russia.

The United States is such an inhumanitarian country that she becomes extremely nervous when faced with problems pertaining to the Philippines and her other South Sea islands. It is, therefore, quite natural for her to hate Japan, possessor of a powerful navy and army.

If she wants to, Japan will be able to occupy the Dutch East Indies, French Indo-China, and even India with little effort following her acquisition of supremacy in the China Sea in connexion with the China Incident. But Japan is refraining from doing so because of her splendid "Imperial Spirit." It will only be when the United States understands Japan's noble Imperial Spirit that she will admit herself beaten.

President Roosevelt, who is the incarnation of the devil army of democracy, has embittered the dispute and is making every preparation against Japan, aiming at the annexation of Canada. Is it not true that America's armed ghost, the Monroe Doctrine, is in reality taking its

first step towards the defence of the entire Western Hemisphere, including Canada, against all encroachment by Nazism, Fascism, Communism, as well as the communism based upon Japan's Imperial Spirit?

This issue cannot be lightly passed over. For it is obvious that the United States, having united with Canada, will not only devote herself to military defence against invasion by those totalitarian countries, but will also make joint efforts with Canada to protect their respective interests by taking measures against propaganda and Fifth Column activities. But the map clearly shows the results for Japan if she wages war with Canada and the United States, which are on the other side of the Pacific. This fact is understandable even to a three-year-old child.

But General Marshall, Chief of Staff of the United States Army, is sending to Canada several hundred tanks, guns, and aeroplanes. If our pro-Americans are aware of this, they cannot help reflecting upon it three times. As to the war materials Canada has received from the United States, has not Mayor LaGuardia of New York, chairman of the United States-Canadian Joint Defence Committee, given witness to their great quantity?

Further, an agreement between the United States and Australia similar to the United States-Canadian joint defence agreement is now being concluded. This is also claiming great attention, and it may not be amiss to say that Japan is, in reality, faced with an unprecedented crisis.

If the United States takes over all England's islands in the Southern Pacific, the Bismarck Islands under the mandate of Australia, and other territories, it is not thought the Japanese Foreign Office will remain non-committal.

Heretofore, relations between Japan and Australia have been uneventful, but since the Russo-Japanese War, Japanese patriotism and the nation's prowess in war, together with the expansion of her naval power, have caused Australians to fear the Japanese nation. In illustration of this, some Australians are advocating the necessity of shaking hands with the United States, and this is really a regrettable situation. More than that, a loud cry is being raised in Australia for the conclusion of a military alliance between the United States and Australia. It is profoundly deplorable that the Japanese nation has

no conception of the serious situation confronting the country. At the same time it is hoped that Japanese diplomats will be able very speedily to promote friendly relations and understanding between Japan and Australia.

5. THE UNITED STATES COMPULSORY CONSCRIPTION ACT

The Compulsory Conscription Bill having been passed by Congress, the United States is now rushing forward to strengthen her system of national defence, and America's tradition since her foundation has thus been completely reversed.

From the standpoint of America's objective geographic and military position, it is not clear why the United States is in need of such a huge army. For this reason, when the bill was brought forward, opinion was divided for and against, thus giving rise to clamorous discussion for a while.

Who were pulling wires behind the scenes in connexion with the United States conscription bill? The United States has a large enough army, but she still wants the conscription law. It is neither labour organizations nor farmers nor the poor who want it; it is the Wall Street Jewish capitalists and their mouthpiece the *New York Times*. In this connexion it may be noted that the conscription bill originated with Colonel Stimson, Secretary of War, and other capitalists.

As American citizens themselves are extremely anxious to avoid war, they are opposed to the conscription system in peace-time. The American Federation of Labour and the Committee for Industrial Organization particularly have declared themselves violently opposed. Despite the fact that the American people, especially the Pacifists, are rebellious against conscription, the bill finally passed the Senate by a vote of 58 to 31, and was immediately sent to the House of Representatives.

The contents of this conscription law are as follows :

1. All men from twenty-one to thirty years of age, who are American citizens, will be registered, and they will be given training for twelve months.

2. Those who are not entitled to be conscripted, according to the above stipulation, and who are from eighteen to thirty-five years of age, will be able to serve as volunteers for one year.
3. The recruits should not be despatched to any districts except to Europe, Asia, and the Western Hemisphere, as well as United States possessions [*sic*].
4. The Government should be vested with authority freely to control all kinds of civilian manufacturing industries in the interests of national defence.
5. Not more than 900,000 recruits are to be put in active service simultaneously.
6. Those who have dependents, as well as conscientious objectors, will be exempted.

In the eyes of a country like Japan, which is full of the burning spirit of patriotism as well as of the Imperial Spirit, the above-described conscription act is ridiculous, though it is not hard to imagine that the act will accelerate the strengthening of United States military power.

The reason the conscription bill, which was considered political dynamite, was adopted is that this is a desperate struggle on the part of the United States to prevent the fall of democracy. Needless to say, the United States is the last citadel of the democratic countries, and the bacteria of capitalism are prevalent in the United States with fearful force. But it must be remembered that all Americans are not blind worshippers of capitalism.

In the United States there is a strong totalitarian movement. In contrast to the Brown Shirts of Germany and the Black Shirts of Italy, there is an organization whose members wear a uniform of silver colour—really a bluish-grey; this garb makes the blood of even such a uniform-loving country as America turn cold. The organization in question is the Silver Legion, its leader being William Pelley.

This organization is also called the Silver Shirts and its uniform is inscribed with a capital L, signifying Liberation. The full membership of the organization is fifty thousand, with two million sympathizers. William D. Pelley, the leader, is well known as an archæologist and author. His cry is: "The American people should return to the spirit

of the founders of their country and build an America for Americans. Let America be liberated from the devil's hands of the Jews." In fact, he is dauntlessly fighting against the financial, political, and propaganda power of the Jews, who wield the ruling power in America.

It was in 1933 that William Pelley first openly advocated this principle. At that time, the influence of his party was so trivial that the authorities concerned did not pay any special attention to it. But stimulated by the world-wide movement for the establishment of the New Order which has been gaining influence of late years, Americans in all walks of life have begun to pay attention to Pelley's Silver Shirts movement. This movement has become especially popular among young people and the intelligentsia. Such being the case, the Jewish faction has suppressed it in such terroristic fashion that it no longer operates on the surface, though it is still going on as an underground movement. Pelley also, and all of his chief followers, are keeping under cover. At any rate, the fact is that America's New Order is now being seriously studied by the American people, and Pelley's movement has attained no little influence.

More than that, with the Silver Shirts Party as the nucleus, various patriotic organizations are carrying on relations with German- and Italian-American citizens. Thus, the influence of the movement cannot be belittled.

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Among other things, the Silver Shirts made public that Rockefeller and more than sixty other capitalists, as well as President Roosevelt, are Jewish; and they declared that America's S.S.S. policy (Sports, Sex, and Screen) is nothing but a Jewish stratagem, and that the Jews and the Reds are different in name but similar in nature.

With regard to Japan the Party declares that rumours regarding a United States-Japanese war are merely Jewish propaganda, for those citizens who genuinely love America are thinking rather of co-operation

¹ The four lines here deleted contain an objectionable reference to two well-known Americans.

between Japan and the United States, and they have not the slightest intention of fighting Japan. Referring to Japan's action in China, the Party is of the opinion that it deserves great support from America as it will help to prevent the Sovietization of China, and that for this reason Japan is really America's comrade, fighting the Reds on America's first line of defence.

It is thought the daring statement, made by the Party, that anti-Japanese propaganda is nothing more than a Jewish stratagem has created quite a sensation among people in general, particularly at this time, when United States public opinion has stiffened against Japan as a result of the China Incident. Mr Pelley once stayed in Japan, and during his visit he associated with patriotic and pious organizations. It is unusual for a foreigner to have such a deep understanding of Japan.

He remarks : " Japan, the leader of the Orient, and America, the guardian of the American continents, are the builders of the New Order in the world, together with Germany and Italy in Europe. Japan and the United States should never turn against one another. America to-day is not a genuine America at all. She is a hypocritical America dancing to the flute of the Jews. Some day our Silver Shirts will not fail to present Japan, our America's friend, with a fine gift."

Now, is he not a rare phenomenon in such a democratic country as the United States ?

CHAPTER II

THE GREAT UNITED STATES NAVAL EXPANSION

I. THE BLOODTHIRSTY UNITED STATES

AT the time of the outbreak of the Manchukuo Incident the United States was much opposed to Japan's action, and she even thought to restrain Japan by resort to economic sanctions. But lack of naval power forced her to abandon the idea. Goaded by this failure, the United States developed an earnest enthusiasm for naval expansion.

The famous Vinson Bill of 1934 was the first step towards naval expansion taken by the United States. This bill provided for construction of 6 capital ships and 96 auxiliary ships, making a total of 102 ships of 430,000 tons. The passage of this bill was of great significance for the United States Navy. At the same time, the menace to Japan in the Western Pacific has thereby been increased.

The reason for this is that war vessels of all descriptions will be built to the maximum treaty limit and thus finishing touches will be put to overcoming the weakness of the United States fleet. In other words, at the time of the Manchukuo Incident the United States Navy was in possession of 15 capital ships, but on account of lack of the auxiliary ships necessary for a trans-oceanic war operation, these 15 capital ships were about as useful as a street tramp, and their menace to Japan became utterly null, only clamorous and empty noise. As a result of this lesson, the United States determined to correct this weakness as speedily as possible.

However, shortly after the order for naval construction on the basis of this plan was issued, the London Naval Treaty was abrogated, and thus the world again witnessed the appearance of a treatyless age. And England lost no time in announcing a great armament expansion plan to cost £1,500,000,000.

Encouraged by this the United States announced the second Vinson

Bill of 1938, which provided for the expansion of the United States Navy by twenty per cent, as well as for the construction of special-service ships necessary for trans-oceanic operations.

That is to say, it was planned to construct 2 battleships, 2 aircraft carriers, 9 cruisers, 23 destroyers, and 9 submarines, making a total of 45; besides these, 26 special-service ships were to be constructed, the grand total being 71 ships of about 400,000 tons.

Prior to the two afore-mentioned plans, the United States in 1933 had disbursed a sum of \$130,000,000 out of the NRA budget towards her Navy fund, and thus, under the guise of business recovery, work on 32 war vessels of 120,000 tons had been started. In addition to the warships to be built on the basis of the two Vinson bills are the following: 8 capital ships, 5 aircraft carriers, 2 cruisers, 100 destroyers, and 30 special-service ships. Work on most of these warships has already been completed, there being just a few which still remain to be built. But it is expected that work on the remaining ships will be started in 1940, to be completed at the latest in 1942.

On the day of completion of naval-construction work, the United States Navy will have about 1,600,000 tons within the age of a warship, and 2,300,000 tons including those warships which are over-age.

However, not content with this, the third Vinson Bill was submitted in 1940; this bill provided for the construction of 400,000 tons of warships and 6000 standing naval planes at an estimated cost of \$1,300,000,000. This bill will add to the existing United States naval strength by twenty-five per cent. To be more particular, the kinds of warships to be built on the basis of the third Vinson Bill include 3 aircraft carriers, 8 cruisers, 52 destroyers, and 32 submarines, making a total of 95, in addition to 31 auxiliary ships. Work on them will be completed within three years.

Admiral Stark, chief of the United States Naval Strategy Section, gives the following reasons for the construction of a greater Navy:

1. The prevailing world situation makes it necessary to provide for the defence of the mainland of the United States and her outlying possessions.
2. In co-operation with the countries of Central and South America,

the United States should prevent the encroachment of other powers upon the Pacific and the Atlantic.

3. For the maintenance of her international commerce the United States is in need of a greater Navy.
4. The import, without hindrance, of raw materials indispensable to national defence must be guaranteed.
5. A greater Navy is necessary for the maintenance of peace and neutrality.

Of the five items given above, the second and the fifth are comparatively new ones ; as they are aimed at the totalitarian countries. That is to say, against Germany's . . .¹ on the Pacific, these two particular items indicate America's intention of suppressing . . . of the two . . . and . . . countries, by means of uniting both American continents, and building a greater Navy. With regard to the fifth item Admiral Stark adds : " The world situation will force the United States to become the guardian of world peace."

But it may be noted that the third Vinson Bill, aiming at such an enormous naval expansion, startled the world like a tocsin. For the United States, on the basis of this bill, aimed at having a Navy of about 2,000,000 tons.

If work on the warships provided for in this bill is completed by 1945, the United States will have a Navy superior to that of any other country. The United States Navy will be equipped with decisive offensive power, and there is therefore no room to doubt that it will be able to carry out a trans-oceanic operation—specifically, a strategy of encirclement in the waters near Japan, as well as in the South Seas.

It is doubtful, however, whether the United States has at present the shipbuilding capacity to meet the afore-mentioned plan, although there is no doubt that she will put it into execution at any cost, in view of the huge shipyards in the United States. With this purpose in mind, Mr Edison, Secretary of the Navy, issued an order conscripting civilian shipbuilding tools, thus paving the way for expanding naval power within a short period by increasing civilian shipbuilding capacity.

¹ The gaps in this sentence and in any that follow correspond exactly to gaps found in the Japanese text.

2. WAR VESSELS UNDER CONSTRUCTION

Upon completion of the great naval construction programme, the United States Navy will have a grand total of about 2,100,000 tons. Compared with the navies of other powers, it will be about three times the size of the French Navy, about three times that of the Italian Navy, about four times as large as the German Navy, and x times the Japanese Navy.

It may be noted the afore-mentioned grand total does not include the following war vessels which are over-age : 8 battleships, 6 cruisers, 120 destroyers, and 33 submarines. These superannuated war vessels will nevertheless render a considerable service in case of emergency, and if these ships are added to the United States Navy, its grand total of tonnage will show a remarkable increase.

In June 1939 orders were issued to Government and civilian ship-yards for construction of 2 capital ships of 45,000 tons each, 8 destroyers of 1630 tons each, 6 submarines of 1475 tons each, 1 submarine of 700 tons, 4 B-type cruisers of 6000 tons each, 1 aircraft carrier (*Hornet*) of 20,000 tons, 2 seaplane carriers of 1650 tons each, and 6 sets of engines for the use of submarines. Particulars regarding the ships under construction are as follows :

TYPE OF SHIP	NAME OF SHIP	DATE ON WHICH KEEL WAS LAID DOWN	DATE OF LAUNCHING	TIME NEEDED FOR CONSTRUCTION
Battleships	<i>North Carolina</i>	Oct. 1937	April 1939	4 yrs. 1 mo.
	<i>Washington</i>	July 1938		4 yrs. 4 mos.
	<i>South Dakota</i>			4 yrs. 4 mos.
	<i>Indiana</i>			4 yrs. 4 mos.
	<i>Massachusetts</i>			4 yrs. 7 mos.
	<i>Alabama</i>			4 yrs. 4 mos.
Aircraft Carriers	<i>Wasp</i>	April 1936	April 1939	3 yrs. 2 mos.
	<i>Hornet</i>			
Light Cruisers	<i>St Louis</i>	Dec. 1936	April 1938 August 1938	3 yrs. 4 mos.
	<i>Helena</i>	Dec. 1936		3 yrs. 5 mos.
	<i>Atlanta</i>			
	<i>Juneau</i>			
	<i>San Diego</i>			
	<i>San Juan</i>			

In addition to the above, the following ships are also under construction : 35 destroyers (of which 12 have already been launched), 12 submarines (of which 2 have already been launched), 2 destroyer depot ships, 2 mine-sweepers, 1 aircraft carrier, 2 trawlers for the use of the fleet, and 4 seaplane carriers.

The estimates for construction of the afore-mentioned ships are as follows :

KIND OF SHIP	AMOUNT (UNIT \$10,000)
Capital ships (35,000 tons).	7085
6-inch-gun cruisers . . .	2230
Aircraft carriers . . .	3160
Destroyers	850
Submarines	650

It may be noted that the construction of a capital ship of the 45,000-ton class costs \$100,000,000. The United States Navy is not yet satisfied with construction of the 45,000-ton class, as it is rumoured that a plan is now under way to increase the tonnage of capital ships to 50,000 tons or even to 80,000 tons. It is also expected capital ships of the 65,000-ton class will appear.

This great United States plan is an unprecedented event in the history of naval construction. Consequently it has greatly alarmed the Japanese nation, both officials and civilians, and has elicited a great reverberation from them.

At a meeting of the naval committee of the House of Representatives, Admiral Stark, Chief of the United States Naval Strategy Section, claimed attention by making public the fact that battleships of the 20,000-ton class and aircraft carriers of from 23,000 to 24,000 tons were under construction.

He also remarked that he would request the Congress to vest him with authority to construct cruisers of the 10,000-ton class. Actually, the United States Navy has no authority to construct auxiliary ships beyond the treaty quantity of 10,000 tons ; therefore, construction of any cruisers of more than 10,000 tons must be approved by Congress.

This procedure is a source of great inconvenience to the United States Navy. And this is why Admiral Stark set forth his intention of submitting a bill to Congress stipulating that the Navy be vested with authority freely to construct warships of any size it wants.

The light cruisers of the 10,000-ton class have heretofore been mounted with 8-inch guns, thus being unable to compete with Germany's pocket battleships mounted with 11-inch guns. In view of this, it is now planned by the United States Navy to mount 14-inch guns on a cruiser with fewer guns than on a battleship but with a capacity for developing a speed faster than that of the German pocket battleship, and with excellent defence characteristics.

It is planned to construct such cruisers to a grand total of 192,000 tons.

In case of emergency, cruisers of this quality and power will run round the Pacific, as well as the Atlantic, vertically and horizontally, demonstrating a capacity far superior to the German pocket battleships as well as to British cruisers.

On the whole, the United States Navy is maintaining the principle of big battleships and big guns. The present United States naval construction plan has, for the first time, revealed a policy of constructing new warships with one ultimate object of their being capable of a trans-oceanic operation; this in view of the world situation which will accompany the end of the present European war.

On September 9, 1940, President Roosevelt signed a bill for enormous additional expenditures for new defence material amounting to \$5,251,486,392 (approximately 22,500,000,000 yen in Japanese money). The main object of the bill is to arm 2,000,000 soldiers and to build the Pacific and Atlantic Fleets. This measure also startled the world.

As result of these additional estimates the United States has been able to go forward towards the realization of the following large-scale national defence plan :

1. The total number of 1,200,000 soldiers, including those newly recruited as a result of enforcement of the Compulsory Conscription Act, should be completely armed.

2. Besides these 1,200,000 soldiers, arms should be supplied for an additional 800,000 men, to be recruited as a result of enforcement of the Compulsory Conscription Act.
3. The following aeroplanes should be constructed: 14,394 Army 'planes and 4028 seaplanes, so that the Army will maintain in future 25,000 'planes, and the Navy 10,000 seaplanes, making a grand total of 35,000.
4. Work can immediately be started on most of the 200 new warships on the basis of the plan to build the Pacific and Atlantic Fleets, which will increase United States naval power by 70 per cent.
5. For the Government and civilian factories which are devoting themselves to military production, new plans and facilities should be supplied.

Within two hours after the signing by President Roosevelt of these additional estimates, the United States Navy Department signed a contract for construction of 7 battleships, 8 aircraft carriers, 27 cruisers, 115 destroyers, 43 submarines, and 1 repairing ship, making a grand total of 201.

In this connexion, arrangements have been made to have 3 battleships constructed at Philadelphia, 2 at Norfolk, and 2 at New York; all of them will be built at naval dockyards in these three cities. With regard to the sizes of these ships, the United States Navy is absolutely non-committal, although the *New York Times* reports that they are from 45,000 tons to 55,000 tons and the Associated Press reports 45,000 tons.

The aircraft carriers are of 25,000 tons each, and the total tonnage of cruisers is 420,000 tons, of which the largest ones are said to be from 15,000 tons to 20,000 tons. It is said, further, that the total tonnage of destroyers is 250,000, each destroyer with an average of 2100, and that of submarines 70,000, each submarine with more than 1500 on an average.

This means that on the day of completion of the so-called two-ocean Navy, five or seven years from now, the total fighting strength of the United States Navy will exceed 3,000,000 tons. Particulars are as follows:

1. *Battleships* : 32 (at present there are 15 battleships ; 17 others are now under construction, or contracts for construction have been made).
2. *Aircraft carriers* : 18 (at present there are 6 ; 12 others are now under construction, or contracts for construction have been made).
3. *Cruisers* : 85 (at present there are 37 ; 48 others are now under construction or contracts for construction have been made).
4. *Destroyers* : 368 (at present there are 197 ; 171 others are now under construction or contracts for construction have been made).
5. *Submarines* : 185 (at present there are 103 ; 82 others are now under construction or contracts for construction have been made).

Grand total : 688 (at present there are 358 ; 330 are now under construction or contracts for construction have been made).

In addition to these, a contract for the expansion of all naval provisions as well as for construction of about 2400 naval 'planes will be let before long. Thus the United States will have an Army and Navy the scale of which is really beyond imagination.

It is not too much to say that Japan's holy work for the construction of the Far Eastern Co-prosperity Sphere will not recoil in the slightest degree before America's menace and bluff, based on her maniac great naval construction plan, but the Japanese nation should be warned, and watch closely and carefully the progress of America's naval expansion.

CHAPTER III

THE HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES-JAPANESE CONFLICT

I. THE FIRST VOICE OF THE ANTI-JAPANESE PROBLEM

THE conflict between Japan and the United States is a very deep-rooted one ; details about it are almost endless. Because of lack of space, I will not mention the conflict prior to the Meiji Restoration ; I will here take up briefly only the problems arising between the two countries after the Meiji Era.

First of all, the year 1898 (thirty-first year of the Meiji Era) should be remembered. For it was in this year that the United States satiated her ambition by swallowing up Hawaii. Following this she fought Spain, thereupon occupying the Philippines and Guam ; this year marked the most brilliant epoch in the history of America's aggression. It was at this time that President McKinley's protective-tariff policy hit its peak, for a period of industrial prosperity had set in in the United States. It is also in this age that, attracted by the "murderous" business prosperity, immigrants flooded the United States not only from Europe but from the Far East as well.

But the Chinese had already been denied entry to the United States by the Chinese Immigrant Exclusion Act of 1882 (the fifteenth year of the Meiji Era). Thus the only immigrants to the United States from the Far East were the Japanese. In 1897 (the thirtieth year of the Meiji Era) there were 1500 Japanese immigrants to the United States, more than 2000 the following year, and 3400 in 1899. It was in 1900 (the thirty-third year of the Meiji Era) that the number of immigrants from Japan to the United States exceeded 12,600. In addition to this, from 10,000 to 20,000 Japanese a year came from Hawaii to the United States mainland.

The Japanese immigrants discovered places for settlement along the Pacific Coast, and it is quite natural that they should have

concentrated in the central and southern parts of California, which are blessed with an ideal climate.

Now, the Japanese immigrants at that time had many characteristics which introduced problems among the American people, from the standpoint of America's customs, language, and religion. To make a long story short, the main criticism against the Japanese was that they were not easily assimilated, and that the Japanese outlook was not identical with the American. Americans at that time attached great importance to this situation.

Consequently, the Japanese themselves gathered together, forming small groups, the so-called "Japanese streets" located in cities, towns, and hamlets throughout California.

The Japanese immigrants representing the first era of immigration were admitted by America without any particular reluctance ; but when the number of immigrants to the United States reached 5000 to 10,000 every year it gave rise, naturally, to confusion among the immigrants, and their leaders had their hands too full of business to handle the new-comers satisfactorily. Accordingly among the Japanese immigrants there were elements who set at naught the opinions and warnings of their leaders, and there were some who attempted to make illegal profits out of the new-comers.

This state of affairs gave Americans in general the impression that there appeared here and there a disharmonious community whose existence was detrimental to their community life. It is a fact that the Japanese were criticized by Americans for their failure to adopt America's manners and customs ; this criticism was not concerned with the high or low standard of moral sense among the Japanese, but with the impression that the Japanese, as a so-called civilized people, were lacking in polish.

In California there were numerous foreign immigrants, including Germans and Irish ; the Irish headed the list. Therefore, in religion Catholicism was far more prosperous than Protestantism, and in San Francisco eighty per cent of the citizens were Catholic believers. As the numbers of the Japanese immigrants in California were increasing year after year, the other foreigners, like those just referred to, began to complain. At that time the Mayor of San Francisco was an Irish-

man named Phelan who greatly hated the Japanese. At a mass meeting of the Pacific Coast Labour Guild which was held in 1889 in San Francisco, a resolution for the exclusion of Japanese immigrants was passed, on which occasion Mayor Phelan in the course of his speech spoke to the following effect :

The Japanese immigrants are a race of the lowest class, a mimicking people, like monkeys. If they are taught something, they will imitate our civilization until they become our rivals in the future. But they have no civilization which will contribute anything to us. Instead they mingle with our lowest society and spread their evil Oriental customs. It is much to be regretted that there are many Americans who help Japanese students to attend our schools and learn our civilization. Therefore, the relationship between Japan and the United States should be confined only to the exchange of goods, and measures should be taken to prohibit Japanese contact with our country, except in the case of diplomats, merchants, and travellers.

This was the first voice of the systematic anti-Japanese movement. On the initiative of Mayor Phelan a mass meeting for the exclusion of the Japanese was held in 1900 at San Francisco, and the following year the Governor of California, in his message to the State Assembly, advised the exclusion of the Japanese. But up to the outbreak of the Russo-Japanese War the movement, and also public opinion in California on the subject of Japan, were by no means malevolent.

When Japan stood up to Russia, which slaughtered seventeen thousand Jewish people at Kiev, Ukraine, and also trampled underfoot the Open Door in China, the entire United States spared no pains in backing her. As soon as the opening of war between Japan and Russia was reported, the sympathy of Americans with Japan was such that three newspapers in San Francisco went to the length of even publishing articles praying for Japan's victory.

When Japan scored her victories over Russia, one after another on land and sea until the war resulted in the complete annihilation of the Russian Baltic Fleet on the Sea of Japan, the Americans realized that Japan should not be belittled, and their attitude towards her became more cautious.

It may be said that the sudden change in United States public opinion on Japan is mainly attributable to the result of the Russo-Japanese War. As a matter of fact, the *San Francisco Chronicle*, which had been friendly towards Japan up to the Russo-Japanese War, suddenly turned anti-Japanese.

John B. Young, the editor of the paper, declared in his articles that the Japanese should be excluded to the bitter end, as they would some day stand in a position to compete with the United States for supremacy in the Pacific. At the same time other anti-Japanese newspapers also wrote to the effect that now that Japan had smashed Russia to pieces, she would drive all the white people out of Asia ; that she would occupy the Philippines and Hawaii ; that as her ultimate goal she would occupy the North and South American continents and Australia ; and that all the Japanese immigrants being Japanese soldiers, Japan would employ these camouflaged immigrants in case of an emergency to occupy California. By means of this kind of demagogy, the Americans instigated ill-feeling towards the Japanese.

Since then this anti-Japanese feeling has acted on the strained nerves of the American people in general.

As soon as the lid of the anti-Japanese problem was lifted, regrettable affairs happened one after another.

A notable example is that at the time of the great San Francisco earthquake in April 1906, various wild rumours were spread ; and the Educational Bureau of the San Francisco Municipality, on October 11 of the same year, issued an order that the Japanese, Korean, and Chinese pupils be given lessons segregated from the white children.

2. JAPAN'S INDIGNATION

This so-called isolation school was originally established for Chinese children. Its building being located in Chinatown near the centre of the area gutted by earthquake and fire in San Francisco, the miserable sights in its vicinity were indeed beyond description. On account of the disorder of the city, gangs of desperadoes ran amuck, annoying the passers-by day and night. As a result, it was quite impossible

for the Japanese children who were living in far distant districts to attend the school.

The Japanese Government, resenting this discriminatory treatment of the Japanese, and considering it a violation on the part of the United States of the United States-Japanese Treaty, caused the Japanese Consul in San Francisco to protest to the United States Government. "Isolation of the Japanese schoolchildren from the white children is racial discrimination, as well as a great insult to the aspirations of the Japanese nation." And the Japanese demanded the attention of the United States Government to this matter. To this the United States Government answered somewhat as follows :

The matter in question is entirely a local issue which appeared as an abnormal phenomenon accompanying the earthquake and fire ; therefore, the United States Government will take proper measures to investigate the matter as speedily as possible, so that the Japanese subjects may enjoy all rights based on the treaty.

Subsequently the United States Government ordered the San Francisco municipal authorities to nullify the illegal measures against the Japanese. To this order, however, the San Francisco municipal authorities replied to the effect that :

So long as the San Francisco educational authorities act within the scope of law regarding the city educational administration, no authorities, no matter who they are, have the authority to interfere with the city educational administration. The only way to solve this problem is to appeal to law.

The Japanese Government, having realized that every hope of negotiation with the California authorities had been sealed in this matter, turned to the United States Government for negotiation.

Originally, the child problem was not limited only to the educational issue, for its main aim was the exclusion of all Japanese subjects. In fact, the child problem was nothing but an excuse for the anti-Japanese movement.

In view of this the Japanese Government through its Ambassador

Aoki in Washington, D.C., submitted a formal protest to the Washington Government against the general anti-Japanese movement and the child problem. On this occasion President Roosevelt replied that after investigating the circumstances he would put forth sufficient efforts to solve the issue. At the same time Mr Metcalf, then the Secretary of Commerce, was sent west to investigate the affair in San Francisco. As a result of his investigation, the Secretary of Commerce made a report favourable to the Japanese side.

At that time there were only ninety-three Japanese children, and their existence could hardly cause any problem involving discriminatory treatment. As a matter of fact, President Roosevelt went so far as to declare: "Not only for the development of the Pacific Coast but also for humanitarianism and civilization, the Japanese should be justly treated, and for the protection of Japanese lives and property, no pains would be spared, even in resorting to force, if any occasion demanded it."

Thus Japanese public opinion, which had been excited and angry, was calmed down; but the indignation of Americans, on the contrary, reached its zenith, as is shown by the fact that even the Congressmen elected in all parts of the Pacific Coast to represent the common interests of the people participated in the attack against the Washington Government, and the anti-Japanese movement only assumed more serious proportions.

In January 1907 (the fortieth year of the Meiji Era) the Japanese Labourer Exclusion Act was submitted to the Senate. At the same time, Mayor Schmidt of San Francisco, interviewing the President in February of the same year, petitioned him regarding the reasons for the inevitable exclusion of the Japanese. The reasons were: The Japanese labourers did not assimilate with American civilization, and they deprived the white labourers of their jobs because of their cheap labour wage.

In this connexion it may be noted that Mayor Schmidt admitted that the Japanese child problem was a branch issue, declaring that he would not mind admission of the Japanese children to the American public schools, provided that Japanese immigration to the United States be prohibited thereafter. Thus the child problem suddenly

disclosed its natural shape as nothing but the excuse for the Japanese Exclusion Act.

Roosevelt himself was finally induced to lend his ears to anti-Japanism, for he submitted to Congress an anti-Japanese immigration bill as compensation for admission of the Japanese children by the California schools, and this was passed by Congress in February of the same year.

The Japanese Government declared itself against the bill for the reason that its national dignity was injured by the limitation of Japanese immigrants in the United States-Japanese commercial treaty. However, the Japanese Government had no alternative but to drop the matter. Shortly after this, Japan was again confronted with two other great schemes for the exclusion of the Japanese; the first was the United States-Japanese Gentleman's Agreement, and the second the California Land Possession Prohibition Bill, both of which were submitted to the State Legislative Assembly.

The United States-Japanese Gentleman's Agreement was merely a note providing that the Japanese Government hereafter prohibit labourers from crossing to the United States, though former residents recrossing to the United States as well as their families were exceptions to the rule. But the actual fact is that by this measure Japanese immigrants were dealt a heavy blow. To illustrate: in 1907, 30,200 Japanese immigrants came to the United States, but 1908 witnessed an immigration of only 5000; there were only 3000 in 1909, and 2000 in 1910.

This United States-Japanese Gentleman's Agreement was valid for seventeen years; it lasted until 1924 (the thirteenth year of the Taisho Era) when the Japanese Exclusion Act was enacted.

On the other hand, the bill denying the right of land possession to Japanese subjects in California was passed by both the State House of Representatives and the State Senate of California by a majority vote in 1907 (the fortieth year of the Meiji Era). After this the law was repealed and re-enacted a few times, but was adopted in its final form by the California State Legislature in 1913 (the second year of the Taisho Era).

With the proclamation of this anti-Japanese Land Law, all Japanese

farmers in California were deprived of the right to possess land. On top of this, the right of the Japanese to lease land was limited to a term of three years.

Of course, this law included a special clause permitting Japanese subjects to carry on agriculture under the name of individuals of the Japanese second generation who had American citizenship. But in 1920 the anti-Japanese clique resorted to direct legislation against Japanese subjects, and thus succeeded in depriving the Japanese of the right to lease land, strictly prohibiting them from running agriculture on behalf of their children, and, at the same time, enacting a law depriving Japanese corporations of the right to possess land. Consequently more than seventy thousand Japanese subjects in California fell into extremely straitened circumstances.

Nor is this all. In April 1924, the United States House of Representatives passed an anti-Japanese immigration law by a majority vote of 322 to 71; this act included a clause prohibiting the entry of immigrants who were not qualified to become American citizens. At the same time, the United States Senate declared itself against the United States-Japanese Gentleman's Agreement by a vote of 76 to 2, and also passed a Japanese immigration law by a vote of 71 to 4.

Following this, President Coolidge attempted to put into force a clause providing for postponing the enforcement of the Japanese Exclusion Act for one year, but to no purpose. Finally he sanctioned the law on May 26 of the same year, and the law took effect on July 1 and has been in force to date.

What results has the passage of this law had for United States-Japanese relations? What effect has its passage had upon Japan? It goes without saying that the indignation of the Japanese public reached its zenith, for nineteen newspapers in the Kanto and Kansai districts of Japan published a joint statement that such a tyrannical action on the part of the United States was a great insult to the national honour of Japan, as well as a great blow to her national dignity.

An extraordinary session of the Japanese Diet was held on July 1 of the same year. At the outset of the session, both in the Senate and in the House of Representatives, a resolution against the United States Japanese Exclusion Act was adopted. In all parts of the country mass

meetings were held. "Don't forget July 1!" Propaganda handbills inscribed with this slogan were distributed in all cities throughout the country.

Some Japanese, greatly resenting the action of the United States, committed hara-kiri in front of the United States Embassy in Tokyo, and others pulled down the American flag from the United States Embassy building.

It cannot be denied that this outburst of Japan's indignation had many echoes in America, but the Japanese demonstrations proved to be nothing but the shooting of an empty shell. For the Japanese Exclusion Act remained unchanged and unamended.

3. CRISIS IN UNITED STATES-JAPANESE DIPLOMACY

The immigration and anti-Japanese problems just referred to were nothing more than a local labour issue in the Western section of the United States at that time.

But it is to be noted that this issue, local as it was, developed into a diplomatic crisis between Japan and the United States, for the clash between Japan's management of Manchuria and America's Oriental policy caused the anti-Japanese issue to spread throughout the country.

In the meantime, all sorts of wild rumours were in circulation that, Japan being an aggressive country, the Japanese Army, on withdrawing from Manchuria at the conclusion of the Russo-Japanese War, would invade the mainland of the United States, or capture the Philippines, and so forth. This kind of wild anti-Japanese propaganda, inspiring fear of Japan, created quite a sensation among Americans, who were comparatively ignorant of the Orient.

This was nothing but a state of mind. But from the standpoint of the genuine interest of Japan, the promotion of United States trade with the Orient, United States financial investments and other undertakings in China, and the advance of United States political influence all ran counter to the principles of Open Door and Equal Opportunity in China. More than that, United States policy thus followed a path leading to an inevitable rivalry and collision with Japan's development and her policy towards China. It was, therefore, quite natural that the

United States, by pursuing such a policy, caused the Japanese to entertain apprehension and hatred towards her.

Again, Japan's participation in the Russo-Japanese War was motivated by her desire to preserve the Chinese territories for China ; China was, in reality, indebted to the results of that war for her escape from the pressure of the Western powers. Notwithstanding this, the Chinese, instead of appreciating this fact, criticized Japan for her ambition, and put forth efforts to follow a pro-American policy, thereby pushing Japan into a disadvantageous position.

To make matters worse, foreigners in the Orient conducted an anti-Japanese propaganda campaign in their letters home, aggravating the ill-feeling of Americans, ignorant of the actual situation in the Far East, towards Japan.

In the meantime, some in Japan cried : " Punish America ! " But war is a national undertaking. In any case, the Japanese people are absolutely not like those who wage wars of imperialism. Looking back upon the Russo-Japanese and Sino-Japanese Wars, it is obvious that the Japanese people are a race which never unsheathes the sword unless the point of a dagger is poised at its neck. The only illustration that can be given of her fighting without this threatening dagger is the German-Japanese War, in which Japan fought to fulfil her solemn pledge in the Anglo-Japanese Alliance.

On account of the anti-Japanese problem, the national honour of Japan utterly collapsed, and this national disgrace aroused great resentment among Japanese people ; but this sort of thing will never move the Japanese to draw their swords. To be sure, Japan will never fight with any other Power unless it is over the China issue, or the South Sea issue, or the Pacific issue, or the northern Kurile Island issue, or the Manchukuan issue. In the event any other country invades any of the afore-mentioned areas and thus abridges Japan's vested rights and interests, there is no doubt that Japan will not hesitate a moment to fight, no matter whether the number of invading nations be one or two.

China is a country where any aggressor can gain his ends. For Japan, China is a life-line—upon which her life actually hangs.

Let us examine and disclose America's great ambitions in Asia.

It should be remembered that America's schemes towards the Orient

originated with William Seward, the foremost American diplomat of 1852. He expressed his views somewhat as follows :

The Americans are climbing to a higher stage ; that is, they are at the point of increasing wealth and speedy territorial expansion. Turn your eyes towards the Pacific, and you will see all the islands of Hawaii and the areas of the China coasts acknowledging the great influence of America's growing power. But in every place where America's influence is felt, hopes for the blessing of America's protection are also held.

Commerce brings America closer to the Asiatic continent. The new situation which thus arises will bring about great changes in America's position ; that is, America is now confronted with a situation requiring her to possess a connecting point between herself and the Asiatic continent ; that is, a colony. There is no doubt that the Pacific, all the shores of the Pacific, and all the Pacific islands will become a main theatre for this particular purpose.

What a surprising thing it is that such a programme was already in existence as far back as 1852 ! The splendid insight of that man Seward is really astounding.

On July 8, 1853, the year after Seward had predicted the future of the Pacific, Japan had a strange visitor. It was none other than Commodore Perry, who arrived at Tsuruga, Japan, aboard a black ship, with a demand that Japan open commerce and trade with the United States.

It is said Perry came to Japan under the pretext of opening commerce and trade, but the truth is that the ultimate object of his visit was to establish, at any cost, a link in America's bases of operation—that is, a communication line, necessary for her commerce with China.

The places on which Perry kept his eyes as stopping-places on the trade route, and which he desired to occupy, were : Bonin and Riukiu in Japan, Formosa, Siam, Cape Cambodia, Cochin-China, Sumatra, and a portion of Borneo. Among other things, the fact that Perry especially kept his eyes upon the islands of Riukiu is clearly evidenced by the records of Perry's expedition and the Riukiu documents. In fact, Perry went so far as to occupy the islands of Bonin formally by landing marines. What would have become of the life of the Japanese

nation to-day had the islands of Bonin and Riukiu been still in the hands of the United States? Even contemplation of this makes us shudder.

It is a gross mistake for anyone to think that the United States is a country of justice and humanity, a peace-loving country, or a country without any territorial ambition. To-day, even among the Chinese, there is no one who has a very high opinion of the United States. It should be recalled that the United States, since her independence, has waged war upon foreign countries on four different occasions. Besides this she has experienced the greatest civil war in history; and her territory has undergone an expansion to five times its area at the time of her foundation.

America's insatiable territorial expansion in the Pacific started with the purchase of the Aleutian Islands and Alaska from Russia for only \$7,200,000 in 1867, the man who made this bargain being Secretary of State Seward.

Seward had his eyes upon the wealth of these regions, but more than anything else, he was prompted to purchase them in anticipation of Pacific problems such as those which are at present hanging fire; for Alaska and the Aleutian Islands embrace the Northern Pacific. That is to say, his ultimate ambition was to complete the acquisition of United States naval bases of operation in the Northern Pacific as well as to build communication networks through these regions.

At present, there are three important harbours—Sitka in the southernmost part of Alaska, and Dutch Harbour and Kyska in the Aleutian Islands—which have been established for the purpose of completing the United States communications network in the Pacific by means of wireless telegraph. The distance between Kyska, the westernmost part of the Aleutian Islands, and Paramushir Island of the Kurile Islands is only 850 nautical miles. Many people are inclined to the opinion that in the event of the outbreak of a United States-Japanese war, Japan will occupy the Philippines or fight in the vicinity of Hawaii; but we should also take into consideration that if the Japanese Fleet advances southward, somebody will do mischief against Hokkaido and Ooshu, with Kyska as the starting-point.

To return to our subject, after occupying Hawaii the United States waged a war with Spain and thereby occupied Cuba and the Philippines.

Guam Island, of the Marianne Islands, later fell into the hands of the United States. The United States also resorted to force in order to fulfil her ambition of wresting Texas, California, and New Mexico from Mexico. Later on, on the pretext that she did not want any more land but wanted wealth, she carried out her scheme for the expansion of trade with China as the theatre of her manœuvres.

At that time it so happened that a serious incident broke out in China.

The Sino-Japanese War of 1894 pitifully disclosed the real impotence of the Great Old Country—China—which had held the Occident in awe for a long period as the Lion of the Orient. Consequently, as soon as they realized the weakness of China, all the European countries lost no time in planning invasions of China; they were, then, busily engaged in seizing Chinese territories one after another while the United States was still absorbed in her dream of the Philippines.

4. SOUTH MANCHURIA-BOUND AMERICA

To speak more concretely, in 1897 Germany, using as a pretext the murder of two German missionaries at a small village in Tseh-chow, Shantung Province, dispatched her fleet to Kiaochow Bay, and this resulted in the German-Chinese Treaty for the lease of Kiaochow Bay on March 6 of the next year. At the same time, Russia, which in conspiracy with Germany and France had succeeded in forcing Japan to return the Liaotung Peninsula to China, advanced southward to Dairen, or Port Arthur, by means of the North-eastern Railway; she thereupon obtained from China the lease of the lower part of Liaotung Peninsula for twenty-five years, following which England succeeded in leasing Weihaiwei and the Kowloon Peninsula opposite to Hong Kong.

France, too, a good mimic, leased Kiaochow Bay by lending an enormous amount of money to the Chinese Government with the Chinese customs revenue as security, and other countries obtained the rights to lay railways, work mines, and cut the forests. In this way the Western powers built up their political and economic stakes in China. About this time Italy attempted to lease Sanchow Bay in Chekiang Province, but in vain, for her negotiations with China resulted in failure.

Nor is this all. In 1897 France forced China to pledge herself neither to transfer nor to partition Hainan Island to any other country, while England obtained in 1898 an assurance from China that concessions in the areas adjacent to the Yangtze River would not be made to any other country.

France then concluded an agreement with China stipulating that the provinces of Kwangtung, Kwangsi, and Yunnan, adjoining Tongking, should never be transferred to any other country, and an identical agreement was also concluded between Germany and China regarding Shantung Province, and another between Russia and China regarding Manchuria and Mongolia.

Then, what was the actual nature of America's policy of the Open Door and Equal Opportunity? It was nothing but her convenient scheme to squeeze into China under the prevailing situation at that particular time.

The person who drafted the declaration of the Open Door and Equal Opportunity was Secretary of State John Hay, and it was recorded by one Rockhill of the United States Legation in Peking. The Open Door was merely the cry of an absurd opportunism.

At this time, when the United States was thus manœuvring to squeeze into China, the Boxer Rebellion, that is, the North-eastern Affair, broke out in North China. On July 3, 1900, an allied army, consisting of Japanese, British, American, German, French, and Italian forces, was concentrated in Tientsin to suppress the Rebellion. On this occasion the United States Government, fearing lest any heedless act in the affair should cause partition of China, brandished over her head three principles—preservation of Chinese territorial integrity, the Open Door, and Equal Opportunity; and she issued a notification to all countries concerned to that effect.

This notification was of significance in the sense that it played a part in holding in check the movement by the powers for a monopoly of rights and interests in China; for the United States not only insisted on enforcing the Open Door in China, but also that all other powers should allow commercial freedom even within the sphere of their influence.

Is it not quite understandable and natural for the United States to

have insisted on the Open Door in China in view of the fact that she was at that time outside the privileged group which participated in the partition of China?

Following this, the United States, throwing in her lot with the other powers, embarked on a programme of making financial investments and acquiring rights and interests in China, thus swallowing sweet juice to her heart's content; this fact is well known to everybody.

But what was done by Japan compared with what the United States had done? What she did at that time was only to obtain a promise from China not to transfer Fukien Province to any other country. Thus, there is no evidence whatsoever that Japan definitely aimed at leasing land or obtaining rights in China.

The very fact that Japan returned even the Liaotung Peninsula to China, which Japan was entitled to have as a result of the Sino-Japanese War, is evidence of her purity and innocence, which look almost too extreme.

This conduct on the part of Japan was one reason why the United States showed for a time a favourable attitude to her, but this favourable attitude was a short-lived one; it lasted only from the end of the Sino-Japanese War to the Russo-Japanese War.

Following the Russo-Japanese War, Japan took over as they were all the Russian rights and interests in Manchuria, and this caused the United States to transform her pro-Japanese sentiment into ill-feeling. This gave rise to a series of disputes between the two countries. At the outset of the first period, when the United States was pursuing her policy towards China, there had never occurred any collision between them, but when she began impudently to expand the meaning of the Open Door, there arose, for the first time, a dispute between her and Japan.

By virtue of the Portsmouth Treaty, which concluded the Russo-Japanese War, Japan did not get even a penny as indemnity; what she got was the southern part of Sakhalin and the Russian rights and interests in South Manchuria; the most precious of Russia's special rights and interests was, in reality, the South Manchuria Railway. Now, as a matter of fact, the United States, with her eyes upon this railway, had nursed the ambition of putting it under her control. For

this purpose the United States Minister to Tokyo, named Griscom, invited Harriman there.

Harriman was a fearful conspirator. Thanks to the good offices of Stevens, adviser to the Japanese Government, and the United States Minister in Tokyo, he had an interview with Premier Katsura of Japan which resulted in a secret contract between them for the purchase of the South Manchuria Railway by the United States.

According to this contract, arrangements were made to bring into being a United States-Japanese syndicate as a preliminary to the purchase by the United States of the Railway and its subsidiaries from Japan. The contract stipulated that the syndicate should be organized in accordance with Japanese law and put under Japanese control, but that finally the organization should be altered in such a way that the rights of both sides would be equal.

Harriman, highly elated and satisfied, urged Premier Katsura to sign the contract, but, in the meantime, the Japanese began to be apprehensive of America's motives, showing reluctance to become deeply involved in the matter. Finally, the Japanese politely declined to sign the contract.

As a result, Harriman, with an agreement regarding the contract in his pocket, departed from Japan aboard the s.s. *Siberia*, dreaming of the great success of his mission. But it so happened that on the third day after Harriman's departure, Komura, the Japanese plenipotentiary to the Portsmouth Conference, returned to Japan from Portsmouth and heard of what had been going on between Harriman and Premier Katsura. He became angry and categorically opposed the contract, holding this view :

From the legal standpoint, the transfer of the South Manchuria Railway and its subsidiaries and properties should, first of all, be approved by the Chinese Government. And from the political standpoint, Japan has just acquired the South Manchuria Railway by sacrificing 210,000 casualties and 2,500,000,000 yen ; therefore, it is absolutely impossible for Japan to trade the Railway for the benefit of American capitalists. More than that, if this contract is disclosed and reaches the ears of the nation, which is not satisfied with the

Portsmouth Peace Treaty, nobody knows what serious incidents would happen in Tokyo, not to mention the destruction of street-cars and police-boxes in the city.

Convinced by Komura's reasoning, Premier Katsura made up his mind to dissolve the contract.

The s.s. *Siberia* bearing Harriman aboard arrived at San Francisco. But before he could enjoy the glorious welcome which was waiting for him, he was visited by Kisaburo Ueno, then the Japanese Consul in San Francisco, and the latter handed to Harriman a telegram from Premier Katsura which read :

IN VIEW OF THE NECESSITY FOR THOROUGH INVESTIGATION AND STUDY OF ALL THE PROBLEMS IN THE NOTE, THE JAPANESE GOVERNMENT REQUESTS YOUR EXCELLENCY TO CONSIDER THAT THE AGREEMENT BE STOPPED FOR THE TIME BEING, UNTIL FURTHER COMMUNICATIONS IN DETAIL CAN BE MADE.

As a result, America's scheme to gain control of the South Manchuria Railway thus proved to be a beautiful fiasco, and Harriman's indignation and disappointment were indeed beyond imagination. The Japanese Government in January 1906 finally requested him to consider the agreement null and void.

Harriman's indignation was such that he complained to whomever he met ; more than that, some Americans held that it would be disadvantageous to the United States in the future if she abrogated the contract, and that therefore Japan should be caused to fulfil it. Finally, some went the length of predicting a United States-Japanese war.

And such a procedure on the part of the United States revealed her attempt to deny Japan's special rights and interests in South Manchuria. Following this the Faku-mon Railway issue, identical in nature with the Manchuria Railway issue, made its appearance in 1909, together with Secretary of State Knox's proposal for the neutralizing of the South Manchuria Railway.

5. UNITED STATES-JAPANESE RIVALRY OVER MANCHURIA

On November 8, 1907, the Chinese Government granted to a British capitalist the right to lay a railway between Hsinmintun and Faku-mon, the distance being twenty Japanese ri (one Japanese ri being equivalent to 2.44 miles).

It goes without saying that the ultimate object of this railway was to extend northward four hundred miles, as far as Tsitsihar, sometime in the future, the trans-Siberian railway, and then to continue southward to the sea along Yingkow and Tsinhuangtao.

The American capitalists, aware of this scheme, sent a letter to Harriman, who had failed to purchase the South Manchuria Railway, requesting that he squeeze into the said scheme, but Harriman's manoeuvre again resulted in failure, owing to a severe panic which struck the United States financial world at that time. This panic thwarted the plan to raise the capital necessary for investment in the railway.

But the plan to lay the said railway was finally shelved, owing to Japan's strong protest against it. The reason for Japan's protest and opposition was that according to Clause 3 of the Secret Protocol of the Peking Treaty, which was concluded between Japan and China following the Russo-Japanese War, no railway should be built in the vicinity of, or parallel with, the South Manchuria Railway.

While the Faku-mon Railway issue was hanging fire, Strate, the United States Consul-General in Mukden, in collaboration with Harriman, schemed to raise a public bond amounting to \$20,000,000 in the United States wherewith to establish a Manchuria Bank, the ultimate object being to revise the currency system of Manchuria, develop industry, and build a railway. They then drew up an agreement with Tang Shiao-yi and Ssu Sei-chang of the Three Eastern Provinces.

Fortunately, however, 1908 witnessed the demise of the Emperor Kuang-su and the Empress Dowager Hsi. At the same time, Prince Chun became regent, and this was followed by the fall of the political power of Yuan Shih-kai, as well as of Tang Shiao-yi. This unexpected

change of political scene also spoiled America's scheme before it could bear fruit.

In the same month as the demise of the Emperor Kuang-su and the Empress Dowager Hsi, Japan and the United States signed the Takahira-Root Agreement.

The contents of this Takahira-Root Agreement are very straightforward in nature, Japan's object being to dismiss misunderstanding as well as the apprehension frequently entertained by the United States that Japan might attempt to occupy Hawaii and the Philippines.

In addition to this, the United States was also worried about what Japan would do in China at this time, when the Emperor Kuang-su and the Empress Dowager Hsi had passed away. It is said, therefore, that Japan concluded the agreement in order to dispel this kind of suspicion.

On the other hand, the Chinese Government, afraid of Japan, is said to have dispatched such a personage as Tang Shiao-yi to the United States in an attempt to have the United States bring pressure to bear upon Japan. It is also rumoured that the Japanese Government, in order to spoil the scheme of the Chinese Government, took the initiative in advance by declaring that Japan and the United States were on friendly terms, and that there was nothing at issue between the two countries in regard to their Pacific policy. But the truth of this rumour should be left to the judgment of historians.

Be that as it may, it is thought the ultimate purpose of the agreement was to soften America's suspicion of Japan. On perusal of its contents, it is revealed as a datum telling how seriously Japan and the United States were engaged in rivalry over Manchuria. It should be borne in mind, further, that the Takahira-Root Agreement assumed a form under which America's right to a voice in Pacific problems was recognized.

Shortly after Japan and the United States exchanged this sphinxlike note Secretary of State Knox, in collaboration with Strate, the United States Consul-General in Mukden, brought forward a proposal for the neutralizing of the South Manchuria Railway in respect to the following six powers—Japan, Russia, China, England, Germany, and France; the ultimate meaning of the proposal being to put the South Manchuria Railway under the joint management of the afore-mentioned six powers. For Japan, this proposal was a thunderbolt from the blue sky, indeed.

Nor is this all. Soon afterwards, Secretary of State Knox worked out a new scheme for the construction of a railway between Chinchow and Aihun—this railway was to connect Chinchow on the Keijo-Mukden Line to Inner Mongolia and then extend to Aihun opposite the Huilung River by crossing the North-eastern Railway of Russia. Obviously this railway was a competitor of the South Manchuria Railway.

The South Manchuria Railway was the small and only interest which Japan acquired as result of the Russo-Japanese War. When the United States tried unbearably and waywardly to boss things by proposing the joint management of the railway or the construction of the Chinchow-Aihun Railway, it was, therefore, too much to expect Japan to remain retiring and silent. In fact, Japan lost no time in protesting to the United States against the proposal, categorically declining it, on the ground that the proposal was an encroachment upon her vested rights and interests.

With regard to the proposal for the neutralizing of all railways in Manchuria, Russia, too, fell in line with Japan by turning down America's tyrannical proposal; this proposal thus paved the way for Russia, which had to date been an enemy of Japan, to shake hands with her. Consequently Knox's diplomacy proved to be an utter fiasco.

Let us go back a little prior to this event. President Roosevelt had newly brought into being an Oriental Bureau in the State Department, in order to deal with matters pertaining to the Orient, and he had also decided to organize a big Fleet to sail round the Pacific.

The contemplated Fleet was an enormous one, consisting of sixteen battleships, six destroyers, two troopships, and one repair ship. According to the plan, the Fleet was to start from the Atlantic and proceed southward and by way of Magellan Strait to San Francisco, and thence it was to visit Japan, the Philippines, and China.

The visit by the Fleet to Japan was to be made under a slogan of United States-Japanese friendship, but its actual object was to inspect the situation in Japan and, at the same time, to demonstrate United States naval power to us.

The order for the voyage was issued on August 29, 1907, but it was on December 16 of the same year that the Fleet, after completing all

necessary preparations, departed from the Hampton Roads naval harbour.

At the departure of the Fleet, President Theodore Roosevelt talked big to this effect :

The object of the voyage of the United States Fleet is to demonstrate to other powers United States naval power. The United States Navy to-day should not be divided into two parts, separated from each other so much that in case of war it would be impossible to combine immediately the Pacific Fleet with the Atlantic Fleet. Division of the Navy can be ventured only after a great naval expansion is realized.

The said Fleet, under command of Admiral Evans, in the course of its voyage carried out all sorts of manœuvres ; especially in Magdalena Bay, Mexico, it spent several days at target practice, and then arrived at San Francisco on May 7 of the following year.

At that time, the immigration issue was dropped to some extent, but Japan and the United States were staring at each other over the South Manchuria Railway problem, thereby giving rise to wild rumours regarding a United States-Japanese war. The tragi-comedy of the situation was that many marines, fearing war between their country and Japan, deserted the Fleet in rapid succession and it was hard to fill the vacancies.

The Fleet again proceeded northward along the West Coast, reaching Seattle, and then it left on July 6 and reached Manila on October 1 via Australia.

Finally the United States Fleet, leaving Manila and proceeding northward, arrived at Yokohama on October 18. Japan received it with a fleet consisting of more than twenty warships, under command of Vice-Admiral Ishuin. Rear-Admiral Charles Sperry, who had assumed command of the visiting Fleet in place of Admiral Evans, formally entered Tokyo on October 19, and stayed overnight at the Hama Detached Palace.

On October 20, Rear-Admiral Sperry and his party were received in audience by the Emperor, on which occasion Sperry presented to the Emperor a telegram from the United States President. To this the

Emperor granted a reply. Following this, the visitors attended a banquet given in their honour at the palace. Then distinguished persons, both official and private, gave a banquet for the honoured guests.

This hospitality of Japan impressed the Americans, who had been feeling the danger of a United States-Japanese collision, to such an extent that the feeling of the Americans suddenly became favourable towards Japan, thus helping them to understand Japan's peaceful intentions. In short, America's scheme to demonstrate her power under the veil of courtesy resulted in a victory for Japan.

6. THE DOLLAR DIPLOMACY OF AMERICAN CAPITALISM

In April 1898, China, through the medium of Wu Ting-Fang, then Chinese Minister to the United States, concluded a contract with United States capitalists for a loan amounting to \$20,000,000 for the construction of a railway between Canton and Hankow, more than seven hundred miles.

One clause of the contract contained a sentence stipulating that the Americans should not transfer their rights to other foreigners. The actual fact, however, was that most of the public bonds provided for in the contract were dexterously purchased by Belgian capitalists and, as a result, the railway undertaking was confronted with the joint management of Russia, France, and Belgium. In view of this, the Chinese Government withdrew the contract for the reason that the undertaking under the joint management of Russia, France, and Belgium ran counter to the contract. Now the question is : Why did the United States let her vested rights slip, and how could the Belgian capitalists get them ? The fact of the matter is that, at that time, American capitalists were thoroughly disgusted with the idea of making investments abroad, especially in China.

But another opportunity came again. In May 1909, the Chinese Government was carrying on negotiations with British, French, and German bankers for a loan for the construction of railways between Canton and Hankow and between Szechwan and Hankow, when American capitalists, headed by the Morgan company, suddenly plunged into a drive to chop in and squeeze into the negotiations.

This was also prompted by Secretary of State Knox's threatening action, to which the Chinese and three other countries were strongly opposed. Knox brought strong pressure to bear upon the Chinese. On top of this President Taft even went to the length of breaking diplomatic precedent by sending a threatening letter to Prince Chun, the regent of the Chinese Government.

Not only the Chinese but also the other three countries, greatly startled by this threat on the part of the United States, finally permitted that country to participate in the contract for a loan to China. Under such circumstances the preliminary contract for a loan for the construction of the Canton-Hankow Railway was made.

This contract was completed and concluded one year afterwards, and in accordance with it, China vested the banking group consisting of the bankers of the four powers with authority to issue a public bond of £6,000,000 with interest at 5 per cent.

What the Chinese Government keenly felt at this time was, more than anything else, the power of the United States capitalist group, backed by the Washington Government. That particular time being the end of the Manchu Dynasty, financial administration in China was in a chaotic condition. As a matter of fact, had things been permitted to go as they were, there would have been no alternative for China but to go bankrupt. Such being the state of affairs, the Chinese Government attempted to extract a sum of \$50,000,000 from the United States for the purpose of revising its monetary system and exploiting natural resources in Manchuria. Getting wind of this, England, France, and Germany became angry, insisting that the plan for revision of the Chinese monetary system as well as that for the exploitation of natural resources in Manchuria should be undertaken under the joint management of the four powers. At first the United States opposed this idea, but she finally favoured it. As a result, the Four-Power Consortium was brought into being, and the United States thus grasped an opportunity for beating Japan and Russia into fits.

As soon as the contents of this secret contract were published by newspapers, Japan and Russia made an uproar; by this contract, encroachment upon their special rights and interest in Manchuria was far greater than that by the previous plan for the establishment of a

Manchuria bank. At this point, Japan and Russia shook hands with each other and strongly protested to China and the Governments of the Four Powers against the contract.

As a result of this protest, the plan for a Four-Power loan was completely muddled. To make matters worse, towards the middle of October the First Revolution broke out in China, and the fate of the said plan was thereby completely sealed.

Following the Revolution, President Yuan Shih-kai again applied to the Four-Power Consortium for a loan of \$100,002,500, but in view of the previous experience, Japan and Russia were also invited into the Four-Power Consortium, for the loan to China, thus forming a Six-Power Consortium. Later on, however, the United States, full of ambition and out of distaste for Japan's participation in the Consortium, seceded from it.

The following year, the First World War broke out and no European countries, thanks to it, could afford any loan to China. Only Japan herself could have afforded to give any kind of loan, because of a rapid increase in the inflow of specie, but, wisely, she completely washed her hands of China at that time.

The United States prior to the World War had been poor in armaments and economic power, incomparably poorer at that time than today. As a consequence of the World War, the Romanoff rule in Russia collapsed, while England parted from Japan. And it was at this period that the United States developed the strongest naval power in the world.

The United States, a country which is fundamentally arrogant and haughty, was thus stimulated by her exalted position to attempt to realize her long-cherished scheme to advance by exploiting China and by knocking Japan to pieces. In reality, it was at this time that the United States, backed by her powerful armed strength, began to demonstrate on the Chinese continent the evil influence of the dollar diplomacy of capitalism.

The primary obstacle to America's advance in China was the alliance between Japan and England. That is, should the United States attempt to challenge Japan's position in Asia, this would mean she would face the combined Anglo-Japanese armies and navies. Therefore, she felt that she would have no chance of attempting an invasion of

Asia as she wanted, unless the alliance between Japan and England was ruptured. Let me omit mentioning the circumstances of this business. But in short, German power having declined after the World War, England, no longer needing any aid from Japan, turned friendly towards the United States. In fact, she went so far as to dissolve her long-established alliance with Japan at the Washington Conference.

It may be noted that prior to this, Japan, by virtue of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, threw in her lot with the Allied Powers on the outbreak of the World War, and succeeded in occupying Tsingtao and all the South Sea islands north of the Equator. Shortly after this Japan submitted to China the note which is known among people as the Twenty-one Demands of Japan on China.

Originally, these demands by Japan were prompted by her whole-hearted desire to deal with the Shantung Problem and bring to an end all problems pending between Japan and China, so that friendly relations between the two countries might be promoted, and permanent peace in the Orient fundamentally assured. Notwithstanding this, how highly the New China of the Revolution was excited by this note is still fresh in the memory of people in general.

China had been quite accustomed to this kind of demand, but the actual situation there at that time was quite different from the time when Germany occupied Kiaochow Bay. In reality, China was no longer a country asleep, but a country awakened, one which would no longer tolerate such a thing. She was angry, in no small degree, at the fact that Japan had employed the same old method as that employed by England, Germany, and Russia.

Finding the situation thus, the United States, in league with the Chinese Government, sent a strong protest to the Japanese Ambassador in Washington regarding Japan's demands on China, and China, encouraged by America's backing, gradually came to hold Japan cheap, laughing at her diplomacy for being inept ; and she signed treaties only after causing great revision in them.

During this period, parleys between Japan and China were held on twenty-four different occasions, and the Chinese designated as National Disgrace Day the day on which the Twenty-one Demands were signed by the two countries. At Peking a national mass meeting was held that

day, on which occasion anti-Japanese harangues were delivered. In fact, the anti-Japanese disturbances on the occasion were beyond description. But it should be remembered that behind the scene of this anti-Japanese agitation, the United States Government was feeding the lamp with oil.

With regard to Japan's demands on China, no European country, with the exception of the United States, made any fuss ; only the United States launched a vigorous criticism of and attack upon Japan. Quite a number of Americans at that time believed that in the event Japan's Twenty-one Demands were put through, China would be completely subjected to her. The United States therefore submitted to Japan many a formal protest against the Demands.

A few months before America's participation in the World War, Japan's popularity in the United States was extremely low ; of course, this might be ascribed to her Twenty-one Demands on China, as well as to the Shantung Problem. But more than anything else, false German propaganda against Japan had much to do with it.

Germany's false propaganda was motivated by her fear of America's participation in the World War ; that is, Germany attempted to dampen the zeal being shown by the United States for participation in the war by spreading wild rumours among the American people that if the Pacific were left unprotected as a result of America's participation in the war, Japan could accomplish anything she wanted, that is, the occupation of China, Hawaii, and the Philippines.

It so happened that a preposterous rumour, setting the nerves of all Americans on edge, was in circulation regarding a Japanese-Mexican-German deal. According to this rumour, Germany was to make an alliance with Mexico, offering her financial aid, and Mexico to revenge herself on the United States by retaking Texas and Arizona, following which she was to negotiate with Japan for arbitration between Japan and Germany, and so forth.

That this propaganda contributed greatly to aggravate United States public opinion and ill-feeling towards Japan goes without saying, indeed.

Soon after the United States participated in the World War, the Japanese Government despatched Ambassador Kikujiro Ishii to the

United States as Japan's special envoy, who on his arrival congratulated the United States Government upon America's participation in the war on the one hand, and, on the other, attempted to soften America's ill-feeling towards Japan. The souvenir of Ishii's mission to the United States was the famous Ishii-Lansing Agreement.

The genuine object of this agreement was to sweep away all rumours detrimental to relations between Japan and the United States. The agreement contained the following provisoes :

The United States and Japanese Governments recognize the existence of special relations between those countries adjacent to each of them. Accordingly, the United States Government recognizes the fact that Japan is in possession of special interests in China.

Especially should this principle be recognized in those countries adjacent to Japanese territories.

The United States and Japanese Governments declare that the principles of the so-called Open Door and Equal Opportunity in regard to commerce and industry in China should always be upheld.

Japan considered this agreement to be a great success for her, but it was brought to light later that the United States, misunderstanding the meaning of the phrase "special interests," was indulging in a strange interpretation of the phrase.

The Ishii-Lansing Agreement was finally abrogated on April 14, 1923.

7. THE NOXIOUS LONDON CONFERENCE

The next revelation of rivalry was the great friction between Japan, the United States, and China at the Versailles Conference.

To this conference the Japanese plenipotentiary brought only three proposals : Japan's succession to Germany's vested rights in Shantung, transference to Japan of all Germany's territories north of the Equator, and racial equality ; but these proposals again gave rise to discord between Japan and the United States.

In consideration of the fact that Shantung and the South Sea Islands had been actually taken by Japan from her enemy by force, Japan did not worry at all about the transfer of Shantung and the South Sea Islands

to her ; but even these matters were completely knocked down by an absurd argument of the Chinese plenipotentiary. On top of this, China, using as a pretext the Shantung Problem, devoted herself to anti-Japanese propaganda, scheming to impair Japan's reputation by spreading groundless reports.

Base and unvarnished as China's anti-Japanese propaganda was, the United States welcomed it, for anti-Japanese feeling was running high among the Americans. Anti-Japanese feeling was further piled up by the independence propaganda of the rebellious Koreans and by the anti-Japanese attitude of Americans in China. Under these adverse circumstances Japan's just intention was fundamentally misunderstood, and Japan consequently found herself in a great plight.

China declared : " Even the Sino-Japanese Treaty is null and void as it was signed under the military coercion of Japan. . . . With regard to the Shantung Problem, Germany has no right whatsoever to transfer Shantung to Japan, because of China's participation in the war."

In reply to this legalistic argument inspired by the United States, Japan categorically declared : " Unless Japan's demands are complied with, Japan will not sign any treaty whatsoever."

In the face of this strong opposition, all other powers would have nothing to do with it, and finally made arrangements first to transfer to Japan all the rights pertaining to Shantung, second that China might, later on, negotiate with Japan over the return of the leased land as well as the disposal of the Shantung Railway. Thus the Shantung Problem was brought to a settlement.

Needless to say, the Chinese presented an appalling sight in giving vent to their wrath over the Shantung deal, and public opinion in the United States, which had swallowed China's false propaganda without discrimination, was also much incensed. In the United States Senate, clamorous yet imprudent argument was held for the abolition of the Shantung Treaty, some crying " Let's declare war upon Japan ! " Swanson, chairman of the Senate Naval Committee, talked tall : " The best measure to take regarding the Chinese problem is a naval construction which will ensure total annihilation of the Japanese Navy."

Following this, the German territories north of the Equator, such as the Marshall, Caroline, and Marianne Islands, were all transferred to

Japan as mandates. It may also be noted that Makino, the Japanese plenipotentiary, in February 1919 submitted to the League of Nations a proposal for racial equality with the approval of the Chinese Government, but the proposal was rejected owing to opposition by the United States and other countries.

During the course of the Versailles Conference, the Korean Independence Movement was in full swing, and this movement annoyed Japan a great deal. But the rise of the Korean Independence Movement, too, was mainly because of America's instigation. American newspapers erroneously reported the massacre of Koreans as well as of American missionaries by Japanese authorities. It is quite natural that this kind of report should have aggravated the ill-feeling of Americans towards Japan.

But it must be remembered that the origin of such malicious anti-Japanese propaganda was Americans themselves residing in the Orient ; and that funds for the Korean Independence Movement were also supplied by America. From ancient times, the United States was, it seems, considerably interested in Korea, for even prior to the Sino-Japanese War many so-called American missionaries had already stolen into Korea, wielding a great influence even at the Korean imperial court. Judging from this kind of intrigue adopted by the United States, it can be conjectured that the United States had been scheming to plant her influence in Manchuria, with Korea as a stepping-stone for this purpose.

Of course this independence movement resulted in a fiasco, contrary to the expectations of the United States ; but notwithstanding this, she continued her aid to the Korean Independence Movement. To-day America's political influence in Korea has been completely wiped away, but she wielded such influence for a while through the medium of her strong Christian missionaries there.

At this juncture, when a series of incidents widening the gap between Japan and the United States was occurring, a large-scale anti-Japanese movement broke out in California, thereby plunging Japan and the United States into an even more dangerous situation.

Following this, in 1919 a new plan for naval expansion was brought forward in the United States Congress. The reason the United States was in need of such naval expansion at that time, when the German

Navy no longer existed, was, needless to say, that she was aiming at her assumed enemy—Japan.

It was at this time that the Japanese Cabinet brought forward and had passed in the Japanese Diet a plan for construction of a navy with an 8-8 ratio in competition with the United States Navy. Indeed, the clouds which hovered over relations between Japan and the United States had never been so dark and fearful in the annals of United States-Japanese diplomacy. On the heels of this naval rivalry, there occurred a famous dispute between a United States wireless telegraph company and the Mitsui Bussan Kaisha of Japan; England and Denmark, too, plunged into the vortex of this dispute.

Thus the dark clouds between Japan and the United States were gathering storm more and more, when the first Disarmament Conference was held in Washington, its object being to deal with the disarmament, Pacific, and Far Eastern problems. As a result of the conference, the Anglo-Japanese Alliance was abrogated, and England and Japan, who had been friends until yesterday, suddenly found themselves staring at each other as rivals. In fact, England immediately started work on a great naval base at Singapore, and this measure contributed more or less to soften America's ill-feeling towards Japan.

The ultimate object of the Washington Conference being to drive Japan's influence completely away from China, it goes without saying that the conference proved to be extremely disadvantageous to Japan. Did China, then, acquire any extraordinary profit out of it? The answer is "No." She was unable to make any worthwhile harvest.

The reason is that the conference felt, in actuality, too uneasy to comply with China's demands, particularly in consideration of the actual situation prevailing in China at that time.

It was only the United States which made a clear gain at the Washington Conference, for its outcome enabled her to remove her obstacle—Japan's special position in China—isolate her rival Japan, and thus thumb down the head of China to follow whatever she would dictate. In other words, the conference enabled the United States to acquire a position of supervision over China, rather than creating a new attitude in United States-Chinese relations under which the genuine sovereignty of China would be respected.

Of the problems which were finally settled at the Washington Conference, there was one which was a source of dispute between Japan and the United States. That was the problem of Yap Island.

Since Yap, Japan's newly acquired island in the South Seas, is situated near Guam, the United States base of operation in the Western Pacific, the United States brought forward various difficulties for the purpose of preventing Yap from being utilized for military purposes.

Let me dispense with the details of this problem as well as those of the Washington Conference, which are too long to be mentioned in this limited space. The outcome was that the United States finally gave in and decided to recognize Yap as Japan's mandated territory. Thus the problem was brought to a settlement.

The Washington Conference contributed, to a certain extent, to dispel the low atmospheric pressure between Japan and the United States. Especially in the summer of 1928, when on the motion of the United States, a pact outlawing war was signed by Japan, England, the United States, France, Germany, and Italy, it seemed as though the possibility of a United States-Japanese war had vanished like a dream. And this pact gave a ray of hope for the future of disarmament. If all countries faithfully fulfilled in the future their promise to reduce their armaments as stipulated therein, the armaments of all of them would be reduced to the lowest limit necessary for self-defence, therefore the pact would be the first step, at least, towards teaching the meaning of peace among all the countries concerned. In this way all the signatories had an excess of confidence in the pact.

Following the conclusion of the pact, President Hoover in May 1929 declared that the armaments of all countries concerned should be converted from offensive to entirely defensive purposes, and that defensive armaments should be relative. As a result the world faced disarmament as an urgent, realistic problem, and this resulted in the Dawes-MacDonald negotiations for disarmament.

But the true nature of these negotiations was also brought to light when it was revealed that America's true intention was not so much disarmament as actual armament expansion itself. That is to say, as a result of the Disarmament Conference, the United States alone witnessed an increase in her naval armaments of 240,000 tons, rather

than a reduction in comparison with the parity of all other powers concerned, of 140,000 tons more with the addition of the naval strength under construction, and of 15,000 tons more with addition of the naval strength under contemplation.

Shortly after this, the London Conference was opened in January 1930 in the British House of Lords in the presence of the British King. Mr Reijiro Wakatsuki, the Japanese plenipotentiary, on his way to London, passed through the United States, on which occasion he issued a statement laying stress upon the accomplishment of a genuine disarmament on the basis of the principle: *The lowest limit of disarmament too weak to menace and strong enough not to be menaced.*

At the conference, the Japanese delegation took exception to the proposal for the abolition of submarines, emphasizing that they should be retained by all countries for defensive purposes, if necessary. Furthermore, it also presented a concrete method for settlement of the auxiliary-warship problem. Instead of appreciating this modest attitude on the part of Japan, England and the United States stubbornly refused to yield even an inch regarding cruisers of big size and submarines, and even coerced the Japanese delegation into silence by declaring that everything would hinge upon the outcome of the Anglo-United States cruiser agreement.

In the end the United States brought forward a proposal to all the countries concerned. The said proposal was a five-power pact comprising the results of the several months' work of the conference, and it embraced the agreement reached between Japan, England, and the United States regarding the amount of tonnage to be retained.

This agreement provided for abolition of the fixed number of capital ships, the postponement for five years of constructing those warships which would replace superannuated ones, limitation of aircraft carriers, the amount of tonnage to be retained below large-sized cruisers, other warships outside the category of limitation, and the method for restriction. From a practical viewpoint, it was nothing but a swallowing whole of what the United States had commanded.

Speaking from Japan's standpoint, none of her demands, such as seventy per cent of big cruisers, which are the lowest amount of tonnage

for her national defence, and her important claim for the retention of her existing strength of submarines, were accomplished. Instead, as her light cruisers were increased and she was forced to accept a tonnage of less than seventy per cent in all, she was forced to abolish 26,000 tons of her most useful submarines, and she was given an expansion of seventy per cent for her unnecessary light cruisers. Consequently Japan was compelled to decrease what was necessary and increase what was unnecessary.

Then what was the conference for? Indeed, it is hard to interpret the genuine meaning of it.

There is a great deal more which should be told in connexion with the London Conference, though it is omitted here because of lack of space. Briefly, to pass an opinion on the London Conference: the conference started on the basis of the pact outlawing war; but what it actually accomplished was harmful, rather than beneficial, to a realization of world peace, a lessening of the national burdens of all the countries concerned, and a solidifying of national defence. In fact, some went the length of scoffing at the outcome of the conference, comparing it with the soul of the world's old fox. To judge who is right and who is wrong is, of course, a relative matter which will seem different according to the positions of those directly involved, but through eyes which want to see the results of the conference without any coloured glass, it can never appear that the conference accomplished its primary aims—world peace, the lessening of national burdens, and the solidification of national defence.

CHAPTER IV

THE UNITED STATES-JAPANESE WAR IS INEVITABLE

I. MISCONCEPTION OF UNITED STATES-JAPANESE FRIENDSHIP

WE hear both of the following : " What if the United States and Japan fight ? " and " Japan and the United States will not fight. " Those who insist " Japan and the United States will not fight " are of the opinion that there will positively be no war between the two countries, since both countries are signatories to the pact outlawing war. That this kind of idea is quite a misconception is witnessed by the fact that to-day Europe has again plunged into another great war. Nor is this all. Those who insist " Japan and the United States will not fight " are nothing but hypocrites wearing the mask of pacifism ; what they are saying is the delirium of the pacifists trying to avoid war.

It is highly doubtful if it will be possible for Japan and the United States to maintain peace, particularly at this time when they are lending ears to such an absurd argument. Even the President of the United States and the chief of the United States Naval Strategy Section have publicly declared : " America will have to fight Japan in the near future. " Is it possible for Japan to be indulging in such nonsense as " Japan and the United States will not fight " when the United States considers Japan her enemy ? If Japan cannot maintain her just and righteous rights and ideals in connexion with the establishment of the Far Eastern Co-prosperity Sphere, she should firmly determine to fight, whether she has to do it once or twice, anyone who attempts to hinder the realization of her ideal for the establishment of that Sphere.

In addition to the fact that Japan is confronting the United States within the Far Eastern Co-prosperity Sphere, the two countries are competing with each other for the hegemony of the Pacific, in armaments and in national policy. " Two cocks in one yard do not agree. " If the rivalry between Japan and the United States continues as at present, a United States-Japanese war is by no means a hypothesis ; it is merely a matter of time.

Those who insist that Japan and the United States will not fight, those who, under the mask of pacifism, avoid war, those who are obsessed by and worship America—they may, perhaps, bring out dusty old documents like the pact outlawing war sponsored by the League of Nations, or the Nine-Power Pact about China, and say that on account of these documents war between the two countries will not break out so easily as is generally thought. They may further remark that if war breaks out, England and the Soviet Union will fight each other, and that in such an event the world will plunge into an unprecedentedly great war.

Assuming Japan and the United States are confronted with a situation in which they will have to cross swords with each other, what country will be able to bring pressure to bear upon Japan, with the treaties as her shield, and nip the war in the bud? It might be thought that England, who has been dealt a heavy blow by Germany and has almost been reduced to a second-rate power, would fight Japan by offering Singapore, Hong Kong, and all of her other possessions in the Pacific to America; but in all probability the clever Englishmen will be pleased to stand on neutral ground and then seize the markets lost by Japan and the United States, thus recovering the influence England has lost to Germany.

For England, there is no need to bring the United States-Japanese war to a satisfactory and smooth conclusion, and if she pokes her nose into it rashly it might cost her vital possessions in the Pacific such as India, the Straits Settlements, Hong Kong, New Zealand, and Australia. Therefore, it cannot be seriously considered that she will participate in the war on America's side.

Even if England participates in the United States-Japanese war, her participation will not appear on the surface but rather will be a very obscure and very slight one.

There is also a rumour that England is planning to arbitrate between Japan and the United States; but such an idea is ridiculous. Even if England assumes the rôle of arbitrator, neither Japan nor the United States will comply with any compromise plan, unless each of them is satisfied with the manner of arbitration. There is no indication of any attempt being made by France, Italy, or Russia to arbitrate between

Japan and the United States. Even if the minor powers assume the task of arbitration, their dignity will not be great enough to satisfy the two countries. Thus it is quite ridiculous to expect arbitration in the dispute from any third country.

Instead, if there is war among other countries, Japan will, in all probability, be approached by the countries at war with the request that she exercise her good offices in arbitrating the dispute. And such a thing is quite natural for Japan, her Emperor being the leader of the world.

Then, is it not obvious that the United States-Japanese war will break out any time the two countries deem it necessary?

When will the United States-Japanese war break out? This question is not so simply answered, indeed.

For the outbreak of war is not a question of either to-day or to-morrow; it is far from predictable. President Roosevelt, in his book entitled *America and the World War*, writes to this effect: "When Japan encroached upon China's neutrality in order to attack Tsingtao, and landed her army from Lungkow, China protested against Japan's action; why did not the United States stand for China and fight Japan for her that time?"

From this, it has become obvious that in war the matter of prime importance is not the pretext or the chance of war but one's determination to fight. If the United States had wanted to fight Japan on behalf of China in connexion with the Manchukuo and China Incidents, she would have had plenty of pretexts and opportunities. Through her missing this opportunity, a new Nationalist government for China will be brought into being, and while hesitating the United States will also have been deprived of the chance to give aid to Chiang Kai-shek.

Then why is it that the United States as a whole maintained a neutral attitude, warning "Don't become involved in war"? The answer is very simple and clear. It was because Japan's attitude was too determined and strong, and because she showed an attitude revealing her determination not to hesitate to fight if anyone interfered with her. It was quite impossible for the United States to venture to interfere with Japan without a firm determination to fight her; more than anything else, the United States realized that under her existing armament conditions she would have no chance at all of winning a war

against Japan. Is it not for this reason that the United States fell back, without any alternative but to connive at Japan's action?

The existing armament conditions in the United States are comparatively poor, for the United States Navy and Army have not gone beyond the stage of paper plans. The fact is that her plans of all descriptions, either big or small, are yet incomplete, and compared with the cream of the Japanese Army, the United States Army has no chance whatever of winning a war with Japan.

If the main portion of a United States-Japanese war turns out to be the naval struggle—since a victory cannot be achieved by the army alone—then we shall have to look into the existing naval armament conditions of the two countries. Even in naval power, America is extremely poor. For example, in the naval battle of to-day, the front line cannot be maintained without dreadnought capital ships mounted with fourteen-inch guns; but among the American capital ships, there are four old-fashioned ones mounted with twelve-inch guns, and several cruisers mounted with eight-inch guns which have just been completed. Most of the United States destroyers and submarines are the old-fashioned and superannuated ones which were rapidly built during the First World War. Naturally the fighting strength of these war vessels has markedly declined and it is absolutely impossible for them to compete with the best of the ultra-modern Japanese Fleet. This state of affairs has prompted the United States to carry out the present great armament expansion. In view of this, the United States will be obliged to exercise prudence and self-restraint towards Japan at least until 1945.

As soon as the great armament expansion is completed, the United States will probably avail herself of the opportunity to declare war upon Japan by establishing a due pretext. Who will, then, win? This question cannot be answered until the war is over, but judging from the existing naval strength of the two countries, there are many indications of Japan's winning the war over the United States. It should also be clearly remembered that after 1945, the year when the great United States armament expansion will be completed, the chances of an American victory will be far greater than Japan's.

Therefore, from Japan's standpoint, it is quite necessary for her to wage war against the United States before the completion of her

armament expansion ; but from America's standpoint, a United States-Japanese war is to be desired only after the completion of her expansion. At the same time, it is said the best period for America's waging war with Japan will be when the United States makes a collaboration agreement with the vanquished Chinese Communist Party and skilfully concludes an agreement for co-operation with the Soviet Union, as well as a joint defensive agreement with Canada, Australia, and all the countries of Central and South America. This is the only time when the United States will be able to carry out certain kinds of action.

It can be declared that Japan and the United States will plunge into a war crisis just before or after the time when the curves of United States and Japanese naval fighting strength approach the point of crossing. If anyone calmly considers what the United States is likely to do at that particular moment, he will not fail to realize immediately that the war between Japan and the United States is near at hand.

2. PACIFISTS AND AMERICA-FEARING PEOPLE

Rain or wind ? Unless Japan and the United States witness in some way a great turn in their relations, it will be impossible for the two countries to avoid war.

The collision between them is neither a desk theory nor an interesting story created by a novelist, but has been prepared by great natural forces, and, therefore, it is certainly not a problem which can easily be solved merely by tinkering.

Therefore, it is already the height of foolishness for anyone to discuss further the possibility of a United States-Japanese war. For sooner or later the time will come when the United States will try to do away with Japan. The actual state of affairs is that the Japanese nation cannot enjoy even a day of peace and security. To-day Japan is confronted with a great opportunity for testing the confidence of the Japanese nation, a race descended from the gods. The time has come when we must add to the contributions made by our successive Emperors and should raise her prestige as an Empire by establishing a long-range, nay a permanent, national policy. Such an opportunity as to-day's will never come again. The Japanese nation should now

call upon their traditional spirit of courage and bravery to trample underfoot the difficult situation confronting them to-day.

Notwithstanding this critical moment, those insisting on the avoidance of war and the pro-Americans are engaged in various blind acts under the mask of pacifism ; and, indeed, their action deserves our indignation. That there is a great number of pro-Americans among the high Government officials is all the more deplorable.

The Japanese nation should absolutely not believe that war will never come to Japan. Nor should they believe too much that the United States has no intention of fighting, or that the United States is a humanitarian country. If anyone holds : " Perhaps there may be a collision of feeling between Japan and the United States, but this collision will be only temporary and will gradually disappear. Thus there is no possibility of war breaking out between the two countries. It is merely a fruitless waste of energy to prepare for a war which has no possibility of breaking out," it should be remembered he is the very person who invites war. If all the leaders of Japan belong to the category of the afore-mentioned person, Japan will lose even what she should seek herself.

Furthermore, the pacifists are talking about Japan's isolation during a period when she is engaged in war, but this sort of view represents nothing but the base psychology of dependence on others which is quite characteristic of weak countries. In other words, the pacifists have degenerated into the psychology of a fallen country, and they are blind to the real power of their country, despite the fact that they should be proud of that power.

On the other hand, what the America-fearing people say is something like this : If Japan fights the United States, she may perhaps emerge victorious from the war itself, but it is highly doubtful how long Japan's financial power would last. In point of fact, there is a great number of old, secondary officials and petty bourgeois who hold such views. Of course, what they say is not unreasonable. But it is not at all a fixed equation of war that the wealthy, strong country shall necessarily win a war with the poor country. If so, the world would have been ruled over and unified by one or two strong countries from ancient times.

Of course, Japan looks very poor from the point of view of money

and material resources, as well as in her other national power. But even without going back to the ancient past, let us glance at the example of the Russo-Japanese War. At that time when Japan fought Russia, the difference between them was as great as the difference between a killifish and a whale. Notwithstanding this, Japan scored a great victory over Russia, and, although after the war Japan did not get even a penny as indemnity, her undertakings had been carried out in such a splendid way that she has built up to what she is now.

On the other hand, let us look at the example of what Turkey did in the First World War. Though she, as the result of her participation in the First World War on the side of Germany, had a hard time of it, she defeated the Greek Army, which was backed by England, France, and Italy, along the bank of the Sakari River, driving the enemy away from Anatolia to the last man. Thus Turkey was able to retake by the Lausanne Treaty all that she had lost by the Sèvres Treaty. In fact, the real foundation on which to-day's glorious Turkey has been built is mainly attributable to the war in Anatolia itself.

In the war in South Africa, the Transvaal, which fought England, can also be compared to a killifish against a whale, but it was only after two years and seven months, along with war expenditures amounting to more than 2,200,000,000 yen, that England was able to conquer the Transvaal. It may be noted that England on this occasion employed her entire national army, but found it insufficient to accomplish her task, thereupon finally taking steps to use all her colonial forces.

In this sense, the difference of wealth between Japan and the United States can be quickly balanced according to the amount of war expenditures disbursed by the two countries. That is to say, the United States is about fifteen times as large as Japan and the wealth of the United States is also several tens of times greater than that of Japan. And even if Japan carries out war on an equal footing with the United States, there will be a great difference in the amount of war expenditures disbursed by the two countries. Supposing that the United States, in the event of a United States-Japanese war, needs ten times the war expenditures Japan will need, this means that the economic power of the two countries will naturally be equalized.

Besides this, the economic power of a democratic country is different

in nature from that of Japan, for once the former totters on its foundation it loses national confidence and it has no way to cope with the situation ; whereas in the case of Japan there is absolutely no such thing as losing national confidence, for Japan is the greatest country, unparalleled throughout the world, and is centred round the Imperial Court. Nobody cares how many thousands or millions or billions are used.

On top of this, the United States-Japanese war will be staged mostly on the water. That means the naval battle would naturally be more expensive than the land battle. As the United States will have to carry out a five-thousand nautical mile trans-oceanic operation with the entire fighting strength of her great navy, her expenditures in transporting war materials alone will be enormous, of a kind which cannot be compared at all to Japan's war expenditures, particularly in view of the notoriety of United States armed services for extravagance.

In short, it is not necessary in the slightest to think of the effect the difference of national power will have upon victory and defeat in the war.

3. EXPENDITURE FOR THE UNITED STATES-JAPANESE WAR

How much war expenditure will be needed by Japan for a United States-Japanese war, of course, cannot be answered until war is actually waged. But the main portion of Japan's war expenditures will be the amount of money which will be necessary at the outset of the war to send the army to and occupy the Philippines, Guam Island, and other . . . areas. The remaining war expenditures will be met by the whole-hearted support of the nation, and that will be enough.

After the occupation of the afore-mentioned areas there will be no extraordinary war operations to be staged by the Japanese Army, and even the Navy can simply hide itself in safety zones and in the bases of operations within its home waters, making occasional patrols. Accordingly, the expenditures needed for this will be very small.

At the time of the Russo-Japanese War, the theatre of war developed into two areas—on land and sea ; as a result, Japan was in need of a large amount of armaments and war expenditures because of the actual situation at that time. In comparison with the Russo-Japanese War, the United States-Japanese war will be more to the advantage of Japan, for

she will have no way of spending money even should she want to ; instead she will need much more money for the completion of her standing armaments. In fact, a certain German military expert, commenting upon the future United States-Japanese war, remarked : " In order to take California, the Sandwich Islands, Samoa, and the Philippine Islands, Japan's fundamental policy is not to spend even a penny."

That Japan will not spend even a penny probably means that she will be able to occupy the afore-mentioned areas under her ordinary military expenditures.

How about the United States ? In this connexion it is thought things will not go for the United States so smoothly as they will for Japan. First, the United States Government will have to pay a war-time salary to her soldiers of more than fifty times what a Japanese soldier gets. If the United States wants to fight Japan and knock her to pieces, she will have to advance westward, whether she likes or not, by sending an expeditionary fleet to Pearl Harbour in Hawaii ; and an enormous expenditure will be made just for this.

Also, because the United States will have to wage war by maintaining a huge fleet several thousands of miles distant from the homeland, it cannot be expected she will do her job only with easy money.

Most of the shipyards and arsenals are located in the eastern part of the United States ; foodstuffs and other war materials would also have to be sent mostly from the eastern part of the country. Therefore, the sources of raw materials are about five thousand miles distant from the theatre of war, and it will by no means be an easy task to supply sufficient materials. Indeed, the pains that would be required of the United States in accomplishing her task can be imagined by Japan, even from her position as an enemy.

In the event a country wages war with her own territory as the base of operations she can fulfil her task with the least amount of expenditure ; but war is really an expensive thing when she attempts to wage war outside her territory.

For example, countries such as France and Germany, which played the leading rôles during the First World War, actually needed to make expenditures far smaller than those made by England ; England disbursed a total sum of 73,000,000,000 yen in war expenditures during

the World War, whereas the war expenditure of France was 1,300,000 yen less than that, and that of Germany was 6,000,000,000 yen less.

The reason the United States needed such extravagant expenditures in connexion with her participation in the First World War was that her theatre of war was three thousand miles distant from her own territories. The situation which will confront the United States in connexion with the United States-Japanese war will not be so different from that with which she was confronted during the World War. That is to say, there is no doubt that Japan's war expenditures will be small, whereas the United States will need a terrific amount.

Even in regard to foodstuffs and the salaries of soldiers, there will be a great difference between Japan and the United States. Not a single Japanese soldier will ask for his salary; it is characteristic of the Japanese soldiers that they are willing to fight for their country beyond their strength with a small allowance, a few rice balls, and fish, with vegetables. But unless American soldiers are provided with a salary about twenty times the average Japanese civil salary, as well as with foods which are as sumptuous as dinner, they ask to be excused from war. Furthermore, a thing may be done for twenty or thirty sen in Japan whereas in the United States twenty or thirty yen will be needed for the same purpose.

Even as regards the sense of responsibility there is a heaven-and-earth difference between Japanese and American soldiers. For instance, Japanese soldiers are entirely different from the American soldiers in their manner of handling arms such as torpedoes, shells, tanks, aeroplanes, and so forth; American soldiers do not hesitate ruthlessly to squander torpedoes or shells, each of which costs many thousands of yen, whereas Japanese soldiers are so careful and prudent in handling these weapons that they do not use them unless they are sure that the missiles will certainly hit the mark.

All things thus considered, it will be possible for Japan to continue to fight the United States easily, even taking into consideration economic power.

War is by no means a struggle between money and money; that is, a war does not last until one side's material resources are exhausted.

If Japan at the outset of war succeeds in capturing completely

Guam Island, the Philippines, and the South Sea islands, she will be easily able to continue to wage war against the United States. What Japan will lose owing to the outbreak of war will be only trade, but the war will have no effect upon her at all since even at present the United States is not buying any of her goods. As Japan, on the other hand, will be able to seize America's trade with China, India, and the South Seas, she will not necessarily and intentionally risk defeat by the United States on account of her straitened financial condition, nor will she help the United States to win the war.

Instead of having an adverse effect upon Japan's trade the United States-Japanese war will accelerate her home industries as well as her foreign trade, thus producing all the more lively business.

The America-fearing people are of the opinion that if war breaks out between Japan and the United States, trade will be destroyed, and that, especially, there will be an end to the Japanese silk industry. But these people are quite ignorant of the fact that even if war breaks out between Japan and the United States the European sea routes will be quite safe, and that even if Japan's silk trade with the United States is stopped, there are many other ways of making up the losses caused by the interruption of the silk trade.

In case Japan cannot sell her silk, she will of course be hard hit, but the United States will be in greater difficulty if she cannot buy silk from Japan. If the piers of Yokohama present a scene as desolate as that after a fire has been put out, Paterson and other silk-industry towns in the United States will not be able to see even one chimney vomit smoke. Even if Japan cannot sell silk to the United States, there are many other ways of stimulating her silk trade with other countries.

The world economy to-day is not such a single-tracked one as is implied, and it circulates without obstacles. Therefore, there is no reason to believe that there will be no way of Japan's working out measures for carrying on her silk trade.

Even if Japan cannot sell a single thread of silk, she will witness a great development in her Oriental trade. That is to say, there is enough room for her to develop her trade with China under the new Nationalist Government, India, the Dutch East Indies, French Indo-China, and the Philippines.

If the one hundred million Japanese subjects are combined and united as one man and each of them is determined to fight—those on the front with guns, those in the factories with hammers, and those in the agricultural villages with sickles—there is no reason to worry about losses caused by the interruption of United States-Japanese trade, for there ought to be ways of making good the losses. Such being the case, Japan's position in the event of a United States-Japanese war is nothing to be too much worried about.

If the Japanese nation indulges in unnecessary anxiety, they will be obsessed by the psychology of fear, complaining, "I'm afraid of America," "I'm afraid of the Soviet Union," "I'm afraid of Germany," "I'm afraid of Italy," and "I'm afraid of China which is going to be stronger"; thus finally they will find themselves in a sorry plight. Had the Japanese people been labouring under the same psychology of fear towards Russia thirty years ago as that under which they labour now towards the United States, they would never have carried through the war with Russia, especially in view of Japan's national power at that time. At the time of the Russo-Japanese War, Russia was located in the vicinity of Japan's eyes and nose; on top of this, Russia was in possession of a stronger navy and army, as well as of greater ability than Japan. The actual state of affairs at that time was that one mistake would have in a moment exposed the entire mainland of Japan to the enemy's cannonading. Therefore, no intelligent persons throughout the world at that time had anticipated Japan's victory over Russia, though what they were interested in was to what extent Japan could fight Russia. Even this war, the odds of which were so positively against Japan, she dared to carry out until she finally scored an overwhelming victory. Recently many rotten patriots have been cropping up, holding the view that unless Japan holds hands with Germany, the future of Japan's destiny will be endangered. This phenomenon is deplorable beyond description, indeed. Fundamentally, the idea of currying favour with Germany is not at all necessary.

To-day the Japanese people should have faith in their own country.

CHAPTER V

THE ARMAMENT OF THE UNITED STATES

I. CAPITAL SHIPS

I WOULD like to draw a bird's-eye picture of America's fighting strength, as well as her armaments.

The United States Navy is famous throughout the world as an offensive navy. England, France, and Italy have respectively put forth efforts to defend their respective countries, no one of them having ever planned an expedition to a foreign country in the far distance, but it is only the United States Navy which is aiming at waging war on an area of many thousands of miles across a great ocean.

Therefore, the United States is the first naval power of the world, and moreover, her aim is to launch a naval expedition across the Pacific to the Far East. Now, the United States has already completed plans for all her Pacific war operations, as to how to attack Japan and even how to smash to pieces the Japanese Navy. For example, the "wheel-shaped formation" is a part of the United States war-operations plan against Japan.

However, the existing fighting strength of the United States Navy is not yet enough to launch an attack upon Japan and the Orient; therefore the United States Naval General Staff is very anxious to fill the gaps; hence the 1940 plan for a great armament expansion. According to this plan, the United States is planning to have 15 [*sic*] battleships against 9 for Japan, and 180,000 tons—more than 150 per cent of what Japan has—of big cruisers against 118,000 tons of Japan's, not to mention other light cruisers, destroyers, and air-forces superior to Japan's.

At present the United States Navy has 15 battleships; therefore, in numerical strength it is superior to the Japanese Navy, which has only 9 battleships; but the former's fighting capacity is greatly inferior

to the latter's. The list of existing capital ships in the possession of the United States is as follows :

LIST OF UNITED STATES CAPITAL SHIPS

KIND OF SHIP	NAME OF SHIP	YEAR OF COMPLETION	DISPLACEMENT TONNAGE	SPEED (KNOTS)	MOUNTED GUNS
Battleship	<i>West Virginia</i>	1923	32,600	21.0	8-16 in.
"	<i>Colorado</i>	"	"	21.0	"
"	<i>Maryland</i>	1921	"	21.1	"
"	<i>California</i>	"	32,300	21.5	12-14 in.
"	<i>Tennessee</i>	1920	"	21.0	"
"	<i>Idaho</i>	1919	32,000	21.3	"
"	<i>New Mexico</i>	1918	"	21.0	"
"	<i>Mississippi</i>	1917	"	21.0	"
"	<i>Arizona</i>	1916	31,400	21.0	"
"	<i>Pennsylvania</i>	"	"	21.0	"
"	<i>Oklahoma</i>	"	27,500	20.6	10-14 in.
"	<i>Nevada</i>	"	"	20.5	"
"	<i>New York</i>	1914	29,600	21.5	"
"	<i>Texas</i>	"	"	21.0	"
"	<i>Wyoming</i>	1912	28,500	21.0	12-12 in.
"	<i>Arkansas</i>	"	"	21.0	"
"	<i>Utah</i>	1911	21,825	21.0	10-12 in.
"	<i>Florida</i>	"	"	21.0	"

As shown above, the United States Navy possesses 18 capital ships, of which 3 superannuated ones are to be destroyed ; therefore, the number of capital ships in actual service is 15. In this connexion it may be noted that besides those mentioned above, the following capital ships are now under construction : the *North Carolina*, *Washington*, *South Dakota*, *Indiana*, *Massachusetts*, and *Alabama*. Adding these to those ships for which construction contracts have already been let, the total number of capital ships in possession of the United States Navy will be 32.

With regard to the age of ships, 6 of the existing capital ships are over 10 years of age, 8 over 15 years of age, and 4 over 18 years of age ; the average age being 12 years and 4 months [*sic*]. The main batteries consist of 24 16-inch guns, 124 14-inch guns, and 44 12-inch guns,

making a total of 192. The average speed of the entire fleet is 21 knots.

The vital point of the above table which immediately attracts attention is that the numerical strength of United States and Japanese capital ships is supposed to be in a 5-3 ratio, but in regard to the number of main batteries representing offensive power, the ratio between the United States and Japanese Navies is 2 to 1; that is, Japan's main battery strength is equivalent to half of America's. Had Japan, at the time of the Washington Conference, maintained a stronger public opinion in support of Japanese plenipotentiary Kato's insistence that Japan be granted a 10-7 ratio, her demand, righteous and logical, would have been accepted by both England and the United States. And had her demand been accepted, she would not have had such a miserable outcome in the number of her capital ships as well as in that of main batteries.

Well, the Japanese Navy, in possession of only 88 guns of large calibre, will have to undergo considerable hardships if it attempts to fight 160 guns of large calibre mounted on 15 capital ships of the United States Navy. And four years from now, the Japanese Navy will have to fight 32 United States capital ships. A useless complaint about the Washington Conference does not deserve repetition, but it has now become quite obvious that the outcome of the Washington Conference was very disadvantageous for Japan, in consideration of the fact that in order to retain one capital ship, the *Mutu*, mounted with 8 16-inch guns, Japan had allowed the United States to possess two capital ships, the *Colorado* and the *West Virginia*, mounted with a total of 16 16-inch guns.

The advantage of the Japanese Navy is only that it is 2 knots faster in speed than the United States Navy and that it is in possession of 3 battle cruisers with more than 26 knots respectively. How skilfully will the commander of the Japanese Navy take advantage of these cruisers, which are characteristic of the Japanese Navy, yet which may turn out to be a weak point? This will be really something to see for the powers concerned.

Since the Washington Conference, the matter of "the angle of main batteries" has given rise to clamorous discussion. That is, the United

States Navy, in its estimates for the 1923-1924 fiscal year, earmarked an enormous sum towards a fund for reconstructing turrets, with the object of expanding the angle of main batteries of 13 capital ships; this is the origin of the hotly discussed problem. According to explanations by the United States naval authorities, England, with a view to extending the shooting distance of her warships, has already started work on the reconstruction of gun-carriages; therefore, unless the United States follows her example as soon as possible, she will be exposed to the fire of British warships which are out of range. From the standpoint of naval strategy "out of range" is something to be avoided at all costs; therefore the United States lost no time in starting work on reconstruction of the turrets of her battleships.

Elementary physics tells us that a shell as a whole can reach farthest when it is fired by a gun at an angle of 45 degrees. The guns of capital ships between the Russo-Japanese War and the First World War had, as a whole, an angle of from 12 or 13 to 17 or 18 degrees.

At that time it was a very difficult task to expand the angle of the guns mounted on capital ships mainly because of difficult technical problems involving the system of turrets; one other reason was that the distance of battle at that time was only 17,000 yards in maximum, so that the guns with the angle referred to sufficiently fulfilled their function. But later, torpedoes were developed, along with observation mechanisms, while aeroplanes could extend the scope of gunshot observation, thereby expanding the actual distance of battling. And in order to cope with this situation steps were taken by the United States to expand the angle of the guns.

Despite the fact that expansion of the angle of the guns runs counter to the spirit of the Washington Conference, the United States, brazenly and without notice, carried out reconstruction of the turrets. As a result of this reconstruction, the following six battleships, the *Texas*, *New York*, *Oklahoma*, *Nevada*, *Arizona*, and *Pennsylvania*, mounted with 14-inch guns, have had the angle of their guns expanded to 30 degrees so that they are able to shoot a maximum distance of 34,500 yards, while five more battleships are now able to shoot a distance of 35,000 yards. Simultaneously with expansion of the angle of the guns, the United States has converted the boilers of six battleships which

had burned coal exclusively to the use of heavy oil. The result of this experiment is that the battleship *Florida*, thus remodelled, has witnessed a remarkable increase in speed as a result of using heavy oil instead of coal, having developed a speed of $22\frac{1}{2}$ knots in its trial run—an unprecedented speed for United States battleships. Indeed the shrewdness of brazen America is really beyond calculation.

Though details about the process of remodelling the battleships are beyond conjecture, the salient points of the work are thought to be something as follows :

1. Expansion of the angle of main batteries.
2. Installation or reconstruction of the catapults for aeroplanes.
3. Defence against submarines : steps to be taken to equip the battleships with underwater defensive machinery. Defence against aeroplanes ; steps to increase the number of steel plates on the armoured decks of the battleships. Besides these, 3-inch anti-aircraft guns heretofore used will be replaced by 5-inch anti-aircraft guns.
4. Steps to be taken to replace the basket mast, a characteristic of the United States Navy, with the three-legged mast.
5. Steam propulsion to be replaced by electric propulsion.

The last-mentioned, electric propulsion, is a unique mechanism in possession of the United States Navy ; its principle is that a steam turbine operates a generator and the electricity thus generated then moves a motor. Needless to say, a propeller is attached to the shaft of the motor. The reason for the insertion of this superfluous thing between the turbine and the propeller is that the turbine demonstrates its maximum efficiency when it is caused to revolve fast, whereas the underwater propeller, when it is caused to revolve fast, suffers a decrease in its efficiency and also gives rise to various engine troubles ; hence the device is inserted between the turbine and the propeller so as to slow down the speed of rotation. There are two varieties of the device for slowing down the speed of rotation ; all other countries except the United States use the gear-wheel ; but the United States has exchanged the gear-wheel for electric propulsion.

This electric propulsion is a very important device, for it appears

the capacity for endurance navigation can be increased by employing it. It is because of this that the United States Navy is said to have adopted electric propulsion, uneconomic though it is.

It may be noted that the United States Navy in 1912 experimented on the efficiency of this device with the *Jupiter* (now the aircraft carrier *Langley*) and the experiment having proved successful, the device was adopted for the first time in the capital ship *New Mexico*, which was launched in 1917.

In fact, the conjecture that the capacity for endurance navigation of the United States Navy has been extended is witnessed by the observation that the battleship *Maryland* (32,600 tons) laden with 5000 tons of heavy oil seems to be capable of carrying on endurance navigation for a distance of 20,000 miles.

In the event the United States possesses in future 32 capital ships with such a capacity for endurance navigation, she will have the wonder navy of the world.

In Japan there are ten capital ships of the 30,000-ton class; they are the *Mutu*, *Nagato*, *Hyuga*, *Ise*, *Yamasiro*, *Huso*, *Haruna*, *Kirisima*, *Kongo*, and *Hiei*; some of them have been converted into training ships. Of these the two capital ships *Mutu* and *Nagato* have the strongest fighting power; they are by no means inferior to the *Maryland*, the pride of the United States Navy, or to the *Nelson*, the pride of the British Navy. It is also said that the United States is now constructing an unprecedentedly huge battleship of 45,000 tons.

The name of this huge battleship has been identified as the *New Jersey*, and it is said arrangements have been made to start work on the ship on September 16 this year (1940) at the Philadelphia Navy Yard. It is expected that the said ship will become a powerful new capital ship with the following specifications: displacement tonnage—45,000 tons; length of the ship—880 feet; width of the ship—108 feet; 9 16-inch main guns; 12 5-inch auxiliary guns; 4 aeroplanes to be carried; speed—more than 30 knots.

With the United States launching, one after another, such "giant ships, Devils of the Sea," there is no reason for Japan to feel able to enjoy security and comfort. It is said the virtue of Japan's *Bushido* (chivalry) is that when one is cut by the enemy in the skin, he should

cut his enemy's flesh, and when his flesh is cut by his enemy, he should cut his enemy's bone. Defence is offence ; this is a matter to be taken into account after sufficient preparations have been made. The Japanese Navy, too, should not only construct warships for defensive purposes but also should hurry the building of warships many times larger than the existing strength with the object of having sufficient force to attack the enemy.

I feel the patriot rise within me, and I hereby appeal to all the patriots of our country who sincerely share my present sentiment.

2. CRUISERS

Naval battles cannot be fought with capital ships alone. As the words themselves explain, "capital ship" indicates the main force of the naval power. In order to display sufficiently its power and efficiency in battle a capital ship needs aid from all kinds of auxiliary ships.

The United States Navy is at present in possession of 37 cruisers, though until five or six years ago it had only 18 cruisers. New cruisers having been built since then in rapid succession, at the New York and San Francisco dockyards, the United States Navy now has a powerful cruiser squadron. The numerical strength of the cruisers is splendid ; it can on no account be overlooked and ignored.

Of these cruisers, the heavy cruiser *Tuscaloosa* has the following specifications : displacement tonnage—9975 tons ; length—570 feet ; width—62 feet ; draught—20 feet ; mounted guns—9 8-inch guns, 8 5-inch anti-aircraft guns, 2 1.9-inch guns, 8 1.6-inch anti-aircraft guns ; catapults—2 sets ; 4 hydroplanes ; horse-power 10,700 ; speed—32.7 knots.

This heavy cruiser is one of seven heavy cruisers of the *Minneapolis* class. This cruiser was completed in 1934, and now belongs to the Seventh Cruiser Squadron.

On the other hand, the new light cruiser *Savannah* has been constructed in competition with the best of the Japanese cruisers, as well as the British cruisers of the *Southampton* class ; she is one of 9 light cruisers of the *Brooklyn* class, her specifications being as follows :

displacement—10,000 tons ; length—600 feet ; the width—60 feet ; the draught—20 feet ; mounted guns—15 6-inch guns, 8 5-inch anti-aircraft guns, 2 1·9-inch guns, 8 1·6-inch anti-aircraft guns ; catapults—2 sets ; 4 hydroplanes, horse-power 10,000 ; speed—32·7 knots.

This kind of light cruiser is equivalent to the Japanese cruiser of the 10,000-ton class in its effectiveness ; besides 15 mounted guns it has several anti-aircraft guns. The only weakness of this cruiser is the condition of the armour, which is too thin, her broadside armour being only 1½ inches thick. In this connexion it may be noted, however, that new cruisers have undergone a remarkable improvement in the defensive ward inside of them ; that means that even if a cruiser has one hole or two holes in the vicinity of her water-line, she will not easily sink. In fact, the United States will hereafter greatly improve this point so as to strengthen the defensive power of the cruisers, and it is thought she is determined not to shrink even from reducing the speed of the cruisers by 3 or 4 knots in order to accomplish this purpose.

One more thing worthy of note is that the big cruisers have experienced an increase in their capacity to make endurance cruises ; the distance of an endurance cruise for the old cruisers was only 4000 nautical miles, whereas the new cruiser *Salt Lake City* has been able to run for a distance of 13,000 nautical miles at a speed of 15 knots.

The distance between Pearl Harbour and Tokyo Bay being 3380 nautical miles, it is quite impossible for an old-fashioned armoured cruiser to cover the distance, but a big cruiser of the 10,000-ton class has no difficulty in making a round trip between Pearl Harbour and Tokyo Bay. The fact that the distance of endurance navigation has been extended will be a great advantage in the waging of a war of trade destruction. Great caution must be exercised with regard to the big cruisers capable of long-endurance navigation, for no one knows how unruly they may be.

In this connexion it should be remembered that big cruisers carry several aeroplanes and are equipped with catapults. On top of this, a United States cruiser of 10,000 tons is to-day much larger than those of the past, which shows that the United States since the Washington Conference has changed the tonnage of her warships in opposition to the Japanese Navy. In other words, a 10,000-ton cruiser provided

for by the Washington Treaty is now equivalent to one of from 12,000 to 13,000 tons, according to the old customary calculations.

America's big cruisers have 8-inch guns, each gun with a barrel of 55 calibres (55 times 8 inches—that is, 36 feet 8 inches). It is really alarming that the United States big cruisers have such long gun-barrels. Japan and England have guns with a barrel of only 50 calibres.

The longer the gun-barrels are, the greater will be the speed of the shells, and consequently the shells will be able to reach the remotest distance, though the question as to exactly how far the shells will fly cannot be accurately answered until the angle of the guns has been examined.

Supposing the maximum angle of the gun is 40 degrees, it is calculated that a shell can reach a distance of 35,000 yards. They say it is not unlikely that the United States has expanded the angle of the 8-inch guns to 40 degrees, or even more, so as to shoot down aeroplanes.

If so, it is expected that guns with such an expanded angle will exceed the range (34,500 yards) of a 16-inch gun with an angle of 30 degrees. In such an event, the power of such guns will be really fearful.

But this is nothing to be worried about. For though they will reach far, the speed of the shells of 8-inch guns thus discharged will, when they reach a certain remote distance, be so greatly decreased that they will prove to be very ineffective at hitting their marks.

The big cruisers of 10,000 tons mounted with 8-inch guns are as described above. Everyone should bear in mind that this kind of warship will play a ~~vital~~ rôle in the future war not only for Japan but also for the United States, since victory or defeat on the scouting front of a fleet will, above all, be determined by the number of these cruisers.

With regard to cruisers to be constructed by the United States on the basis of her great naval expansion plan, there will be various types, the biggest of which will be from 15,000 to 20,000 tons, a kind never before heard of. The total tonnage of cruisers to be constructed by the United States Navy is 430,000. Each cruiser to be built is

based on the United States Navy's unique device. The time will come when the cruisers of the United States will be far superior to the cruisers of any naval power throughout the world, and the detailed contents and the whole picture of the cruisers will be brought to light.

3. DESTROYERS

The function of the destroyer is to attack the enemy fleet at full speed, with torpedo-tubes as its main weapons. Furthermore, the destroyer has guns mounted on its decks in order to fight enemy destroyers and cruisers, and it is also armed with depth-charges to fight submarines. The destroyer's duty is not only to launch torpedo attacks, but also to make reconnaissances, like cruisers, to be on the look-out for attacks, and to convoy commercial ships.

In reality, the destroyer is a very busy ship in the actual battle. For the movement of a battleship is quite impossible without the protection of destroyers, especially on a sea under which enemy submarines seem to be running amuck. And on a sea where there seem to be enemy mines, the destroyers are engaged in clearing off the mines. When the time finally arrives for a decisive battle between two enemy fleets, the destroyers are engaged in chasing after the torpedo flotilla or attacking the main force of the enemy fleet under cover of a smoke-screen; when night arrives, the destroyers monopolize the theatre of battle; it is at night that they can demonstrate their real power by attacking the enemy fleet in rapid clashes.

The United States heads the list of nations as an owner of destroyers. She has more than 300 of them, that is, about twice England's and about thrice Japan's.

The reason the United States has come to possess such an enormous number of destroyers is that her original intention was, it seems, to fill the gap caused by lack of cruisers with destroyers. However, destroyers being small and with a poor capacity for long-endurance navigation, they tend to exhaust the energy of their crews. From this standpoint a destroyer cannot be such a useful vessel as to take the place of a cruiser.

Whether the United States Navy had become aware of this truth

or not it is hard to tell, but the American Navy League some time ago issued a statement admitting the impossibility of the destroyer's taking the place of the cruiser.

Of more than 300 destroyers of her Navy, the United States has transferred 50 to England, while many superannuated destroyers have been scrapped. Therefore, the number of new destroyers in active service is said to be only 130 or 140. This means the ratio of destroyers between Japan and the United States would be about 2 to 1. But on the day of completion of the great United States armament-expansion programme, which includes 171 destroyers now under construction, making the total 368 destroyers in all, Japan's strength in destroyers will be far beneath comparison with America's.

The existing United States destroyers are old-fashioned, all having been built at the time of the First World War. In this connexion Admiral Yarnell said: "All the American destroyers are no good. I would like to exchange our 300 destroyers for 50 Japanese ones." From this remark the condition of the American destroyers can be guessed.

Destroyers will play a very important rôle when the 'wheel-shaped' formation is organized; they are stationed round the main fleet against torpedo attack by enemy submarine flotillas. For this purpose the United States has carried forward work on 368 new destroyers. In truth any American admiral, no matter how reckless and bold he may be, will never venture to traverse the 5000 miles of the Pacific with such tattered destroyers as those the United States Navy now possesses.

If the United States Navy essays an expedition with a fleet consisting only of battleships and cruisers, without destroyers, it is obvious that they will have an awful time of it. There are various reasons for the hopeless defeat of the Russian Baltic Fleet on the Sea of Japan, but one of them was that the fleet lacked a torpedo flotilla.

It is understood that the new United States destroyers under construction on the basis of the naval-construction plan are, on the average, of 2000 tons each, equipped with 16 torpedo tubes, while the number of guns has been reduced to 5. The United States Navy is making a great study of the possibility of a small war vessel of less than 2000 tons being able to run freely round the theatre of battle on the

rough waves of the Pacific. If 368 destroyers run amuck in the future on the Pacific, that will be a serious matter indeed.

A destroyer of the *Crown* type is said to be capable of making an individual long-endurance navigation for a distance of 6000 nautical miles, laden with 400 tons of heavy oil. A destroyer of the *Thomas* type with a displacement tonnage of 1800 tons has cut down the number of torpedo tubes by 12, but she is capable of developing a speed of 38 knots and cruising a distance of 6000 nautical miles without additional supply.

This capacity for steaming 6000 nautical miles without a stop will enable the United States destroyers to reach Tokyo Bay from Puget Sound and then return to Hawaii.

The United States destroyers will thus be able to continue war operations for more than one week near the waters of Japan after receiving a supply of heavy oil at the islands of Wake and Midway. Here is an alarming state of affairs.

4. AIRCRAFT CARRIERS

The Navy being different from the Army, a moving aerodrome has to be transported to a remote sea-front. The aircraft carriers, as moving aerodromes, take with them to the front the sea air-force.

An aircraft carrier has a peculiar and unpleasant shape which looks as though the vessel were paved with a sheet of steel plate. This war vessel, with the capacity to accommodate a large number of aeroplanes, traverses the oceans, attacking the bases of operation of the enemy fleet, or fighting the enemy air-force. In certain respects aircraft carriers are stronger than battleships.

As a matter of fact, the aircraft carrier has a fearful fighting strength. On top of this, if it is accompanied by battleships, cruisers, and destroyers, it becomes a magnificent and powerful fighting unit.

The weakest point of the aircraft carrier is the easy destruction of her decks. Once the decks are destroyed, an aircraft carrier's life is completely ended. The decks, being of considerable width, easily become the targets of enemy 'planes, and enemy shells can easily make holes in them. Against this danger, aircraft carriers are equipped

with a large number of anti-aircraft guns. They also have as many guns as the cruisers do. Since the first target of the enemy in the theatre of war is the aircraft carrier, it is quite a difficult job to keep the aeroplane decks of carriers intact to the last minute of the battle.

Therefore, any navy endeavours to keep its aircraft carriers away from the vicinity of the theatre of war so that they may be as remote as possible from the enemy fleet.

The United States is at present in possession of 6 aircraft carriers, of which the *Saratoga*, *Lexington*, and *Wasp* are very famous.

Some of them belong to a fighting squadron the scope of whose activities is the Pacific. United States aircraft carriers have their masts, bridges, guns, fire-control stations, and stacks all to the right of the centre, so as to facilitate the taking off and landing of the aeroplanes.

In the future it is thought that aircraft carriers, too, will use Diesel engines so as to dispense with stacks completely, though no navy in the world has as yet advanced that far.

The *Saratoga* has a displacement of 33,000 tons, with a length of 850 feet, a width of 100 feet, and a speed of 33 knots, while her offensive power consists of 8 8-inch guns and 12 5-inch anti-aircraft guns ; there is no 4.8-inch gun.

The characteristics of the new aircraft carrier *Wasp* consist in a displacement tonnage of 14,700 tons, a length of 700 feet, a width of 80 feet, a draught of 20 feet, a mounted gun of 5 inches, 8 anti-aircraft guns, and about 50 aeroplanes, though her horse-power is kept from the public. In displacement tonnage the *Wasp* is 5200 tons smaller than the *Yorktown*, but the size of the vessels is almost equal.

To-day all countries have tended to attach much importance to aircraft carriers of small size. In this respect, a carrier such as the *Wasp* is a new weapon deserving the greatest attention.

The United States Navy, in accordance with the armament-expansion programme, will increase the number of its aircraft carriers to 18 at a bound, and their strength will be more than horror itself. More than this, several carriers of the 25,000-ton class will also appear. In such an event, the fighting strength of the United States Navy will be devilish indeed.

5. SUBMARINES

Submarines, breaking through the rough waves as far as many thousands of miles, reconnoitre the enemy, launching torpedo attacks upon the enemy fleet. Further, during the battle they swim under the destroyers and submarines which surround the enemy battleships, discharging fish torpedoes and thus sinking the enemy warships one after another. There are many navies throughout the world which are in possession of submarines. In all probability, however, the Japanese Navy is the best in respect to submarine-attack tactics.

Accordingly, as soon as war breaks out on the Pacific, a portion of the Japanese Fleet will immediately . . . of the Pacific. It is expected that of all Japanese warships the submarines will carry out the most vigorous activities. Anyone thinking of Japan's submarine tactics in connexion with Pacific war operations cannot help but feel his blood tingle at the thought.

Up to five or six years ago the United States had 127 submarines, but there are now only 103, the rest having been destroyed. Of these 103 submarines, only 80 are in active service. On completion of the great expansion programme, the United States Navy expects to possess 185 submarines.

Admiral Pratt once said: "The chief function of the United States submarines is to exercise guard along the United States coasts." What he said is a mere bluff. If 185 submarines advance towards the Orient and run amuck with the Philippines as the base of operations, Japan must be on the alert.

The big United States submarine of the *Squalus* class has a displacement of 1475 tons, length of 300 feet, width of 26 feet, draught of 14 feet, 1 3-inch anti-aircraft gun, 8 sets of 21-inch torpedo-tubes, 2 bows, a speed of 17 knots on the surface and 8 knots under water. Besides this, the T-class submarines have a displacement tonnage of 1110 tons, and those of V class, 2890 tons; those belonging to the classes of R, S, O, H, L, K, are under 1000 tons. The backbone of the United States submarine fleet consists of the submarines of S class, which are still comparatively young, their size being from 800 to

990 tons. The number of submarines of this class is 50 in all ; therefore, the strength of these vessels can never be discounted.

The submarine is a weapon which encounters a lot of danger because of its smallness. As even the commander of the United States Fleet, in his report, criticized the imperfect ventilation inside the submarine, it is a very unhealthy weapon. Step once inside a submarine, and though you may be able to stand the ventilation, imperfect as it is, your eyes are of a sudden confronted with a world of pitch-darkness which is so narrow and oppressive it seems as though they had been pushed into the internal organs of the human body and, at the same time, as though God were opening a living hell before your eyes.

Think of the members of our submarine crews who are confined inside their submarine for four or five hours, fulfilling their most dangerous duties ; you cannot help but feel deeply grateful to them for their supreme service to their country. In view of the hardships imposed upon the submarine crew, England and the United States, both of which lay emphasis on the idea of individual rights, have a hard time obtaining submarine crews. And there is no reason to expect an excellent fighting spirit from their existing crews.

In this respect Japan is entirely different from America.

A submarine is necessarily accompanied by a submarine depot ship whose function is similar to a mother's, supplying fuel, foodstuffs, or becoming the flagship of the submarine flotilla. In case the submarine is sinking, the depot ship hastens to her rescue.

6. UNITED STATES NAVAL BASES

Without adequate bases of operations no navy, however powerful it may be, can expect to carry out effective war operations.

At the time of the First World War, the Grand Fleet of England chose as its base of operations Scapa Flow, a bay of the Orkney Islands, 475 miles from Heligoland, Germany's naval base, and Cromarty. In the event war breaks out between Japan and the United States, what place will the American Navy choose as her base of operations ?

In order to answer this interesting question we must, first of all, have a knowledge of the existing bases of the United States Navy.

Let me first of all discuss the Philippines, the United States territory strategically closest to Japan. The Cavite naval harbour in Manila Bay should claim our closest attention.

This harbour dates back to the Spanish era ; it was here, on April 30, 1899 [*sic*], that the United States Asiatic Fleet under old Admiral Dewey routed the Spanish Fleet. At present this harbour, standing close to Manila, occupies a most important position as the base of operations for the United States Asiatic Fleet.

Besides this, there is Subig Bay, to the north-west and not far from Manila Bay, and within this bay the Olongapo naval harbour is located, protecting Manila Bay on the flank. From 1905 the United States spent several tens of millions of dollars for the improvement of these two ports, until the Washington Conference curtailed defensive work on them. As a result, work on the ports was suspended for a while, but now the United States is again concentrating her efforts on making all kinds of preparations.

The Philippine archipelago is located south of Formosa across Balitan Channel ; it is so close to the Japanese mainland that Japan should pay it close attention.

Next to the Philippine archipelago the United States territory closest to the Japanese mainland is Guam Island, covering an area of 228 square miles—the biggest of the Marianne Islands. This island relays cable-grams between San Francisco and Manila ; a branch-line of the cable connects Chichijima of the Bonin Islands to the Japanese cable from Tokyo. The defence of Guam gives rise to various problems.

The Apra naval harbour in Guam has a fortress, a great wireless station, and a navy coaling-station. Small though this island is, Bywater, the author of *The Future United States-Japanese War*, calls it the Heligoland, or the Malta, of the Pacific. Thus this island is of great strategic importance. As a result of the Washington Conference this island was also put into the defence-restriction area along with the Philippines.

Secretary of the Navy Knox, after making an inspection of Guam Island, declared : “ I hope that in the United States Pacific defence plan Guam Island will be fortified on a large scale, and as speedily as possible.” Thus he displayed his intention in regard to the United

States Pacific defence plan, which merits keen attention. The rocky area of the island has already been surveyed for an aerodrome. It is even understood that a subterranean hangar is under construction there. It is said that all the subterranean oil-tanks for aviation petrol have been carefully constructed remote from all the important points, on the level ground of the island extending as far as the foot of the mountain.

Wake Island is about 1300 nautical miles north-east of Guam Island, and Midway Island is located about 1200 nautical miles north-east of Guam Island, both of them being United States territories. Wake is a convenient place for the supplying of coal and oil, while Midway relays cablegrams.

These two islands as the front bases for the defence of Hawaii have each a considerable military value. Along the coast in the vicinity of harbours on Midway Island are piled high iron bridge beams painted in red with rust-resistant paint and numerous labourers from both Hawaii and America are engaged in constructing docks and oil-supply stations for submarines and bombers, as well as provisions for the mooring of warships. It is said the harbours and the straits in their vicinity are already capable of accommodating war vessels as big as cruisers. Until two or three years ago this place had almost no defences.

One other place which is worthy of note is Canton Island in the Southern Pacific, which has been transferred to America by England. In fact, this island has suddenly become the object of the world's attention. Work on a naval and air base for the United States on the island is now being steadily carried on.

Until two or three years ago this island, surrounded by the biggest coral islands in the Pacific, was of quite insignificant military value, and no country paid any attention to it. But to-day the world is focusing its keen attention on it as a place which bids fair to play an important rôle in guaranteeing the safety of the United States. By the time this book makes its appearance on the market, the coral lagoons around the island will surely have been dredged, and work on a big naval and air base capable of accommodating the entire United States Fleet, as well as bombers and fighting 'planes, will surely have been completed.

When the United States first became aware of the strategic importance of Canton Island, England, too, focused her eyes upon it ; hence each made simultaneous formal proclamation of possession of the coral island. In the meantime the war-clouds of Europe were growing darker while the Far Eastern crisis was becoming intensified. In view of this state of affairs, both the United States and England at once suspended their dispute over the question of to whom the island should belong, and reached a decision to co-operate with each other for the development of the island, which is of importance to both of them. The lagoons around the island are surrounded by a ridge of white coral, resembling links, the length being 9 miles and the width 3 miles. A portion of the reef having already been dynamited, work in that part has already been started for a complete harbour which will be capable of accommodating the biggest hydroplanes and which will be used for military and commercial purposes.

At present the Clippers are allowed to land and take off in this harbour, and in the event military 'planes fly to it, it will also be used as an air-base. As a matter of fact work on expansion of the harbour is now being hurriedly carried on so that the great United States air-force may immediately fly to it.

Since the outbreak of the European war, England had practically no leisure to look after this island ; she had merely stationed her representative there, and the task of developing the island had been left entirely to the United States. Also, the conversion of the island into an air and naval base for the United States will eventually contribute to strengthen defence of all islands in England's possession, especially Australia. For the United States, also, it is quite obvious that in the event of all the British islands on the Pacific being encroached upon by other powers, her vested rights will be menaced too. Thus, the United States must prevent, at any cost, the British islands from being encroached upon by other countries. Canton Island, therefore, is the busy cross-roads of the Pacific, and it bids fair to continue to make gradual development.

On perusal of a map, one can clearly realize the strategic importance of Canton Island. If the forefront of the United States defence extending to 3000 miles is surveyed, it becomes clear that Canton Island,

which is now being hurriedly armed, becomes a point protecting the strategic triangle of the North American continent (a line connecting Alaska, Hawaii, and Panama) against penetration from the west.

If any country attempts to invade South America from the Far East, she must, reluctant though she may be, pass through the waters adjacent to Canton Island. On the other hand, the naval authorities in Hawaii say that work on the development of Guam, Midway, and Wake, the three sentry points, has been all but completed. Thus it must be considered that the basic work in connexion with the defence of the United States has been finished.

Other United States territories close to Japan are the Aleutian Islands, Alaska.

At the westernmost part of the islands is Kyska, and Unalaska (Dutch Harbour) is located at the easternmost part of the islands, both being very important bases of operations for the United States Auxiliary Fleet. Some persons are of the opinion that the United States Navy, when it attempts the invasion of the north-eastern coast of Japan, will not fail to choose these two islands as its bases of operations.

At the northern point of Alaska, we find an important port called Sitka, and this port is also used as a base of operations for the auxiliary fleet. But as the place is so far off from Japan, while the afore-mentioned two ports are restricted districts, Sitka has no restrictions whatever.

The Tutuila naval harbour in Samoa, the only United States possession in the Southern Pacific, has the same importance in this respect. Since Samoa has a wireless station, a coal station, and a munitions warehouse, it is said it will inevitably become a base of operations for hindering Japan's trade in the event of the outbreak of a United States-Japanese war.

It is also thought that the United States has decided to establish more special regions in Alaska, and it appears that Secretary of the Navy Knox is keeping everything relating to this decision from the public. It appears to be quite natural that the United States should establish an air-base in this region. Anyhow, Alaska claims the keen attention of Japan, as it is opposite to Japan across Bering Strait.

The great naval base of the United States Navy which is closest to Japan is Pearl Harbour. This great harbour is located about 12 miles

from Honolulu on the southern coast of Oahu ; it covers a water area of 10 miles with a depth of water of 60 feet.

This harbour has a huge dock capable of accommodating a big fleet ; the dock was completed in August 1919. There is a strong fortified region armed by big guns of 12-inch, 14-inch, or 16-inch calibre around the bay from Diamond Promontory, the easternmost part of the island. Besides this there is a huge oil-storage station capable of storing from 600,000 to 700,000 tons of heavy oil. In short, this harbour has all kinds of provisions which justify the reputation of the harbour as the No. 1 United States naval base in the Pacific, through which the United States Fleet will advance westward.

Since 1922 provision has been made in this harbour for the accommodation of the entire United States Fleet. As a matter of fact, Pearl Harbour has become an impregnable fortress—what the Americans call the Gibraltar of the Pacific.

The legal numerical strength of the standing army in Hawaii is supposed to be 118,000. But how many soldiers are actually stationed there ? With regard to the strengthening of Pearl Harbour, Secretary of the Navy Knox held the view that with the object of making it the most impregnable fortress in the defence lines of the Pacific, the harbour should be dredged deeper and deeper and that steps should be taken to expand Wheeler Air Field, as well as the fortifications of Oahu. He also insisted on increasing the legal numerical strength of the standing army to 150,000.

In the event a Japanese army attempts a landing on Hawaii, it is said that the numerical strength of the Japanese landing force will be 40,000. If this is so, why does the United States need to have a huge army 150,000 strong in Hawaii arrayed against her assumed enemy—Japan ? Yet it can be presumed, on the basis of the afore-mentioned facts, that in the event of the outbreak of a United States-Japanese war the United States is contemplating using that much of her numerical strength against the Japanese landing force.

A United States naval base on the west coast of the United States is Bremerton, on Puget Sound. There are three great fortresses and two huge docks in this harbour. Besides this, the harbour has an auxiliary-warship dockyard and all other provisions necessary for a naval

harbour. This harbour is one of the chief bases of the United States Navy. Near it is Port Angeles, a base for submarines, destroyers, and aeroplanes. At Sand Point there is an air-base.

About 70 miles south of Bremerton is the Columbia River, noted for its scenic beauty, and in the estuary of this river is Astoria, a small but strongly fortified harbour ; this is being used as a submarine base.

The biggest naval base along the Pacific Coast is the Mare Island naval harbour, at an island in San Pablo Bay north of San Francisco. This small island is about 20 miles from San Francisco, but the water being shallow, the claim of this harbour to first rank is disputable.

Therefore, a new naval base has been established in the vicinity of the Alameda Peninsula opposite San Francisco, with complete provisions for the repair of a big fleet. Thus, within San Francisco Bay, the coastline of which is 300 miles long and the water area of which covers 1600 square miles, two naval bases stand face to face, while the three-and-a-half-mile Strait of the Golden Gate, leading to the ocean, is powerfully defended by impregnable gun batteries which guard the cliffs of both banks, well known as an unparalleled natural fortress.

There is also a fortress at the San Pedro naval harbour, a part of Los Angeles, serving as a base of operations for submarines and aeroplanes. The climate being ideal, San Pedro is an exceptionally good harbour ; there are many Japanese subjects in that area engaged in fishery, though of late years many of them have been driven out.

There is also the famous city of San Diego, the southernmost naval harbour of California, 126 miles from Los Angeles ; this harbour as a naval base has excellent accommodations. It is secure from wind and wave ; the bay is 13 miles in length and from one half mile to two miles in width. The water area of the harbour is about 24 square miles, and the depth is about 36 feet. As compared with depth of water at Mare Island, which is 23 feet, San Diego is far superior in its capacity for accommodating a large up-to-date fleet.

American military experts consider this naval harbour as an important base in connexion with the defence of the Panama Canal ; consequently, all necessary provisions are gradually being made ; a fuel-storing station, a munitions warehouse, a wireless station, an air-base, and

fortifications, while marines are stationed there. This harbour is also notable as a base of operations for auxiliary warships of all descriptions.

With regard to the fortress of the Panama Canal the United States military authorities, straining every nerve, are putting forth supreme efforts to defend it. This kind of fuss is really ludicrous. The Panama Canal is about 46 miles in length (about 18 Japanese *ri*) with water 40 feet deep; it is both politically and economically a very important link, as it connects Panama on the Pacific Coast to Colón on the Atlantic Coast.

Near the entrance of the canal are scattered many small islands, of which Framenco, Perico, and Naos have each a powerful fortress. Along the causeway which extends 3 miles between Balboa Harbour and Naos Island, a coast fortress has been erected, armed with 16-inch, 14-inch, and 6-inch calibre rifle guns, and 12-inch mortars. And on the land a military force has been built up, with several standing regiments of horse, foot, and artillery being stationed there.

Balboa Harbour, moreover, has perfect qualifications as a base of operations from which a large fleet can operate, for it is equipped with a dock fuel-storing station, a munitions warehouse, and a warship-repair factory, all of which are necessary for the servicing of a large fleet.

The United States military authorities, still feeling nervous and uncertain in spite of these preparations, have also taken steps to arm all the more strongly the islands of Paraiso, Taboguilla, and Taboga, which are located in the estuary. Submarines are always stationed there, and an air-base has even been established there.

It is already a fact that cannot be doubted that South America, too, in view of the current situation, will offer to the United States the Galapagos Islands in the Pacific in the waters adjacent to Panama, in the name of joint defence.

The Galapagos Islands are located in the Pacific more than 300 miles west of Ecuador and more than 500 miles south of Panama; they consist of sixteen volcanic islands. The islands cover an area of 30,280,000 [*sic*] square miles with a population of from 500 to 600. Since the opening of the Panama Canal they have played an important rôle as a link between it and Australia. Hereafter, their position will be come all the more important.

It is also rumoured that agreement between the Governments of the United States and of Costa Rica has finally been reached on the lease of Cocos Island to the United States. United States military authorities say that the island is not suitable as a naval base for the United States Navy, but this kind of statement is apparently pedantic. It is a pretence that they are putting up, as they even feel too ashamed themselves to admit frankly the importance of the island.

Taking all the afore-mentioned United States naval bases of operation into consideration, a complicated line linking Manila, Guam, Tutuila, Pearl Harbour, San Diego, Alameda, Bremerton, Sitka, Unalaska, and Kyska constitutes an irregular polygon extending for 15,000 nautical miles, thus encircling the Japanese Islands at the north-west corner of the Pacific, from three angles, south, east, and north.

On top of this, the intention of the United States naval authorities is to blockade the Japanese Islands after the completion of the great armament-expansion programme, and Japan should be on her guard against this United States scheme. Japan is like a mouse driven into a bag.

In the face of this situation, Japan's defensive preparations as well as her defence resources are extremely poor. Indeed, I cannot help but cry, "Are we safe as we are?"

7. THE EXISTING STRENGTH OF THE UNITED STATES ARMY

The United States Army, compared to the Japanese Army, is very poor. The tactics of America are to let the Navy fight first, and then, when the Navy gains victory, the Army will cross the sea and advance into the enemy's land. Therefore, without the Army, America cannot accomplish the ultimate objective of the war.

This United States Army is divided into three groups, the regular Army, the National Guards of the States, and the Reserves, each having its own characteristics. The regular Army is a mercenary force; eight divisions are located on the mainland and one division each in the Panama Canal Zone, Hawaii, and the Philippines.

The National Guards of the States started with the units of volunteers who sprang to arms at the time of the War for Independence; these

units have continued up to the present. There are less than 200,000 of them in all, now. These National Guards are an army of volunteers and lovers of their country. They are neither conscripts nor mercenaries who get salary. Though they are soldiers, they have manœuvres only two or three weeks in a year. But when a war breaks out, it is this Army that has the greatest fighting power. The Reserve Army is a war-time army and, in normal times, only the officers above non-commissioned rank exist. This force must have about 100,000 men.

Such a low-grade army being of little use, America decided to put into force the Compulsory-Military-Service Act, thereby raising an army of 1,200,000 soldiers, including those to be newly recruited.

Besides this, they plan to recruit another 800,000 men in order to make a powerful Army technical corps. Further, the Chief of Staff of the United States Army once said, "We will conscript more men in war-time so that the total force will be 6,500,000 men."

In addition to this, all factories in America will be under Army control in war-time. What a grand plan this is!

The soldiers of the American Army do not seem to be weaklings. Remembering the way the American Army fought at the time of the First World War, we cannot say that they are very good at fighting, but there is something astonishing in their excellent fighting spirit. Everybody dashed at the German positions like wild boars without even thinking of their lives. Therefore England and France were shocked to see the great number of killed and wounded American soldiers.

It is very hard to believe that the soldiers of America, the civilized country of machinery, could be so brave in hand-to-hand fighting, but we can say, from this example, that they have an excellent offensive spirit.

Of course, America being an industrial country, she sets great store by all sorts of machinery. Therefore, a corps such as the armoured-machinery corps is much more abundant than in Germany and is undoubtedly the best in the world. We wonder if their tank corps isn't the best, too.

The main strength of the United States Army is the infantry, just as it is in Japan. The present Chief of Staff, General Summerall, once remarked, "The main force of the American Army is the infantry. The infantry will certainly continue to be the main force."

The present Chief of Chemical Warfare, Lieutenant-General Fries, once carelessly said, "A war is something in which your sole object is victory. The ultimate purpose of a war is just to win. Therefore, in order to win, you do not have to make any choices as to what methods to employ. You can do anything you want to do. Thus, I think the best thing to do is to embark on a violent poison-gas war."

The special strength of the United States Army is in this poison-gas warfare. There have been some corps of chemical-war regiments in the United States Army from its early days, and there are chemical corps stationed in the garrisons in the Panama Canal Zone and Hawaii. Also in a place called Edgewood there is a big poison-gas arsenal which was made with 80,000,000 yen Japanese money. It has ten times as much as the Hachiman steel-mill in Japan has. In this factory many thousands of poison-gas bombs are being manufactured every day ; as to the size of this factory, it is the biggest in the world.

The air-force of the United States is not an independent corps. The organization of her air-force, as I will explain in a later section, is absolutely the same as Japan's ; it is divided between the Army and the Navy.

I would say that no matter how many hundreds of thousands or millions of soldiers the United States Army may have, we should not feel intimidated by it for the time being. It will be a menace to Japan only when the control of the oceans is seized by America. Thus, it can be said that the Navy of America is what we should fear most.

8. THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE UNITED STATES NAVY

While I am on this subject, I will give a brief introduction to the history of the development of the United States Navy. The history of the United States Navy began in 1775 at the time of the War of Independence, when the Revolutionary Congress decided to establish a navy for defence on the sea. They first decided to build some warships at a cost of \$100,000. Following this, it was proposed at the second session that a new fleet should be constructed with thirteen large ships with 24 to 32 guns. This proposal was considered at the third session, which continued for four years beginning in December 1775 ; and it

was this and nothing else that was the origin of the United States Navy Department.

The United States Fleet first decided upon by the national assembly on December 22, 1775, had four ships—*Albert*, *Columbus*, *Andria Dria*, and *Cabot*. At the time of the formation of the United States Navy, it was quite natural that they should learn everything from the navy of their mother country, England—organization, various rules and customs, and even traditions.

During the following few years, they tried to meet the British Fleet using the small boats and small guns each state possessed, but they were defeated each time. In February 1778 the American colonies made a treaty with France, and thereafter they had the aid of the French in attacking the British Fleet. The story of Captain Jones's attacking the British Fleet off Flamborough Head, England, in September 1799, leading the joint fleet of America and France, is a famous one. To-day the United States Navy worships him as the god of battles, and has enshrined him in the chapel of the naval academy in Annapolis.

In 1793, to effect a revival of the decayed American Fleet, construction of six frigates was begun, with a budget of \$300,000 per ship. In 1797, three ships, the *United States*, *Constitution*, and *Constellation*, were launched. They were built according to the plans of Humphreys, the best shipbuilder in America at that time. Of these, two ships exist as national treasures even to-day, over a hundred years since then.

Later, by the time America had dispatched her fleet to the Mediterranean, where it had a battle with the Algerian Fleet, her Navy had gradually become quite powerful. Between this time and the Civil War, the United States ships were used as guards of the slave-ships, for the slave-trade was then at its height. In 1846 two warships visited Yedo Bay. In 1853 Admiral Perry was on his way to visit Japan with two frigates and two sloops.

The states of the North and South split because of the opposition of their opinions, and at the time the Civil War broke out, the Navy consisted of 42 ships in all, of which half were wooden frigates or ships of the line without steam-engines. The most notable achievements

of this war were : first, the Northern fleet blockaded the long coastline for four years ; and second, methods of shipbuilding as well as of munitions manufacturing were improved.

The period between 1870 and 1885 was the most disgraceful period in all the history of the United States Navy. Her fleet could by no means compete with the ocean-going steel ships possessed by European countries at the time.

In 1881, when Garfield became the new President, the reconstruction of the Navy was planned and a proposal to build 70 ships in all was made in Congress, but its discussion was postponed. Two years later, the budget was decided and the following ships were built : three defence (safeguard) cruisers—*Chicago* (4500 tons), *Boston* (3000 tons), *Atlanta* (3000 tons)—and one dispatch boat, *Dolphin* (1500 tons). These four ships are the so-called steel ships, and can be called the ancestors of the modern United States Fleet. These ships, at that time, won their fame throughout the world as “ The White Squadron.” The *Chicago*, particularly, had four 8-inch guns, eight 6-inch guns, and two 5-inch guns ; and as for America, she felt very proud.

In 1885 four more steel ships were built. These were defence cruisers, the *Charleston*, *Baltimore*, *Philadelphia*, and *New York*, and at the same time two gunboats, the *Petrel* and the *Yorktown*, were built. Of these, only the *Charleston* abolished sail equipment, and she became famous as the first American ship equipped with a battle mast.

The ships America built from 1890 to 1897 were 9 battleships, 1 armoured cruiser, 2 defence cruisers, 9 gunboats, 20 torpedo boats, and 1 submarine.

Of these, the *Kearsarge* and the *Kentucky* are of 11,520 tons and were equipped with four 13-inch main batteries, four 8-inch guns, eighteen 5-inch guns, and eighteen small-calibre guns, and they have a speed of 16.9 knots. They were very well-armoured and equipped. Like the United States warships that were built later, they adopted the characteristic main-battery arrangement of the United States Navy, which is to place the 8-inch twin turrets on top of the twin 13-inch main-battery turrets which are carried on the front and back of the ship. No warships of any leading nations at the time carried an auxiliary gun on top of the main-battery turrets ; therefore when

these ships were completed, they were a great marvel to the shipbuilding experts of the world.

In 1898, 70 big and small ships were built. Of these, the armoured cruisers *New York* and *Brooklyn* were the flower of the world's warships. The high-speed cruisers *Minneapolis* and *Columbia*, used for commerce-raiding, were also remarkable ships.

On the outbreak of the Spanish-American War in 1898, the Dewey Fleet captured Manila Bay, and General Sampson won an overwhelming victory at the battle off the coast of Santiago, completely annihilating the Spanish Fleet. The United States Navy greatly distinguished itself and this was really due to the new ships, which had a considerable fighting power.

As a result of this war, the United States was able to expand its foreign territories, which gave rise to the need for construction of a larger fleet.

During the first six years of the twentieth century, the United States Navy made a great advance, and all of a sudden she was in possession of a large fleet, next, in fact, to the English and German Fleets. Twelve battleships in all were built during the six years from 1900 to 1905, and in addition, 7 armoured cruisers, 3 defence cruisers, 3 reconnaissance cruisers, 2 gunboats, 2 training ships, 11 submarines, and colliers and tug-boats were supplied.

In 1905 it was decided to build two new ships, the *Michigan* and the *South Carolina*, adopting the principle of a big warship with big guns. These two ships are the No. 1 and No. 2 dreadnoughts, and they are the forerunners of the modern United States capital ships.

There followed, in 1906, the *Delaware* (20,000 tons); in 1907, her sister ship, the *North Dakota*; in 1908, two ships of the same type, the *Utah* and the *Florida* (each weighing 21,825 tons); in 1909, the *Arkansas* and the *Wyoming* (each weighing 26,000 tons); in 1910, the *New York* and the *Texas* (each weighing 27,000 tons); in 1911, the *Nevada* and the *Oklahoma*; in 1912, the *Pennsylvania* (31,400 tons); in 1913, the *Arizona*; in 1914, 3 ships were built at once, the *New Mexico*, the *Mississippi*, and the *Idaho* (each weighing 32,000 tons); in 1915, the *California* and the *Tennessee* (each weighing 32,300 tons); in 1916, the *Colorado*, the *Maryland*, the *West Virginia*, and the

Washington (each weighing 32,600 tons) were planned; from 1917 to 1918 it was agreed to build 6 huge battleships of the *Massachusetts* class, with a displacement of 43,200 tons, 3 ships each year; the ship-building plan of 1916 was for 4 cruisers of 43,500 tons; and in 1917 and 1918 1 cruiser was planned for each year, making a total of 6 cruisers.

These warships were increasing their displacement from year to year, and the calibre of their main batteries was becoming larger and larger.

After the first European war, America, who became a millionaire overnight, arming herself with her dollars, launched a powerful ship-building policy. The building of many cruisers of one type displayed the characteristic American expansion. But in 1921 the Washington Treaty at last succeeded in checking this, so that England and America became equal and possessed 15 battleships apiece. Construction on the six huge ships of the *Massachusetts* class which were, at the time, being built or planned, and on the 6 cruisers of the *Washington* and *Constellation* class, was suspended, except for 2 that were converted into aircraft carriers. America has maintained this status up to the present.

But when the second European war broke out, America planned a great expansion, and put it into execution.

The realization of her plan would be a serious affair even for the strong countries. It seems that we are not far from the day when America, who always aims at being No. 1 in the world, will also attain the position of having the best navy in the world.

CHAPTER VI

THE NEW UNITED STATES WEAPONS AND MECHANIZED FORCES

I. NEW WEAPONS

IN the United States Army and Navy there is a countless number of splendid weapons.

Of the weapons, guns have, needless to say, the strongest fighting power. The astounding development of the gun is evidenced by the fact that it is possible for a long-distance gun to shoot the distance between Tokyo and Shizuoka. There are many kinds of guns; the Army has field-guns, horse guns, mountain guns, 4-inch Kano-guns, and railway guns. American shells are made with especially powerful gunpowder; in fact, painstaking efforts are being made by the United States Army to turn out shells capable of shooting at the enemy from a great distance.

It is said that the railway gun is able to shoot at the enemy from a distance of more than 50,000 yards. The field-gun has a calibre of 2.8 inches, its function being to aim at the enemy on the field of battle. Therefore, it should be able to shoot as rapidly as possible and as far as possible. The new-style American field-gun is capable of aiming at a distance of 22,000 yards, which means that its shooting capacity is similar to that of machine-guns. It is also said the United States has invented the best heavy guns in the world, though the details still remain to be published.

Among the horse guns, mountain guns, howitzers, and field-howitzers, many have excellent characteristics; and besides these field-guns, there are splendid coast guns (heavy guns) defending coast fortresses, as well as siege-guns for attacking enemy fortresses. The railway gun is also a long-distance gun defending the coasts; and it is an alarming fact that the United States is in possession of many hundreds of cars for armoured and military trains.

Parallel with the development of aeroplanes there have appeared anti-aircraft guns of good quality. With the object of shooting down aeroplanes the munitions workshops are now vigorously turning out anti-aircraft guns of various descriptions. The smallest anti-aircraft gun is identical with a rifle, but the biggest one is equivalent to a cannon. One battery consists of from three to four anti-aircraft guns. For its main force—the infantry—the United States Army has recently developed a light rifle capable of shooting a distance of 6500 yards. The rifle is small, but without it it is quite impossible to wage any kind of war. As a matter of fact, war is absolutely impossible, either offensively or defensively, without rifles. For a rifle is the only weapon which a soldier holds firmly in his hands for his own protection.

The American machine-gun can shoot 800 bullets a minute, and its performance excelling that of the Czechoslovakian type, it can be claimed the best gun of its kind in the world. The power of the machine-gun is really terrific, but its only defect is that it is too heavy. In the matter of weight, too, the American machine-gun claims to be the best in the world.

With regard to the electric gun, America's best energy is absorbed in its study and invention. At the time of the First World War a great wonder was Germany's Big Bertha, with a calibre of 8.4 inches, and a gun barrel of 120 feet, it had a 55-degree angle, a 270-pound shell, a range of 75 miles, shooting to an altitude of 25 miles, the shell traversing its course in three minutes. Stimulated by this the United States, in accordance with her principle of producing the world's best, as well as for her own satisfaction, turned out a long-distance gun with a calibre of 10 inches, a gun barrel of 225 feet, a shell weighing 400 pounds (the gunpowder weighing 1440 pounds), shooting to an altitude of 46 miles, and flying for a distance of 121 miles in about five minutes. But the gun barrel is so long that there is fear of its being bent, so it is supported by sets of beams like a bridge.

Even if such a gigantic American gun makes its appearance, the fact still remains that it uses gunpowder, and it is therefore impossible to expand the pressure and temperature within the tube of the gun a great deal, and such being the case, the initial velocity of the shell cannot be increased very much. In the case of a gun, the greater

the speed of the shell at the time of its discharge, the farther it will reach.

Without this vital defect, the electric gun demonstrates its characteristics to the last as a long-distance gun.

The electric gun is a gun using electricity in place of gunpowder. It was invented by a Frenchman named Fauchon Villeplée in 1916. At present, study on this particular kind of weapon is making amazing progress.

Details about the new weapon are kept strictly secret ; but in brief, if iron is placed near the end of a coil of copper wire carrying an electric current, it is drawn into the coil ; that is to say, the electric gun shoots shells on the principle observed in this electrical experiment.

Many such coils are lined up within the gun barrel, and if current is passed through the first coil, the shell is drawn in. Next turn off the current in the first coil and pass it through the second coil, and the shell will be drawn on into the centre of that coil. Meantime, the speed increases more and more until by the time the shell departs from the gun it will be flying, according to the calculations of Fauchon Villeplée, at a speed of a mile a second (equivalent to that of the Big Bertha).

The Fauchon Villeplée electric gun is 100 feet in length, the shell weighing 220 pounds and the gun barrel 150 tons, and the whole thing weighs 450 tons. It is said the maximum range of this gun is 500 miles. Whether this is true or not is uncertain, but if true, this gun will be able to shoot easily from France to Berlin and Rome. Thus the only super-long-distance gun possible is the electric gun. Then is it America's secret design, in the event of a United States-Japanese war, to confound the Japanese Navy with electric guns which are now hidden ?

2. FEARFUL CHEMICAL WARFARE

There are various kinds of projectiles in use by the United States—shrapnel, shells, demolition bombs, armour-piercing shells, incendiary bombs, smoke bombs, flare bombs, poison-gas shells, etc. A bomb such as the time-bomb used by Germany in the bombing of London

had already been manufactured in America ten years before. This bomb is devised in such a way as to delay the explosion so that the bomb may explode after a certain period. In siege warfare the demolition bomb develops most dreadful power. Armour-piercing shells are used by coast guns and other big offensive guns ; with these shells battle is waged against warships attacking fortresses from the sea. The biggest of this type can pierce through steel plate 12 inches thick ; therefore, cruisers do not approach coast fortifications. Even a small armour-piercing shell is a formidable foe to tanks, as it is powerful enough to pierce their iron plates ; and, to make matters worse, it bursts inside the tank.

The incendiary bomb is made of incendiary chemical material which burns the enemy positions and everything it comes across. The smoke bomb produces a smoke screen ; once it bursts, the theatre of battle is converted into a sea of white cloud.

Flare bombs are made of bright-burning chemicals such as magnesium and aluminium, the purpose being to disclose the night activities of the enemy, or to discover aeroplanes flying at night.

A tank goes forward across trenches and barbed wire, but even so irresistible a weapon has a defect, for its armour is not as thick as it appears. Once it is hit by a powerful demolition bomb, its life is over. As a result of this defect, tanks of smaller size capable of advancing a greater distance and with thicker armour-plate have made their appearance. The United States Army has turned out such a tank, called the Christy, which is capable of developing a speed of 62 miles per hour ; it is expected on the other hand that heavy tanks will continually increase in size. It is not unlikely that the United States Army is building a horde of big tanks, each of from 10 or 15 tons to 20 tons. The big tanks move with much noise, trampling underfoot and demolishing trenches and barbed wire, thus paving the way for the advance of the light tanks, infantry, and artillery which follow on their heels. Because of the abundance of natural resources such as petrol and heavy oil in the United States, these tanks should surely be able to move about very actively.

Not only tanks operated by petrol but also tanks operated by electricity are said to have been made in the United States.

The armoured car is the sister of the tank, and very similar to it, being equipped with an inexhaustible track. Among the armoured cars are the transport car, the foodstuff car, the wireless car, the printing car, etc. The United States, the greatest producer of automobiles, is indeed in possession of countless different kinds of armoured cars. It appears that the United States Army, in consideration of importance of the tank in the present European war, is devoting itself to improving its tanks as well as its mechanized detachments. It is said that a plan is now on foot to turn out standardized tanks so that they may be used by both the United States and England.

The United States Navy has not so many kinds of projectiles as the Army ; its main one is the armour-piercing shell, which has a strong piercing power. A 16-inch shell weighs 1000 pounds, and it can pierce an iron plate 63 inches thick. The powder chiefly used by the Navy is mostly smokeless. Smokeless powder increases the velocity of the shell. If an enemy shell hits a warship in her powder magazine, the warship will sink within a few minutes. In view of this, the strictest guard is exercised aboard warships for protection of their powder magazines.

Besides these, the United States Navy has many extremely splendid anti-aircraft guns, powerful cannon, and small machine-guns.

As for torpedoes and mines, the United States Navy is making a special study of all kinds, including submarine mines and magnetic mines. The Navy is helpless in battle without optical and electric instruments. America, being next to Germany in the production of lenses, turns out the best optical instruments, such as telescopes, distance-measuring machines, periscopes, range-finders. The electric instruments are the wireless telegraph and the telephone, which are the ears and voice of the Navy. Unless it has these electric weapons in a naval battle on the Pacific, the Navy will be as helpless as a dummy. America is the most advanced country in television, too ; the function of television is to enable submarines and cruisers, active in reconnaissance near enemy bases, to show to the headquarters of their main fleet the activities of the enemy fleet.

Electricity not only is in use for fighting purposes, but also runs almost all machines inside the warship. For example, communications

are by means of electricity, and illumination, too, while a searchlight is a weapon indispensable to night watch and signalling. The optical telephone has been used for a long time for the transmission of conversation by translating sound into light and light back into sound. With this machine any kind of secret can be transmitted. It works on the principle of the talking picture.

America's poison-gas warfare, that is, chemical warfare, is most dreadful. In this type of warfare, perhaps even Japan cannot beat America.

The army of Japan's western neighbour, the Soviet Union, has also been strenuously studying chemical warfare, and the fact that the two countries—the Soviet Union and the United States—are devoted to this study is really a danger to Japan. Such being the case, Japan should be fully prepared to cope with this type of attack.

If a poison-gas shell containing a potent poison is shot by a mortar to a great distance, its effect would be far from small, for 200 tons of yperite would be able to annihilate the entire populations of Tokyo, Osaka, and Nagoya. Remember that in the First World War the British Army alone suffered 170,000 casualties owing to poison-gas.

Will America wage this poison-gas warfare? Perhaps America, the stronghold of Jewish politics, whose favourite words have always been peace and humanity, will not venture to commit such an inhumane action. It must, however, be borne in mind that the United States has already created many large-scale chemical-warfare regiments, and that chemical-warfare detachments are part of the garrisons in the Panama Canal and Hawaii.

Look at the big poison-gas plant at Edgewood, which has been established at an estimated cost of 80,000,000 yen. Is it not the largest plant of its kind in the world?

Also look at the poison-gas disseminating, throwing, and long-distance projecting machines, which are being manufactured every day by the munition factories in the United States. Do they not produce every day many hundreds or many thousands of gas-projecting machines with a calibre of from 4 to 8 inches?

Supposing several tens of these projecting machines were lined up and fired simultaneously by means of an electric current—poison-gas

would hover like clouds to a distance of from 2000 to 10,000 feet, and many tens of miles in width. The United States Navy, too, is busily occupied in the practice of chemical warfare. During the First World War the Army employed poison-gas, but the Navy saw the end of the war without waging any chemical warfare. From now on, however, the United States Navy will undoubtedly not fail to use it.

Lieutenant-General Fries of America speaks to this effect :

From now on, twenty per cent of the Navy's shells will be filled with poison-gas. If a warship is hit by a poison-gas shell, the shell travelling at terrific speed will penetrate into the warship, filling every cabin with poison-gas in a short time. In such a case, the enemy sailors will be unable to move without gas-masks.

General Mitchell remarked : " If an enemy warship is hit by a tear-gas shell of twenty-five pounds, all members of the crew will collapse weeping."

In chemical warfare there are also the smoke tube, incendiary powder, and flame-thrower, besides poison-gas. The flame-thrower blows out flame through the medium of compressed air to a distance of 160 feet, burning with a fearful intensity for about two minutes. This flame will burn down forests, villages, enemy positions, and everything it touches. If an attack is launched with this weapon of flame, enemy troops, even at the bottom of their trenches, will have no way to avoid being burnt to death.

To a certain extent it has now become possible to harness radio waves. When we see phantom tanks advancing or making a halt without anybody in them, we feel as though we can imagine an unmanned armoured corps executing manœuvres on a future battlefield.

America is the leading country in the development of wireless. Some people are inclined to think that the electric wave itself becomes a motive power in operating tanks, but this is a gross misunderstanding. It goes without saying that the warship is laden with a sufficient amount of fuel ; the gun contains powder. But the idea of control by wireless waves is that the waves are transmitted in such a way as to give a certain stimulus to the warship's controls, and in this way the control

automatically operates the rudder, throws coal into the furnace, and even shoots the guns. Another marvellous thing is the skilful combination of infra-red ray television and infra-red ray nocturnal vision. In the event of war enemy aeroplanes must invade the skies over cities. On such an occasion the so-called "black light" searchlight will be made to search the city skies from all angles and this searchlight being invisible to human eyes, the blacked-out and silent cities will enjoy an untroubled sleep under the eyes of the enemy 'planes. How silly are the enemy 'planes which rashly fly over it. In such an event, the black light searchlight will, first of all, illuminate the enemy 'planes, the reflection of which will be caught by television as well as by nocturnal vision. Thus the action of the enemy 'planes can be observed while one is seated in one's room. Among other things, infra-red rays are ten times stronger than ordinary light in penetrating into fog. Furthermore, the observation of black light with human eyes can be accomplished in this way : by the use of ultra-violet rays a spark of light is caused to appear on a plate, and the spark of light vanishes the moment an infra-red ray comes into contact with the plate. That is the principle of nocturnal vision, and if this principle is applied black light is also visible.

It is the death ray which is in the twilight zone between existence and invisibility, attempting to be a menace like a dummy warrior. It is, however, highly doubtful as to whether modern science has advanced to such a stage as to produce the death ray, which is reported to have been discovered in the United States.

There are the X-ray, the ultra-violet ray, the gamma ray, and so forth, which function in various ways, but which are not powerful enough to be effective at great distances. On the other hand, the wireless wave reaches a great distance, but its destructive effect is not so great. But the death ray will doubtlessly not end up merely as something out of a fairy tale. We are fast approaching the materialization of this ray in some form or other ; this is a fact.

Let me mention briefly the "deadly sound wave." This is the sound produced when a crystal plate is caused to vibrate by electricity. The speed of vibration of this sound being higher than ordinary sound, the deadly sound wave is inaudible, but it is powerful enough to destroy

the cells of living things. For example, fish and mice can be killed by this sound. With regard to the application of this sound to a large-scale theatre of battle nothing definite is as yet understood.

In addition to these, there might crop up bacteria warfare—typhus, dysentery, diphtheria, tuberculosis, and others ; and would it not be like the United States to take our Japanese nation by surprise with these new weapons and tactics ?

CHAPTER VII

THE GREAT UNITED STATES AIR-FORCE

I. THE HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES AIR-FORCE

PERHAPS it was General William Mitchell of the United States who once remarked, "The Army will eventually become an accessory of the air-force."

The United States air-force is a powerful one indeed. An interesting fact is that its organization is similar to Japan's in the respect that the United States Army and the Navy each has an independent air-force of its own. Up to four or five years ago the numerical strength of the United States Army air-force was 1800 aeroplanes, about twice the air strength of the Japanese Army, but to-day the United States air-force is far stronger than it was then.

The United States Army 'planes four or five years ago were mostly Curtiss fighting 'planes and bombers, Boeing fighting 'planes, and Keystone bombers; these 'planes were by no means despicable, but they were not remarkably strong. Besides these, there are 1000 aeroplanes in the possession of the United States Navy, while the air-reserve corps consists of more than 10,000 aeroplanes, most of them being civilian 'planes.

In the following I am going to talk, in detail, about the United States naval air squadron. It may be recalled that the United States naval air squadron in the summer of 1911 was a poor one, consisting of only three aeroplanes. A man named Captain Chambers was appointed chief of the aviation section in the General Affairs Bureau of the United States Navy Department, while the United States Aviation Bureau allotted a sum of \$25,000 for aviation services. At the same time, First-Lieutenant Theodore T. Ellison, who had obtained the aviation licence of the American Aviation Club, was appointed an air officer in the United States Navy.

Selection was then made of one aeroplane of the Wright type, and

two aeroplanes of the Curtiss type, with Junior-Lieutenants Rogers and Towers as students. In August 1911 Rogers obtained an aviation licence to fly 'planes of the Wright type, and Towers one to fly those of the Curtiss type the following month. Aeroplane No. 1 of the Curtiss type was a land 'plane equipped with a 40-horse-power engine, as well as with pilot seats on each end of the 'plane, and it was capable of developing a maximum speed of 55 miles per hour. On the other hand, aeroplane No. 2 was a hydroplane of the Curtiss O.X. type, equipped with an eight-cylinder 80-horse-power engine, and it had a speed of 57 miles per hour.

The Wright type 'plane was a land aeroplane of the Baby type, equipped with a 32-horse-power engine, while by means of a chain two propellers of the propulsion style were made to rotate—which caused Rogers to call it “the flying windmill.” Besides these two aviators, there was one other person, Victor D. Herbster, who worked as an apprentice at the Wright Aviation Company in Dayton; he was actually the ace of pilots in the United States.

Considerable experimental flying has been done in the United States. Thus, Mr Eugene Ely, on November 14, 1910, succeeded in taking off from the United States cruiser *Birmingham* in a biplane of the Curtiss type, and on January 18, 1911, he also successfully landed on the deck of the United States warship *Pennsylvania* in the same 'plane. In the latter case it may be noted that the bottom of the 'plane was equipped with a grappling-hook while the landing-deck on the *Pennsylvania* was specially built. To be more particular, the landing-deck was 46 feet in width (only 4 feet wider than the width of the aeroplane's wing) and 125 feet in length, and was equipped with more than ten ropes to which sandbags were fastened at each end. Mr Ely landed beautifully on this deck at a speed of 40 miles an hour.

This successful experimental flight impressed the United States naval authorities so much that they took steps to bring into being an aviation section at an estimated cost of \$25,000. In July 1912 First-Lieutenant Ellison, the senior pilot, made at Annapolis the first experiment of launching an aeroplane by means of the compressed-air catapult; it resulted in failure, the machine being badly damaged. However, in November of the same year the second experiment was

successfully made under the guidance of Junior-Captain Richardson, the architectural engineer.

Thus, aviation was put under the Strategy Bureau in the United States Navy Department in August 1913, though the United States Army had set the example four years earlier. The present Director of the Aviation Bureau in the United States Navy Department is Rear-Admiral John Towers, who was the No. 3 senior pilot of the United States Navy; the rest of his colleagues are now dead.

In 1913 the Naval Aviation Academy was established at Pensacola, the first head of the institution being Junior-Lieutenant John H. Towers; the institution is said to have started with eight training aeroplanes of the Curtiss O.X. type and two of the Wright type (four Star-Davent cylinders); but to-day the Pensacola aviation school is always in possession of several hundred elementary-training and practical aeroplanes. Indeed, this remarkable contrast between the past of the institution and its present fills one with ineffable emotion.

The Pensacola Naval Aviation Academy, which is in the State of Florida, is almost similar to the Kasumigaura Air Academy in Japan, for it is devoted to training 600 "young eagles" every year. On completion of his training at this institution the aviator receives further training by going into Fleet service for three years. Admission to the said squadron is limited to men under 20 years of age—bluejackets, naval reservists, members of the Marine Corps and of the Naval Reserve Corps, and the people at large. Also the graduates of Annapolis Naval Academy and those naval officers who have served aboard warships for more than two years are qualified for enlistment in the aviation squadron. They are required to serve for four years, including the training period. The examination for admission is strict; it covers studies, character, physical condition, and psychology. Those admitted into the squadron are trained with 325 hours of flight a year; that is, each member of the squadron is required to fly for one hour every day. The monthly salary is \$75 in addition to \$1 allowance every day. Each member is supplied at Government expense with his uniform and all other necessary things; he also has his life insured for \$10,000, the premium of which is paid by the Government during the period of his service.

On graduation from this Academy the aviator is made a naval officer with a monthly salary of \$125. After serving in the Navy for three years he takes an examination for promotion, and if he passes it, he is promoted to the rank of Junior-Lieutenant with a bonus of \$1000 in cash and then put in the reserve corps. If he is desirous of serving the Navy three years more as a Junior-Lieutenant, he is paid a bonus of \$500 when he is put in the reserve corps after his three years' service. The training and life are very strict.

A squadron is organized with eight students, and it is divided into two wings—left and right. On the day when the left wing receives training on the ground, the right wing receives training in the air, and vice versa. The schedule of training is subject to change in order that the students of both wings may experience all types of weather in their training. The following are the contents of the physical science courses which are given to aviation students :

The course on the engine

The principles of the engine ; dismantling and repair ; theory of the mechanical organization ; system of evaporation ; system of ignition ; practical engine ; discovery of engine trouble.

The course on the chassis

Aviation dynamics ; aeroplane design ; the propeller ; progress of work at the factory ; repair of the chassis and dismantling and repair of the engine.

The course on communications

Principles and practical application of the wireless telephone ; aeronautics based on the application of the wireless telephone.

The course on gunnery

Estimation of distance for rapid firing ; aviation gunnery ; armaments ; theory of bombing.

The course on photography

Photographing from the air ; the method of using optical in-

struments in photography ; aerial-map photography ; photographic chemistry ; materials.

The course on aeronautics

Instruments ; construction ; theory and practice of air navigation ; tactics ; strategy ; navigation based on astronomical observation ; air tactics.

The course on meteorology

The causes of storms ; weather maps ; meteorology.

Flight training is performed in the following five squads : The first squad (elementary-training hydroplanes) ; the second squad (elementary land training 'planes) ; the third squad (combat land 'planes) ; the fourth squad (combat hydroplanes), and the fifth squad (the high-level combat aeroplanes).

The training of the first squad consists in solo flight. For the first forty-five hours the student makes solo flights, alighting with the motor running. Having completed practice in landing on the limited landing-ground, and the basic high-level flight, he is admitted to the second squad, in which he receives training in flight for about eighty-five hours. The second squad is located at the Cory aerodrome about four miles from Pensacola, and its training consists in the elementary piloting of the land 'plane, high-level flying, formation flying, and night flying. After finishing this training he moves up to the third squad, which gives him a chance of mastering the skill of piloting a land 'plane in actual use, instead of a hydroplane. Following this stage he becomes a full-fledged pilot, and after that he is allowed to make a co-operative practice flight in elementary air tactics with other pilots. In addition, he receives training in shooting the revolving gun, using wireless telegraph or dead reckoning, and open-air aeronautics.

In the fourth squad he learns piloting, including that of hydroplanes in actual use. At this stage he is given a training distinctly characteristic of the Navy, which is different from the Army aviation squadron. That is to say, the training of the fourth squad consists of launching aeroplanes by means of catapults, high-altitude flight, and horizontal

bombing, as well as flight based on dead reckoning or on astronomical observation.

The last, the fifth, squad again returns to the land 'plane and gets training in the combat 'planes with high performance in instrument flight (training for this flight lasts until one passes the examination for regular aviation service), the piloting and tactics of the solo fighting 'plane, dive-bombing, with the ability to make a forced landing, the operation of the fixed machine-gun, high-altitude flight, field operations, high-level formation flight, and shooting torpedoes by means of torpedo 'planes.

The Commander of the Pensacola Aviation Academy is Captain W. Fitch, who graduated from the Naval Academy at Annapolis in 1906 ; after serving in the United States Fleet he became in 1930 the Commander of the Aviation Corps of the battleship squadron. Since June 1938 to date he has been Commander of the Pensacola Aviation Academy.

2. THE EXISTING STRENGTH OF THE UNITED STATES AIR-FORCE

What is the existing strength of the United States Naval Aviation Squadron ?

An air company of the United States Navy is composed of 18 'planes and is divided into two squads, each of them with 9 'planes. It may be noted that each battleship and cruiser carries aeroplanes ; in the case of the former there are 3 observation 'planes, while cruisers of Class A carry 4 reconnaissance 'planes and those of Class B 2 reconnaissance 'planes.

a. The Battleship Fleet

The battleship flotilla : 12 battleships carrying 36 aeroplanes (3 each).

The cruiser flotilla of Class B : 8 cruisers carrying 16 aeroplanes (2 each).

The flagship (a cruiser of Class B) of the destroyer flotilla carrying 2 aeroplanes.

The aircraft carrier flotilla : 5 carriers with 360 aeroplanes, each ship carrying one company apiece of fighting 'planes, light bombers,

reconnaissance bombing 'planes, and torpedo 'planes, as well as some other miscellaneous 'planes. The grand total of aeroplanes carried by the Battleship Fleet is 414.

b. The Scouting Fleet

The cruiser flotilla of Class A : 16 cruisers carrying 64 aeroplanes (4 each).

The flagship (a cruiser of Class B) of the destroyer flotilla : 1 ship carrying 2 aeroplanes.

The aircraft carrier flotilla ; 2 seaplane carriers with 48 aeroplanes (each ship with two companies of hydroplanes—each company consisting of about 12 'planes).

Bases for the coast flight of hydroplanes : Pearl Harbour, Cocos Island, Sitka, Seattle, Norfolk, and San Pedro. There are about 13 companies consisting of 156 aeroplanes. The grand total of 'planes carried by the Scouting Fleet is 272.

c. The Marine Corps attached to the Fleet

Quincy and San Diego : One company of each of the following : fighting 'planes, reconnaissance 'planes, bombers. Besides these are aeroplanes for miscellaneous services—in all, 108 (each company consisting of from 12 to 18 'planes).

d. The Asiatic Fleet

A cruiser of Class A carrying 4 aeroplanes.

An auxiliary aircraft carrier carrying 6 aeroplanes (2 'planes for miscellaneous service).

e. The Landing Party

The reserve corps of the Pensacola Aviation Academy (with 300 aeroplanes of all descriptions), and reserve aviation squadrons, at Floyd Bennett Field, Chicago, Boston, Long Beach, Seattle, Miami, St Louis, Kansas City, Oakland, Minneapolis, Detroit, Philadelphia, Anacostia ; making a total of 13 bases with about 200 'planes. The dirigible corps of the Lakehurst Aviation Squadron is in possession of 4 dirigibles for military purposes and one heavy dirigible for training purposes. The

grand total is : 500 aeroplanes, 4 light dirigibles, and 1 heavy dirigible. Among the afore-mentioned 'planes the aviation squadron of the Battle-ship Fleet is as follows :

Bombers : 5 squads—2, 3, 4, 5, 6.

Fighting 'planes : 5 squads—2, 3, 4, 5, 6.

Reconnaissance 'planes : 6 squads—2, 3, 5, 6, 41, 42.

Torpedo and bombing 'planes : 4 squads—2, 3, 5, 6.

Observation 'planes : 4 squads—1, 2, 3, 4.

Cruiser reconnaissance 'planes : 3 squads—2, 3, 8.

The aviation squadron of the Scouting Fleet is as follows :

Scouting seaplanes : 18 squads, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 19.

Cruiser reconnaissance 'planes : 4 squads, 4, 5, 6, 7.

The above organization of the aviation squadron seems to have undergone a little change, but it has been presented for the sake of reference.

The code addresses of the United States Aviation Squadron follow :

VB stands for Bombing.

VF stands for Fighting.

VJ stands for All-purpose.

VT stands for Torpedoing.

VR stands for Transportation.

VO stands for Observation.

VP stands for Scouting.

VS stands for Reconnaissance.

VN stands for Training.

Any 'plane with two duties has two letters, its first duty being indicated by the second letter. In the case of other duty being indicated, a third letter is added as follows :

VBF stands for Bombing and Fighting.

VOS stands for Observation and Reconnaissance.

VPB stands for Scouting and Bombing.

VSB stands for Reconnaissance and Bombing.

VSO stands for Reconnaissance and Observation.

VTB stands for Torpedoing and Bombing.

VJR stands for All-Purpose and Transportation.

The magnificent set-up of the United States Naval Aviation Squadron can be understood in part from the foregoing statistics. Specifications of the aeroplanes in actual use and those for experimental purposes are as follows :

Fighting 'Planes

Grumman FL type biplane with retracting landing-gear ; star-shaped Wright Cyclone air-cooled engine ; speed 240 miles per hour ; speed of climb 45 feet per second ; distance of endurance flight, 720 miles. Brewster XF2A-1 I type monoplane with retracting landing-gear, equipped with a Twin Wasp Junior 650-horse-power engine. Other details regarding its specifications are uncertain. Middle-wing Grumman XF4F-2 type monoplane with retracting landing-gear.

Reconnaissance-Observation 'Planes

Vought-Sikorsky OS2U-1 middle-wing monoplane for use on both land and water ; a Wasp Junior 400-horse-power engine. Other details are uncertain. Curtiss XSO3C-1 middle-wing monoplane, a scout 'plane for use on both land and water ; 12-cylinder V type 420 horse-power air-cooled engine.

Reconnaissance-Bombing 'Planes

Bel BG type biplane ; 750-horse-power Wright Cyclone engine ; maximum speed, 210 miles per hour ; distance of endurance flight, 660 miles. Curtiss Hell-Diver 77 type biplane with retracting landing-gear ; 840-horse-power Wright Cyclone engine ; maximum speed, 235 miles per hour ; distance of endurance flight, 600 miles. Vought V-142 type ; 750-horse-power Twin Wasp Junior engine ; maximum speed, 210 miles per hour ; speed of climb, 22 feet per second ; distance of endurance flight, 1000 miles. Curtiss SBC-3 type biplane with retracting landing-gear ; 850-horse-power Twin Wasp engine. Brewster XSBA-1 type ; middle-wing monoplane with retracting landing-gear.

Vought XSB2U-1 type low-wing monoplane with retracting landing-gear ; 700-horse-power Twin Wasp Junior engine.

Torpedo-Bombing 'Planes

Douglas XTBD-1 type ; low-wing monoplane with retracting landing-gear ; 850-horse-power Twin Wasp engine. Other details uncertain.

Scouting-Bombing Hydroplanes

Consolidated PBY-3 type biplane ; 2 700-horse-power Wright Cyclone engines ; maximum speed, 140 miles ; distance of endurance flight, 2670 miles. Consolidated PBY-2 type high-wing monoplane ; retracting pontoons at the end of each wing ; Twin Wasp 900-horse-power engine ; maximum speed, 190 miles per hour ; distance of endurance flight, 4000 miles. Consolidated PB2Y-1 type high-wing 2-motor monoplane ; 2 perpendicular tails ; retracting pontoons at the end of each wing ; 4 50-horse-power [*sic*] Twin Wasp engines. Other details uncertain. Martin XPBM-162 type twin-engine bomber [*sic*]. Sikorsky XPS type high-wing 4-engine monoplane ; wings equipped with rigid pontoons ; 4 50-horse-power [*sic*] Twin Wasp engines. Other details uncertain.

The Consolidated 31 type twin-engine hydroplane is said to have been designed by the Consolidated Aviation Company for commercial purposes, but it may be noted this hydroplane is based on an experimental design in that it has thin wings. The abilities of this experimental 'plane are the object of keen attention throughout the world, for it is capable of developing a maximum speed of 360 miles per hour with a maximum distance of endurance flight of 12,000 miles ; these figures are really astounding. It is thought the United States Navy is studying and experimenting with this new 'plane as a scouting 'plane for military purposes.

On the other hand, those 'planes carried aboard battleships, including the fighting 'planes of aircraft carriers, reconnaissance-bombing 'planes, and torpedo-bombing 'planes, have had the power of their engines continually increased so that they may now be in the 1000-horse-power class. Those reconnaissance and observation 'planes carried aboard battleships and cruisers are still equipped with 400-horse-power engines

of the air-cooled type (the star-shaped V-type) and they are being converted into middle-wing monoplanes, which have many advantages from the standpoint of aeronautical mechanics. At the same time, a remarkable advance has been made in the methods of manufacture of the supports of the single-pontoon type, as well as in the pontoons attached at the ends of the wings.

With regard to the scouting-bombing hydroplane, a study is being made of the feasibility of adopting four engines, or twin engines. The twin-engined hydroplane has definitely come to the front, though it seems that at one time a decision was reached to adopt the four-engine type. In short, what the United States Navy is aiming at is to increase the distance of endurance flight.

The existing condition of the United States air-force has been roughly outlined above. In fact, the United States is now devoting itself to strengthening national defence with the slogan, "National defence should start in the air," a decision having been reached to expand her air-force by constructing 45,000 'planes, including 15,000 Army 'planes and 15,000 Navy 'planes, and others. It is said that orders for them have already been placed with all aeroplane manufacturing companies.

America, on the other side of the Pacific—what is she aiming at in her naval expansion and in the expansion and training of her air-force?

Needless to say, Uncle Sam is aiming at none other than Japan. How much the United States is afraid of the Japanese Fleet and especially of surprise attack by Japanese submarines is shown by the fact that scouting hydroplanes are engaged in a vigorous training in the pitch-darkness of night. As a matter of fact it is feared that the United States air-force may carry out a record-breaking air raid upon Japan, in order to intimidate her, rather than concentrate on defence of its mainland.

Once the enemy succeeds in making an air raid on a large scale upon the Japanese cities, which are mostly of wooden houses, it is feared that all the cities will be reduced to ashes. In the event the United States air-force successfully invades Japanese territory and wields freely her devilish power of destruction, there is no doubt that the havoc wrought by the enemy air-force will be terrible indeed.

CHAPTER VIII

THE UNITED STATES STRATEGY

I. OFFENSIVE TACTICS

ASSUMING war finally breaks out between the United States and Japan, what kind of strategy will be adopted by the former?

If we glance at the essay of Herbert Russell, the British naval critic, entitled "Japan's Naval Power" in the *Naval and Military Record*, we will be able to understand their strategy. He writes to the following effect :

Japan will never fight other countries on other matters than the Manchukuan Problem. But in the event Japanese and Manchukuan policies arouse antagonism in a third country, or China asks for aid from other countries in attacking Japan's Manchukuo policy, it will be impossible to avoid the outbreak of war. But then, no matter what kind of ultimatum she may get Japan should assume an attitude of "All right, I'm here. Come and kick me out." And if Japan follows the example set by England—whose fleet during the First World War was hidden in Scapa Flow, Scotland—by withdrawing her main fleet into the inland sea of Seto, it will cause apprehension in the enemy fleets, thereby proving to be of great protective power to her auxiliary fleet, active on the China Seas and in other directions. In the event the enemy fleets carry out an expedition towards the Western Pacific, the defensive fleet, inferior as its combined power may be in principle, will stand in a favourable strategic position. Therefore the Japanese fleet will be able to attack these enemy fleets, dealing a severe blow.

Russell apparently wrote such an article because it was just when Japan was in a state of excitement on account of the Manchukuo problem. But such a view is already outmoded. In a war with America,

wouldn't this strategy of the Japanese Navy be too passive? It cannot be thought that by pursuing such a conservative strategy the Japanese Navy would be able to enjoy an advantageous war situation sufficient to ensure the defence of such a sea-girt country as Japan.

It is, however, a fact that the fighting strength of the Japanese Navy is inferior to that of the United States Navy. If a naval battle is carried out according to the usual method, there will be no prospect whatever of Japan's victory. For this reason it is said there will be no alternative for the Japanese Navy but to rely upon defensive strategy.

But victory or defeat in war is not necessarily determined by the relative strength of the fighting forces; there is no rule whatever that the inferior fighting strength will be ensured of security only by standing on the defensive. A certain critic has said that Japan has no prospect whatever of winning a war over the United States when her fighting strength is compared with the latter's, quoting Napoleon's words that "to fight with a fighting strength sixty per cent of the enemy's is similar to gambling; that is, it is impossible to work out any reasonable strategy without a fighting strength equal to at least seventy per cent of the enemy's"; and also quoting from General Karl von Clausewitz, that "two units of defensive power match three of offensive power." But will this kind of estimate be a fixed rule?

Looking at this problem from the standpoint of actual war, Japan during the Sino-Japanese War fought with 57,000 tons of warships against 83,000 tons used by China, and during the Russo-Japanese War Japan had 280,000 tons of warships against Russia's 370,000 tons; in both of which Japan was victorious; and during the First World War, Germany used 1,150,000 tons of warships and England hid 2,450,000 tons of warships at a lonely island north of Scotland; in the Battle of Jutland, Germany emerged victorious by fighting England with a fighting strength equal to fifty-eight per cent. of the enemy's.

There is no reason, therefore, why the smallness of one's fighting strength should necessarily make one a vanquished nation, or that an offensive strategy should always prove disadvantageous.

On the contrary, an inferior navy, in possession of geographical

advantages, will compensate for its inferior fighting strength by offensive tactics, provided its geographical advantage is skilfully exploited, and it will finally capture the trophy. The Sino-Japanese and Russo-Japanese Wars are evidence of this fact.

All indications show that the United States Navy, drawing a lesson from the British Fleet which failed to conquer the German Fleet during the European war just because it tried to maintain the safety of its warships, has finally come to think: "The United States Navy should, even at some risk, carry the fight as far as the coasts of the enemy, thus creating an opportunity of launching a decisive attack by striking the enemy's vital spots." Having also studied "How to force the inferior fleet of Japan into battle and annihilate it," the United States is hurrying on the realization of her plan for a great armament expansion as a preliminary to putting into execution the principle of quick battle and immediate decision. As soon as she declares war against Japan, it is thought she will resort to tactics of attacking the Japanese Fleet. In the event Japan sticks, with an over-confidence in her geographical advantage, to a strategy of defence from beginning to end, the United States expeditionary fleet will meanwhile advance to the Philippines, while the armaments on the island of Guam, the United States base of operations for the occupation of all the Japanese islands in the South Seas, will be strengthened all the more strongly. As soon as it finds an opportune time, the United States Fleet will occupy Formosa and the Ogasawara Islands (the Bonin Islands), while the Japanese mainland will be bombed from the air by the United States air-force, thus creating an epoch of great terror.

As a result, the China coasts and the South Seas will probably be blockaded by the United States Fleet, and therefore Japan's foreign trade as well as her naval activities will be in jeopardy. If the situation is such that even the Strait of Korea loses its security, there will be no alternative for Japan but to surrender.

Then what kind of strategy should be adopted by Japan? Although the Japanese military strength is inferior, although her geographical position is extremely advantageous for defence, still I do not think that defensive strategy alone would be adequate for Japan to meet the situation. Instead Japan should, if possible, grasp the initiative and

take offensive action so as to dismember the United States Navy and eventually annihilate it, reducing its fighting strength step by step. At the same time steps should be taken by Japan to capture all United States naval bases which could serve as the stepping-stones for a United States expeditionary fleet on its way to the Western Pacific. Japan's diplomacy under the New Order being to act under military colours, it will be possible for the Japanese Navy to take such measures as the occasion demands without missing an opportunity.

What plan of operation should Japan take against America's plan in order to bring about victory over the United States? It can be summarized somewhat as follows :

1. With the object of preventing the United States Fleet from advancing to the Western Pacific and in order to facilitate the operation of the Japanese Navy in the Western Pacific, and to stir up home morale, we should at once . . .

2. The surprise-attack fleet should be dispatched to the Pacific Coast of the United States in order to destroy United States foreign trade, attack the enemy fleet, and lay mines in the enemy's harbours. Besides all these necessary measures, the Panama Canal should be closed, or destroyed, or other adequate measures should be taken.

3. When the United States Fleet departs on its expeditionary voyage, submarines and other warships should be dispatched to attack it, so as to reduce the United States fighting strength bit by bit.

4. Japan should hold sea supremacy in the South China Sea and the Sea of Japan, thus guaranteeing the safety of communications between Japan and the Asiatic continent. By protection of these marine communications Japan's foreign trade should be carried on smoothly so as to strengthen Japan's foreign position. It is also necessary for Japan to grasp sea supremacy extending to the eastern part of India by conquering the Singapore Naval Base, especially in view of the necessity of constraining the manœuvres of England and . . .

5. As soon as war is started, submarines should be dispatched to the Atlantic, and steps should, if possible, be taken to dispatch some submarines to this area shortly before the outbreak of the war. The

object of this operation is to threaten the United States even from the Atlantic, with the ultimate objective of depriving the United States Atlantic Fleet of a chance of combining with the United States Pacific Fleet.

6. The Army should be mobilized and dispatched to the districts of . . . and . . . and, particularly, every precaution should be taken against Soviet Russian manœuvres.

7. If meanwhile the Philippines become independent, and declare war against Japan, Japan will be able to occupy the entire islands openly.

Even supposing the Philippines proclaim their neutrality, it is thought Japan will have considerable reason and right to occupy the islands immediately upon the outbreak of war, since Japan is fighting the United States. Japan will have right to control the Philippines. The Dutch East Indies and French Indo-China will meet with the same fate. In brief, all efforts should be put forth by Japan to prevent the Philippines and all South Sea islands from being converted into bases of operations for the United States.

2. WESTERN PACIFIC STRATEGY

Against all these operations what measures will be taken by the United States ?

From the age of the civil wars Japan's tactics have been to forestall the enemy. In both her wars—the Sino-Japanese War and the Russo-Japanese War—she used these tactics. When one considers it, if a country with an inferior fighting strength attempts to fight another country, she has no alternative but to avail herself of her enemy's unpreparedness to strike and annihilate him.

It is, therefore, most probable that the United States, afraid of this kind of tactics, will be on the alert to prevent, prior to the declaration of war, the Japanese Fleet from destroying the Panama Canal, or from attacking United States warships stationed in certain harbours.

For the purpose in view it seems that the United States will resort to a positive attitude in attacking Japan, and attempt to annihilate

the Japanese Fleet once and-for all as soon as it is lured into open water.

For example, a commander-in-chief of the United States Fleet, in the course of an address in the Senate, spoke to this effect: "The United States Western Pacific strategy is divided into three steps; the first is to advance to the Philippines, the second to organize a fleet at Manila, and the third to attack the Japanese mainland."

But will it be possible for the United States Navy to advance as simply as is thought to Manila, which is 8000 nautical miles from the Panama Canal and 5440 nautical miles from San Francisco? Let us study a report prepared by a United States admiral dealing with the amount of oil to be needed by the United States Fleet for its advance to Manila.

1. The Fleet to consist of 30 battleships, 20 big cruisers, 40 destroyers, 20 coal and oil ships, 30 supply ships, and 1 construction ship. After assembling at Panama this fleet will reach Manila via Hawaii, Midway, and Guam.

2. The speed of voyage to be 10 knots subject to favourable conditions of weather and operation.

3. The distance between Panama and Hawaii being 4685 nautical miles, the Fleet is to drop in at the harbour of . . .

4. The amount of oil and coal to be consumed is calculated as follows:

(a) Battleships, cruisers, and destroyers, travelling at a speed of 10 knots, will consume in one day 18 tons of coal and $3\frac{1}{2}$ tons of heavy oil per mile [*sic*]; they will need 1000 tons of coal and 160 tons of heavy oil each day in port [*sic*].

(b) Each of the coal and oil ships and the other auxiliary vessels will use, within the same limits, one-sixth ton of coal and one-eighth ton of heavy oil, and 12 tons of coal and 10 tons of heavy oil for each day in port [*sic*].

5. Battleships will store raw foodstuffs enough for 40 days and dry foodstuffs enough for 5 months.

6. Three supply ships will be empty as soon as they arrive at Guam, and they will depart for Sydney to purchase more raw foodstuffs.

Particulars are as follows :

DISTANCE	MILES	COAL (TONS)	OIL (TONS)
Panama-Magdalena . . .	2265	49,000	8,500
5 days' stay	—	5,000	800
Magdalena-Honolulu . . .	2543	55,000	9,500
5 days' stay	—	500 [sic]	800
Honolulu-Guam via Midway	3450	74,700	13,000
10 days' stay in Midway . .	—	10,000	1,600
Guam-Manila	1542	33,500	5,800
Total	9800	232,200	40,000
The loading capacity of warships		129,000	16,900
The loading capacity of 20 coal and oil ships		120,000	28,100
Total		249,000	45,000
Balance		16,800	5,000

The above are, of course, rough estimates. The speed of 10 knots is too low in time of war ; a speed of at least 16 knots is needed. More than this, in order to avoid submarine attacks such a great fleet as that mentioned above will have to follow zigzag courses similar to the teeth of a saw, changing direction every ten minutes or every half hour, thus lengthening the distance of the voyage. Moreover, if the speed is 10 [sic] knots, most of the American coal and oil ships will not be able to travel at a speed greater than 14 knots.

Much more, if the United States Fleet reaches Manila at the cost of 35 days, the Japanese Fleet will meanwhile have completed all necessary fighting preparations and occupied the Philippines, Guam, Tutuila, and Wake. It is also probable that the Japanese Fleet will extend its hand of influence as far as Midway, near Hawaii, if the occasion demands.

The United States is said to be attempting to build warships of big size, and to improve their machines, and to extend the cruising range to more than 20,000 miles in maximum. If this is true, the United States Fleet will be able to advance to the seas near the Japanese mainland with Hawaii as its base of operations ; and after having one

or two battles with the Japanese Fleet it will still be able to return to Hawaii and do something more. For this reason Japan's occupation of Manila will have no serious effect upon the situation of war. But sea battles are not carried out with battleships alone.

The United States Fleet may be able to thwart Japan's submarine attacks in some way or other. It may be possible for aeroplanes (scouting 'planes) to detect submarines during the day; but their function will be ineffective in preventing night submarine attacks. Then there will be the activities of light cruisers and destroyers. The cruising range of a destroyer is from 6000 to 7000 nautical miles; this means that even if a battleship is able to make a voyage of 20,000 nautical miles, it is highly doubtful from the standpoint of military operations to what extent this will be effective.

Let us suppose that in order to attack Japan, the United States Fleet has no other course but to organize a huge fleet consisting of battleships with a capacity of making a long voyage of 20,000 nautical miles, cruisers of 12,000 nautical miles, destroyers of 7000 nautical miles, aircraft carriers of 10,000 nautical miles, and other warships and vessels. The movement of this fleet will be constrained by an inferior fleet, for the United States Fleet, superior though it is to the Japanese Fleet, will have to resort to very ordinary tactics in order to fight it.

The United States naval authorities explained in Congress that the United States Pacific war operations will further necessitate 500 commercial ships. The United States is at present in possession of almost 900 commercial ships, each of which is of more than 6000 tons, but in view of their speed and age, the actual number of ships usable for Western Pacific war operations will be only about 450, or half the total number. In the event half of the total commercial ships are put to use in Western Pacific war operations, this would mean a decrease of three-fourths at least in United States foreign trade.

Consequently, foreign commercial ships of neutral countries will naturally be active, cutting into United States foreign trade, and in the event of the war lasting for a long period, the losses inflicted upon the United States will be so serious that she will be unable to stand them, no matter how wealthy and strong she may be.

For this reason, the United States Navy will have to attempt to

fight quickly and annihilate the Japanese Fleet as speedily as possible for an immediate decision.

As a result, America studied the problem of "how to induce the inferior Japanese Fleet to join a decisive action with her fleet so as to annihilate it as speedily as possible," and finally came to the conclusion : " Even at some risk, the fight should be taken to the coastlines of the enemy's mainland in order to create an opportunity of waging a decisive battle with the enemy fleet ; for this purpose steps should be taken to strike at the enemy's vital points so as to compel the enemy to mobilize its fleet."

Therefore, the United States Fleet wants to advance to the Philippines and Guam at least before Japan occupies them ; but such an attempt is far from feasible owing to the circumstances of distance and war preparations. Therefore, after the Philippines and Guam once fall into the hands of Japan, the United States Fleet ought to attempt to recapture them by creating a strategical disposition favourable to it. But in this connexion Rear-Admiral McKean spoke to this effect in Congress :

Once the Philippines and Guam fall into the hands of the Japanese Army, the United States Fleet will have to operate from Hawaii, and it will take a long time for the United States to recapture all her bases of operation, one by one, and launch a real attack upon the enemy. Thus the position of the United States Fleet will be extremely disadvantageous.

Such being the case, in the event of Japan's occupation of the Philippines and Guam, the United States will not adopt passive tactics in her attempt to recapture the lost islands, but she will resort to aggressive tactics (as the cause of the war itself is her aggressive policy) as soon as her great armament-expansion programme is completed. In other words, the United States Fleet will, on her own initiative, occupy the area of the Japanese Bonin Islands, and by bombarding the coasts of the Japanese mainland, it will take the points within the scope of its capacity of occupation. Further, the big Japanese cities will be bombed from the air by the United States air-force in an attempt to force the Japanese Fleet to come out for a decisive battle. If the

Japanese Fleet fails to respond to this challenge, communications between Japan's sources of life, Manchukuo, Mongolia, and New China, will be cut off, and Japan's raw-material route from the Dutch East Indies and French Indo-China will be broken off. Thus delivering a heavy blow to Japan and increasing the insecurity of Japanese existence, the United States will, in all likelihood, attempt to bring Japan to her knees. To cope with this situation, too, Japan should be fully prepared.

CHAPTER IX

THE PRINCIPLES OF QUICK BATTLE AND IMMEDIATE DECISION, AND THE LONG-ENDURANCE WAR

I. THE UNITED STATES PRINCIPLE OF QUICK BATTLE AND IMMEDIATE DECISION

WITH regard to the United States-Japanese war there are two opinions : first, that it will simply be a war of quick battle and immediate decision, and second, that it will end in a war of exhaustion. As a matter of fact, " war of exhaustion " has become a phrase frequently used by people in general since the First World War.

Because the First World War lasted more than four years, both the Allies and their enemies were most exhausted and weakened. The miseries of Germany after the war and the hopeless defeat and exhaustion of Austria do not need any further mention. The exhaustion of the Allied countries such as France, England, Italy, and Russia was equally serious. For example, the British Empire lost within only four years most of what she had accumulated for the past several hundred years. In fact, indirect exhaustion brought about by a war is severer than the havoc directly wrought by the war itself.

Any one who thinks about the progress of the Pacific war must attach much importance to the strategical position, from which he is apt to conclude that the United States-Japanese war will be a kind of war of exhaustion.

Recently the United States Navy, fully aware of the destructiveness of the so-called long-endurance war, which undermines the energy of both attackers and defenders, has been afraid of following such a course. Particularly, if the four hundred United States commercial ships were withdrawn for the Pacific war, United States commerce and trade would be confronted with the tragedy of complete and immediate collapse. This would be too much for the United States.

The United States, convinced that further pursuance of a lukewarm safety-first principle would deprive her of the opportunity of fighting a decisive battle, and thus put her to much trouble, has concentrated her study on one point, that is, how she can force the inferior Japanese Fleet into battle.

As a result, the United States has finally made up her mind to fight quickly and seek an immediate decision.

If this observation has really penetrated the intention of the United States Navy, Japan, too, welcomes the idea.

If the United States-Japanese war develops into an endurance war, the United States strategical position will become more and more difficult; as is feared by the United States herself; there is no prospect of United States victory in such a case. Moreover a long-endurance war will unexpectedly strengthen Japan's position, and it can be assumed that it will not force Japan into a difficult situation.

If the United States has really made up her mind to fight quickly and seek an immediate decision, she really deserves the title of the Rome of the Twentieth Century.

For if America, already making a military expenditure of 72,000,000 yen a day for another man's war, should herself become involved in war and should continue to fight for three or four years, it would not be at all surprising if she thus dissipated more than half her national wealth.

Japan can undertake a long-endurance war or anything else, but her desire is, if possible, to wage quick battle for an immediate decision. Much as Japan would like this, everything depends, however, on what her opponent is going to do. In other words, it is not Japan but the United States which has the freedom to choose either a quick battle or a long-endurance war. Indeed, the charm of Japan's strategic position is that she is strategically passive from beginning to end. Therefore, to make good use of her strategic position, it is a proper measure for Japan to decide upon her policy after knowing what the United States is going to do.

The reason Japan considers a quick battle and an immediate decision to be a splendid idea is that, first, she will be able, to a certain extent, to avoid the calamity caused by a war of exhaustion. Even if the Pacific

war lasts for several years, I do not think Japan will be so devastated as is generally thought, since the war between the United States and Japan will be mainly fought on the water, which will be quite different from large-scale land battles. It can be assumed that Japan's losses will not be so serious as is generally expected.

A war involving mobilization of many millions of soldiers with enemies in all directions and the front extending many hundreds of miles is an entirely different story from that in which one country fights another by putting surprise-attack fleets into action and using the Army once in a while. The United States-Japanese war, however, being a war involving a big power versus another big power, both adversaries in it will suffer considerable blows and losses should it last for several years.

Even if the United States suffers losses many times more than Japan does, that does not mean that Japan's losses will be slight. In this respect, Japan heartily welcomes a quick battle with the United States, irrespective of its outcome.

The second reason quick battle and immediate decision is better than a long-endurance war is that the former is eminently compatible with the Japanese national character. The Japanese nation hates shilly-shallying with trivial, vexatious things.

From this standpoint the United States principle of quick battle and immediate decision entirely suits the Japanese temper.

2. JAPAN'S PRINCIPLE OF QUICK BATTLE AND IMMEDIATE DECISION

The primary qualification required of one to become a hero of long-endurance war is, needless to say, a redoubled perseverance. When not only a nation but also its army have such a depth of will-power and perseverance as to enable them to undergo calamities without making the slightest stir, they will then be entitled to claim to be the adversary of a strong power.

It cannot be thought the Japanese nation lacks such endurance power. According to an established idea, the Japanese are the people most easily aroused and most easily cooled off of all nations the world

over. This is certainly one way of looking at them. Up to date the Japanese, whether fortunately or unfortunately, have not been faced with any necessity of demonstrating their endurance power ; therefore, the question as to how long they will stand a long-endurance war still remains a sort of enigma. But the fact that the Japanese people are quite normal even after a four years' fight in connexion with the China Incident shows that the Japanese endurance power is by no means a matter for disappointment.

It may be said that to a certain extent the Japanese are among those who have actually experienced long-endurance war. In order to carry out a really long-endurance war, we should not fail to take the following three measures :

1. Steps should be taken to preserve an abundance of materials and to introduce a planned economy.
2. The prices of commodities should be given ceilings.
3. The private interests of a small minority of armament industrialists should not be recognized.

There will be nothing to worry about, provided thorough preparations are made to enforce these three measures.

The third reason for considering a quick battle and immediate decision to be better than a long-endurance war is that the quicker the war is settled, the narrower will the scope of war become.

In the event of extension of war the diplomatic war will become intense, and if our diplomacy is successful, it will be quite all right, but in case of our diplomatic failure, we shall have to face another strong enemy, thus finding ourselves in a more difficult predicament.

Purely from the humanitarian standpoint, it is the command of international justice to limit the catastrophe of war to the narrowest scope. If the catastrophe of war is limited to the narrowest scope, Japan's surroundings after the war will be in a very sound condition, and therefore she will be able to extricate herself with comparative ease from the devastation occasioned by the war. The fourth reason the principle of quick battle and immediate decision is commendable is that the chance of Japan's victory is greater than the United States'.

Judging from the mutual strategical positions, the Pacific war shows

that there is much possibility of the United States-Japanese war developing into a long-endurance one. If, however, the commander-in-chief of the United States Fleet at Pearl Harbour resorts to a quick battle for an immediate decision, it will be a reckless action, undoubtedly accompanied by irretrievable failure. Is not, then, the so-called wheel-shaped formation an example of this recklessness?

CHAPTER X

THE OPENING PERIOD OF WAR

I. THE LIGHTNING MILITARY ACTION

WHEN will the military action of the United States-Japanese war start?

Until the two countries cross swords with each other, there must be a series of diplomatic conversations between them. Our experience in the Russo-Japanese War, for example, shows that in spite of the increasing aggravation of the crisis at that time, diplomatic conversations between the two countries lasted almost one year before the actual outbreak of the war. It must, therefore, be remembered that even up to the outbreak of the United States-Japanese war, there must be diplomatic conversations as usual, in some form or other, at least until the initiation of military action.

From the strategical standpoint, Japan is blessed by a chance to take the offensive, for she is in a position to be attacked by the United States. This is because there is not even a single target of attack in the vicinity of the United States, whereas in the vicinity of Japan are numerous points which will naturally become targets of attack.

In the vicinity of the mainland of the United States, Japan does not possess any territory of her own even as large as a cat's face. Nor has she any battleships of her own stationed there. On the contrary, the United States is in possession of territories such as the Philippines and Guam, which are near Japan's eyes and nose. Nor is this all. With some of her Asiatic Fleet the United States is attempting to dominate the British bases at Singapore, Hong Kong, and even Kowloon.

If, under such strategical dispositions, the United States and Japan are confronted with a grave diplomatic crisis, thereby thickening the war-clouds between the two countries, what period will Japan choose to open war? The time she chooses to act will have an enormous influence on the progress of the war.

If the war-clouds between the United States and Japan become intense, the United States will make up her mind to remove her Atlantic Fleet and combine it with her Pacific Fleet.

From Japan's standpoint this fact is of the utmost significance. As a matter of fact, many military experts are of the opinion that Japan will act at least before the combination of the United States Atlantic and Pacific Fleets is possible.

If Japan acts at this period, it may be said that she has chosen the best time.

We do not think, however, that military action, no matter how quick Japan's action may be, can be carried out before the combination of the two fleets. But I certainly think that the time for Japanese action will come when the United States Fleet departs for Pearl Harbour after its combination, or when it is finally on the point of carrying out a positive action after its successful arrival in Hawaii.

In the former case Japan will not be directly menaced, but in the latter case Japan will feel a great menace.

Suppose that Japan, with generosity and far-sightedness as her principle, clings hopefully to her diplomatic conversations with the United States and confines her action to scouting the movements of the United States Fleets concentrated in Hawaii—if these United States Fleets depart westward from Pearl Harbour, Japan cannot lose even a second; she should launch a naval action like a lightning flash.

If Japan acts at this time, it can be said that she has chosen the right period for it.

Lastly, there is another period to be examined for the opening of the war. That is after the arrival of the United States Grand Fleet at Guam, or the Philippines, or Singapore.

If Japan finally acts at this period, it can be said that she has chosen the worst period. Once such a situation arises, there will be no alternative but to say that Japan has intentionally chosen war under disadvantageous conditions, no matter whether this is the result of weak diplomacy or of a cowardly state policy. Japan is inherently blessed with a chance to choose freely her own time to open war. If, nevertheless, she gives up her unusual privilege, she will condemn herself

to fight the United States with a fifty-fifty chance and, moreover, her strategic position will be extremely dangerous.

I do not think, however, that Japan will be so foolish as to commit such a folly, but that she will make her final determination to act before the arrival of the United States Fleets at Guam or the Philippines. Thus, it is not difficult to imagine that the period of Japan's military action will not be after the departure of the United States Fleets from . . .

2. THE UNITED STATES FLEET AND THE OPENING PERIOD OF WAR

It does not need to be repeated that Pearl Harbour is worthy of the name of the Gibraltar or the Malta of the Pacific, as an advance base for the United States Navy. However, the only thing that may be called a defect is that its location is a little too much to the eastward, which makes it too far from Japan. No matter how strong a United States Fleet is stationed in Pearl Harbour, it will never be able to strike at the heart of Japan. Midway and Wake are a little nearer to Japan, but this group of small islands seems to lack important qualifications for becoming a base of operations for a big fleet.

But when we consider other United States territories, such as the Philippines and Guam, we face an entirely different situation. If the powerful United States Fleet is based on Manila in the Philippines or Apra in Guam, the distance to either the eastern or southern coasts of Japan is not more than from 1300 to 1700 nautical miles. In this case, then, the United States will easily be able to strike at the heart of Japan. If, at the outbreak of war, the United States loses Guam and the Philippines, she will no longer possess any base of operation from which to carry out aggressive tactics against Japan, and therefore, even if the United States Fleet departs from Pearl Harbour westward, it will have to return crestfallen to its old nest because of the lack of places to stop over.

It is for this reason that an anti-Japanese fanatic, Thomas Millard, once remarked that defence of the Philippines would mean defence of the United States mainland. Much importance should be attached to the military value of Guam and the Philippines. Let us think of

India after the loss of Singapore and of Australia after the loss of New Guinea. No matter how well Trincomalee and Sydney are prepared defensively, if they lose these two places will they not resemble one who stands in nakedness before the fire of the advancing enemy?

If Japan occupies Guam and the Philippines without giving them up to the United States the long, snakelike coastlines of Japan will, in all likelihood, see the end of the war without having received a single bomb.

Indeed, this is a heaven-sent gift which has fallen to the destiny of Japan. Will she refuse this blessing and attempt to fight a difficult fight? Or will she accept it and fight in obedience to the command of her fate?

3. TWO PERIODS FOR OPENING THE WAR

There are still two more periods for opening the war.

As already mentioned, the first period for opening the war is before a part of the United States Atlantic Fleet is combined with the United States Pacific Fleet. From Japan's strategical standpoint, this is the best period for opening the war. The second period for opening the war is after the United States combined fleets arrive at Hawaii and then successfully reach Manila Bay. From Japan's standpoint, these are bad periods for opening the war. It may be thought that these two occasions have very slight possibilities of realization, but a war is apt to break out just when you are not expecting it. So let me give you a general idea of the situation which will accompany these two periods.

First of all, if Japan utilizes the best period for starting the war, the conclusion is quite obvious. In such an event, Japan will, in a very leisurely manner, occupy the Philippines and Guam and then undoubtedly build invincible fortresses on the occupied islands. She will surely have ample time to complete excellent defensive installations.

The results of the United States naval manoeuvres showed that if a part of the United States Fleet, stationed on the Atlantic, departs

from its naval bases in the eastern part of the United States on a westward expedition, and makes a stop at the Guantanamo naval harbour in Cuba, and then passes through the Panama Canal, finally emerging into the Pacific and entering San Diego or Mare Island, it will take at least sixty days to complete the task of joining with the Pacific Fleet. Furthermore, another sixty days will be necessary for the Fleet to receive its war-time supplies and be put in thorough fighting trim before it departs westward for Pearl Harbour.

If Japan acts simultaneously with the departure of the United States Atlantic Fleet, there will be a period of at least four months between the opening of Japan's action and the arrival of the entire United States Fleet at Hawaii. This will enable her to make careful and thorough preparations for an attack upon the Philippines, Guam, and other United States bases of operation in the Pacific. It will also be possible for Japan to capture Midway, the outpost of Hawaii. During this period, Japan can also occupy Tutuila in Samoa.

In short, it will mean that during a period of four months, the Japanese Fleet will be free to carry on its activities throughout the Pacific, and there will exist no strong opposing forces in the Pacific to interfere.

If Japan acts in this first period, there will be the danger of the Panama Canal, the only route connecting the Pacific to the Atlantic, being destroyed. This would be very painful to the United States.

Destruction of the Panama Canal will compel the United States Atlantic Fleet to take a great circuitous route of 13,000 nautical miles in order to come into the Pacific; it must go down southward along the coast of Brazil and come up northward via Magellan Strait, along the western coast of South America and the Humboldt Coast. No doubt this long voyage will itself exhaust the Fleet. Therefore, it will be three months later before the Fleet will be able to depart for Hawaii with sufficient fighting preparations. In the meantime, if the United States Fleet observes the audacious action of the Japanese Fleet without being able to restrain it, its plight due to confusion and impatience will be beyond imagination.

In the meantime the gallant Japanese surprise-attack fleet will haunt the United States coasts, doing everything in its power, by means

of explosive mines and torpedoes, to obstruct the free action of the United States Fleet, and to put it in an impossible situation by preventing not only the combination of the Atlantic and Pacific Fleets, but also the safe advance of the big Fleets, even after their combination, to Hawaii.

If the United States and Japan are faced with a situation compelling them to cross swords, Japan should choose, by all means, this best opportunity, and act at once.

4. THE WORST PERIOD FOR OPENING THE WAR

Now let us consider the worst period in which Japan could act.

The worst period for Japan to open war with the United States would be when the powerful United States Fleets are stationed at the Philippines and Singapore. There is a great difference, so far as menace to Japan is concerned, between the United States Fleets stationed in the Philippines and the United States Fleets stationed at Hawaii.

The general strategical situation of the Philippines is extremely advantageous to the United States. The port of Manila is about 1300 nautical miles from the Sasebo naval harbour in Japan, and is about 1700 miles from Yokosuka. Thus, the entire sea-coasts extending from the south-west to the north-east of the Japanese mainland will be completely embraced within the scope of activities of the United States Fleets, and as a result the Japanese territories from Formosa to the Riukiu Islands and Kiushiu will be in jeopardy, the situation being similar to that in which a fish attempts to swim up against the current.

At the same time, the sea-routes south of the East China Sea will be cut, and thus the marine communication routes connecting Japan to the South Seas, Australia, India, and Europe, will no longer be of any use to her. Speaking in simpler language, the south-west and south-east coasts of Japan will be blockaded, and all marine communications with foreign countries completely interrupted, except over a part of the Sea of Japan and the East China Sea. In this case the situation will be serious for her.

So long as the powerful United States Fleets remain in the Philippines,

Formosa, Kiushiu, and most parts of the Japanese mainland will probably be exposed, at any moment, to air raids by the United States air-forces.

The United States strategy after the completion of her great armament expansion will be to blockade the Japanese coasts by using innumerable warships, so as to prohibit Japan's intercourse with the Asiatic continent and deprive her of her sea supremacy on the East China Sea. The United States will also plan to co-operate with Soviet Russia to capture sea supremacy even on the Sea of Japan.

If it is impossible to cut off communication between Japan and the Far Eastern continent, the task of the United States Fleet in the Philippines will be to detect the Japanese Main Fleet and fight a decisive battle with it under conditions favourable to itself, trying if possible to annihilate it.

Should Japan act at this worst period, then is the time the Japanese nation must cultivate greatly the power of perseverance and firm resolution, which will enable them to withstand any kind of calamity. Our enemy, America, may bombard the Japanese coasts or raid the Japanese cities from the air in order to lure out the Japanese Fleet.

But so long as there exists a powerful fleet in Japan, the United States herself will not be able to take an unrestrained course. If the United States attacks Japan in fear and trembling, the losses inflicted upon Japan will be negligible. Further, if their ships are in Japanese waters, uncertainty as to when the Japanese surprise-attack fleet is going to strike will keep them constantly running around at their maximum war speed, thereby consuming a great amount of fuel, exhausting the crews, and damaging the hulls of the warships. And who knows if the desperate situation will not compel the United States to throw down its spoon? If the United States force is divided into two or three units, there is danger of each of them being sunk by the superior Japanese Fleet; therefore, it is quite necessary for the whole United States Fleet always to act as a unit. How this contradictory situation will be solved can only be seen when the time comes.

If America is once wounded in the Philippines, the result will be more disastrous than if she were wounded at Hawaii; and in Manila Bay, which has no equipment of huge docks, the United States Fleet

will be in the dilemma of finding itself uncomfortably in the thick of the fight. And finally, this will make them hurry their decisive battle with the Japanese Fleet; and if they lose their calmness striving for an immediate decision, the situation will naturally become favourable for the Japanese Fleet. Then the Japanese Fleet, which has been quiet until now, will all of a sudden take control of the war situation, and will probably fight the United States Fleet, demolishing it in one blow.

If things come to such a pass, the United States Fleets, having fallen into a dilemma of their own making, will have to decide whether to become grass at the bottom of the sea or, swallowing their humiliation, raise the XG signal of surrender to the top of the mast.

CHAPTER XI

JAPAN'S ATTACK UPON THE PHILIPPINES

I. THE PHILIPPINES AND THE UNITED STATES ASIATIC FLEET

I MUST now describe how Japan will carry out an attack upon the Philippines. This attack must be made with the object of depriving the United States Fleet of the naval bases through which it may advance to the Orient, thus blocking the United States strategy in Asia.

But if the failure of Japanese diplomacy is anticipated by the United States, and the United States Fleet advances to Manila before the declaration of war, Japan's attack upon the Philippines will, in all probability, be confronted with serious difficulty, and it will be quite impossible for her to expect victory.

If Japan is behindhand, the United States Fleet will attack the Japanese Fleet at its naval bases before it is possible for the latter to attack the Philippines. It may happen that the United States Fleet will attempt to lure the Japanese Fleet to the vicinity of the Bonin Islands or in the direction of the China Sea and join battle with it. Thus, it is beyond expectation that the Japanese Fleet, which is actually inferior to the United States Fleet, will be able to attack the Philippines after the latter's arrival at Manila Bay. Therefore, if the United States and Japan find themselves on the verge of war, Japan should not lose time in grasping the initiative and attacking the Philippines before the arrival of the United States Fleet at Manila Bay, thus destroying the chance of United States action.

In consideration of the fact, however, that the United States has been running the Philippines as one of her great naval bases in the Orient, it cannot be considered an easy task for Japan to occupy the Philippines.

Let us examine defence conditions at Manila Bay. In the mouth of Cavite naval harbour, there are studded such islands as Corregidor, Cabra, and El Fraile, each of which has a powerfully armed fortress.

All these islands are equipped with strong defence installations ; especially Corregidor, which has a name for impregnability, being armed with 15 12-inch guns, two 10-inch guns, five 6-inch guns, and four 3-inch guns ; and the other islands also have many 14-inch or 12-inch guns. This is not all. In the rear of the city of Manila there are two lines of batteries, thus powerfully defending entire Manila Bay. Such being the case, it will be absolutely impossible for any attacking force to make a frontal approach to the Bay, no matter how strong that force may be. Further, Olongapo naval harbour, surrounded by the strong fortress of Subig Bay, is just in a position to protect the flank of Manila Bay from the north. If these facts are set at naught and an attack launched upon Manila, nobody knows what kind of calamity will fall upon the head of the attacking force.

One other important thing should be mentioned. Cavite naval harbour is the main base for the United States Asiatic Fleet. In this harbour there are stationed more than sixty warships including battleships, light cruisers, gunboats, destroyers, submarine depots, submarines, mine-sweepers, special-service ships, mine-layers, and so on. Admiral Hart, the present Commander-in-Chief of the United States Asiatic Fleet, once in a while travels China and the South Seas aboard the flagship *Augusta*. This is apparently for the purpose of carrying out certain action, taking advantage of new situations. The fighting strength of the United States Fleet is by no means to be overlooked. Ten years have elapsed since the establishment of the independent Philippine air-force and the Philippine air-defence plan was completed. The said air-force consists of more than 3000 airmen, several hundred fighting 'planes, scouting 'planes, training 'planes, heavy bombing 'planes, and dirigibles. It is really of fearful strength.

Such being the actual state of affairs, it will be difficult for the Japanese Navy, skilful and strong though it may be, to make an open attack upon the Philippines. Under water there will be submarine attacks ; explosive mines will be thoroughly scattered ; in the air will be the skilful and selected 'planes of the great Philippine air armada. All these facts show that the attack upon the Philippines will not be

as simple as that launched by Japan upon Port Arthur at the time of the Russo-Japanese War.

Notwithstanding this, Japan must at any cost capture the Philippines, which are the main base of operations for the United States Fleet in the waters of the Orient. We must know that this is our great concern in the coming war. So long as the islands remain out of Japan's hands her tactics will inevitably become passive, and as a result she will suffer heavy economic and financial blows which will put her in an extremely straitened condition.

2. ESCAPE OF THE VANQUISHED WARSHIPS

How much fighting strength will be needed, then, by the Japanese Fleet to attack the Philippines? In order to attack the Philippines, the Japanese Fleet should be organized in sufficient strength to smash the United States Asiatic Fleet.

In two or three years the United States Asiatic Fleet will witness a twofold increase in its fighting strength, and in order to cope with this strength Japan needs to make a really important decision. At least, the Japanese Fleet should be dispatched not so much to attack the United States Asiatic Fleet as to limit its activities and prevent its escape. A certain naval critic has said that in the event of a United States-Japanese war the Asiatic Fleet will immediately be attacked by a powerful Japanese Fleet, and that thus the United States will have to sacrifice this fleet as a blood offering to the Japanese Navy. Therefore, if there is a prospect of war breaking out, the United States Asiatic Fleet will hasten to Hawaii to be combined with its home fleet.

But further explanation is needed of this observation. It is highly questionable whether the United States Yangtze and South China garrisons, which are taking the place of the British force and the China Squadron in the job of surveillance, would do such an incomprehensible thing as to withdraw completely from China; the fact that the United States Asiatic Fleet is probably taking the place of the British Fleet in Singapore and Hong Kong indicates that anything like complete withdrawal by the United States from China is almost out of the question. Moreover it must be remembered there is fear of Japanese

commercial ships' being attacked by the Asiatic Fleet or the Singapore Fleet in Chinese waters, the South Seas, and other places, with consequent damage to Japan's foreign trade.

Therefore, the first thing the Japanese Fleet should do in its attack upon the Philippines is to blockade the entire islands in order to cut off the escape of the United States Asiatic Fleet. Similar steps should be taken to prevent the advance of the Singapore Fleet by restraining the Singapore Naval Base. If this job of blockade is carried out effectively, the next step is to . . .

In regard to Luzon, where Manila Bay is, its frontal defence is strong, but its rear defences are almost negligible. Lingayen Bay, on the north-west of Luzon, and the region extending from Polillo Bay [*sic*] to Lamon Bay on the east side is . . . Bias Bay in South China.

The Philippine Islands are about 1200 nautical miles south-west of Kiushiu, and the distance between Manila Bay and Sasebo naval harbour in Japan is only 1318 nautical miles, whereas the distance between Manila and Yokosuka is a little farther as it circles round San Bernardino Strait, the southernmost part of Luzon; but it still does not exceed 1740 nautical miles. On the other hand, Manila is 5000 nautical miles from Pearl Harbour in Hawaii, a little less than four times the distance between Manila and Sasebo, and a little less than three times the distance between Manila and Yokosuka.

That is to say, if the Japanese Fleet, simultaneously with the departure of the United States Fleet from Pearl Harbour, departs from Sasebo or Yokosuka, it will easily reach the Philippines within one-third of the time it takes the United States Fleet to reach the Philippines. Suppose the Japanese Fleet develops a speed of 15 knots in time of war; it will reach the Philippines within less than four days from Sasebo, whereas it will take more than thirteen days for the United States Fleet to reach the Philippines from Pearl Harbour.

This means that there will be a difference of about ten days between the times of the United States and Japanese Fleets. If the Japanese Fleet is able to avail itself of this margin of time, ten days, to attack the Philippines, everything will go smoothly for Japan. But it is an interesting problem whether the Japanese Fleet and the Japanese Army could successfully invade the Philippines within this short time.

3. THE OCCUPATION OF GUAM BY THE JAPANESE FLEET

The next question is the attack on Guam.

The island of Guam is located 1340 nautical miles south of the Bonin Islands of Japan, 1500 nautical miles east of the Philippines, and half-way between Saipan and Yap, a little closer to Saipan.

That means it is a little closer to Hawaii, but even so it is still more than 3300 nautical miles away. The United States Fleet will not reach Guam for at least nine days after leaving Pearl Harbour with a supposed speed of 15 knots. On the other hand, if the Japanese Fleet departs from Yokosuka, only 1360 nautical miles from Guam, it will arrive about five days earlier than the United States Fleet. If Japan succeeds in capturing control of Guam in five days, the outcome will be similar to that in the case of the Philippines.

In view of this situation, the United States is devoting herself to strengthening the Guam defences so as to accommodate a big fleet. This is nothing less than expansion of the menace to Japan, and it is beyond estimation how difficult it has become for her to carry out her Pacific war operations. It is also feared that the United States will use Guam as a base of operations for a surprise-attack fleet to hinder Japan's foreign trade, or to inflict losses on the Japanese Fleet by attacking it. Therefore the occupation of Guam is an urgent problem for Japan.

Guam is a small island covering an area of only 228 square miles, but she has Port Apra, fortresses, a big wireless telegraph station, and a coaling station. The island is 32 miles in length, from 4 to 10 miles in width, and about 100 miles in circumference. The size of the island is equivalent to that of Awaji Island in Japan. The capital of the island is Agaña; Port Apra is about 8 miles from Agaña.

The famous wireless telegraph station is located on the hill of Machanao, 600 feet in height; and the Orote peninsula is fortified with 6-inch guns. In the military barracks of the capital, there are about 3000 marines. Up to last year (1939) this island was utilized as a coaling-port, but now it is being armed for defence and converted into a harbour large enough to accommodate a fleet.

Besides Guam, Canton Island, in the Southern Pacific, leased from

England, is supposed to be converted into a big naval and air base, thereby proving a new menace to Japan. Such being the case, Japan should attack the following islands—Guam, Canton, and the Philippines—as speedily as possible. In the case of delay in occupying these three important strategic points, they will be strengthened and used as bases of operations from which all kinds of manœuvres will be carried out by the United States against Japan. In such a case, Japan would not be able to attack them with small forces, and her ability to occupy them would be questionable.

CHAPTER XII

THE FALL OF MANILA

I. THE ATTACK UPON . . . AND MANILA

. . . on Luzon should be carried out simultaneously with the attack upon the United States Asiatic Fleet in Manila Bay.

But because the United States Asiatic Fleet in Manila Bay will be on the alert to strike at the Japanese Fleet, steps should be taken by Japan to pave the way for the safe landing of her troops at Lingayen, Lamon Bay, and other proper points not so much by sinking the United States battleships as by causing a diversion of the United States Fleet. Therefore the Japanese surprise-attack fleet should launch an attack upon the enemy in a death-defying manner.

If the Japanese troop-ships bearing from certain points the necessary military strength are fortunate enough to avoid any trouble on the sea and to advance as far as Luzon, landing operations will prove a great success, although it is highly doubtful whether the transportation of this military strength could be done without being detected by the enemy.

If the Japanese Army embarks from harbours in Kiushiu and Chugoku, it will succeed in reaching its destination within five days ; but if this scheme is detected by foreign ships, due to the closing of the regular trade routes, its secret will suddenly be revealed. Therefore, the enemy will enforce stricter defensive measures at all points suitable for the landing, with aeroplanes and submarines round these areas. Until the landing operation is completed, a considerable price will have to be paid. Although it is hard to forecast how the landing will develop, it must be borne in mind Japan should be ready to suffer some losses to be caused by more or less opposition. Homer Lea, in his book entitled *The Valor of Ignorance*, dealing with the future United States-Japanese war, said that Japan would be able to occupy the Philippines within three weeks, provided an army 40,000 strong was

landed at Lingayen and Lamon Bays. Bywater, too, points out that the task of occupying the Philippines will necessitate eight divisions.

If the task of occupying the Philippines necessitates Japan's dispatching an army 60,000 strong, it should be accomplished with the aid of 500,000 tons of troop-ships, that is, 100 commercial ships, each ship averaging 5000 tons. This will not constitute any problem since Japan possesses a large enough number of commercial ships to meet this demand, though it is highly doubtful whether a troop-ship fleet consisting of 100 ships would be able to advance to the Philippines without being detected by the enemy.

But as General Karl von Clausewitz pointed out, the fundamental principle of tactics is that three units of offensive power should be brought against two of defensive power. Therefore, the task of attacking a United States Army 16,000 strong will be carried out adequately with an army of 25,000. If an army consisting of eight divisions is dispatched, it will require an enormous amount of expense to maintain it and a great number of commercial ships to keep up connexions with the Japanese mainland. It is by no means a wise policy.

Since Japan's occupation of French Indo-China, the United States, under various kinds of pretence, has been reinforcing her troops in the areas of China; therefore, if these reinforced troops are concentrated in the Philippines, the total United States military strength on the islands will be considerably increased.

No matter how brave the Japanese Army may be, a landing operation during the day will, it is feared, be exposed to air attack by several hundred fighting 'planes. Rear-Admiral Fiske, in an article dealing with the problem of the defence of the Philippines, remarked rather exaggeratedly to the effect that "the Japanese troop-ships would be completely exposed to bombing by the United States air-force and probably not a single boat could reach the coast safely."

But one thing he should not forget to take into account is the cream of Japan's "land and sea eagles." Instead of leaving her troop-ships at the mercy of the United States air-force, Japan will chase the attackers around with a considerable number of "wild eagles." More than that, the Japanese Navy will spread smoke-screens and use anti-aircraft fire, thus protecting the landing of the Japanese Army.

Although it is the ideal of Rear-Admiral Fiske to force the Japanese Army to a standstill in the midst of the sea, its realization will not be possible.

Further, if the Japanese Navy launches an attack upon Manila Bay, half of the United States air-force will be unable to fly in the direction of Lingayen ; thus the landing operation will be successfully accomplished by the Japanese Army without suffering serious loss.

The Japanese Army will land in Lingayen Bay, though the distance between Lingayen and Manila Bays is twice that between Polillo and Manila Bay ; but there is the convenience of railway facilities which will enable the Army to advance easily. In the course of its advance, it is thought that the Japanese Army will, of course, encounter the enemy forces in many places, but it is also thought that the Japanese Army will advance as far as the vicinity of Manila almost without resistance.

It should be remembered, however, that in the rear of Manila there are two defence lines ; the one is the McKinley Battery and the other consists of a field-artillery force. The former extends $6\frac{1}{2}$ miles in length on the east side of Manila and the other from Manila Bay several miles in length to Laguna De Bay to the south-east. On this lake are gun-boats, apparently in readiness to make a joint operation with the Army.

In view of this, the Japanese Army should be ready for strong resistance by the enemy force at this particular point.

2. THE RISING SUN FLAG FLIES OVER THE PHILIPPINES

Once the Japanese Army thus reaches the rear of Manila, the fall of Manila will be merely a question of time, no matter how bravely the United States Navy and Army may resist it by using various kinds of new weapons.

But in case Japan is delayed too much in occupying Manila, this will affect the morale and dignity of the Japanese nation and the Army, bringing about undesirable results in Japan's relations with foreign countries. Therefore, efforts should be put forth by Japan to occupy Manila as speedily as possible, even at the cost of the considerable sacrifices which would have to be made in the course of this operation.

It is not a mere dream, as a result, to think that the Rising Sun Flag of Japan will be raised over the fortress of Corregidor in Manila Bay within two weeks after the landing of the Army. Once Manila falls into the hands of Japan, and Luzon is completely occupied, it is needless to say that the entire Philippine Islands would be under Japan's rule.

If Manila falls, there will be no alternative for the United States Asiatic Fleet but to surrender ; and in the case of surrender it is thought steps will probably be taken by the Fleet to scuttle itself ; but if it is America's method not to allow scuttling, it will have to face the calamity of being captured by the Japanese Fleet. Also, it is not difficult to imagine the United States Asiatic Fleet making an attempt to escape from Manila Bay so that it may devote itself to its task of destroying the trade of Japan. If several cruisers and submarines make a successful escape from Manila Bay, they will cause serious havoc. Therefore, as the first task of its blockade, the Japanese Navy should exercise every precaution to prevent the escape of the United States Asiatic Fleet.

If Japan occupies Guam and the Philippines, she will undoubtedly have a convenient situation for her military operations. As Bywater has pointed out, if Guam and the Philippines fall into the enemy's hands, the United States will be confronted with a serious problem, the solution of which will be almost impossible. The loss of Guam and the Philippines means that the United States will not have even a single base of operations in the West Pacific. Without such bases she will never be able to strike at the heart of Japan from Pearl Harbour.

On the other hand, the morale of the Japanese nation will be greatly heightened by the occupation of Guam and the Philippines ; at the same time if the brave Japanese submarines will haunt the long Pacific coasts of the United States, attacking United States commercial ships and threatening to destroy the supply routes between the United States mainland and Pearl Harbour, the American people, proud though they are, will be extremely worried about the situation.

CHAPTER XIII

THE FEARFUL WAR OF TRADE DESTRUCTION

I. THE UNITED STATES WAR OF TRADE DESTRUCTION

BEFORE the First World War, the capture or sinking of enemy commercial ships had represented merely one aspect of the complicated war action, but it did not constitute an important portion of the totality of war. But with the outbreak of the First World War, Germany with her inferior navy carried out, almost out of desperation, a war of trade destruction, and its results having been enormously effective, the trade-destruction war is to-day regarded as one of the most effective war methods.

It is still fresh in our memory how seriously the warships *Kaiser Wilhelm der Grosse* and *Königsberg* threatened the British trade-routes at the outset of the World War.

The German cruiser *Emden*, of only 3600 tons, under Commander von Müller, shortly after its escape from Tsingtao cruised at will between the South Seas and the Indian Ocean, thus threatening the Allied communication routes. In a short time it sank 71,000 tons of British ships, and captured and released 18,000 tons of the same. Indeed, the value of the losses thus inflicted upon the British ships at the outset of the war amounted to approximately £6,700,000.

Especially after Germany, out of desperation, began to use the so-called U-boats, and vertically and horizontally carried out an unrestricted submarine warfare, the Allied countries suffered a loss of more than 500,000 tons of ships every month. As a result England, which had relied upon foreign trade for the supply of most of her foodstuffs, fought on threatened by the possibility of starvation.

Be that as it may, it will be inevitable, in the event of a United States-Japanese war, for the two countries to be engaged in ferocious trade-destruction warfare.

Let us examine those trade routes which the United States will attempt to destroy.

First of all, the United States will pursue Japanese commercial ships navigating the Atlantic. The Japanese ships navigating near United States waters at the time of the outbreak of the United States-Japanese war will become the first victims of war, as will the United States ships navigating in the waters of the Far East.

There is also a danger that Japanese ships navigating in the direction of London and Hamburg will be frequently exposed to attack by United States submarines and cruisers haunting the eastern part of the Atlantic.

The distance between Boston or Philadelphia, the two United States naval bases on the Atlantic side, and the coasts of Western Europe is about 3000 nautical miles. That section being free space left for United States activities, Japan will have no way whatsoever of limiting United States activities there, no matter what effort she may put forth. The new United States naval bases in South America also cannot be set at naught.

The next place where America will use her power will be along the Australian route.

If the United States base of operations is Tutuila in Samoa, it will probably be a little too far. Ordinarily Japanese commercial ships navigate along the western coasts of the Philippines and, coming out to the Celebes Sea, reach Torres Strait by way of Macassar Strait, the Banda Sea, and the Arafura Sea. Such being the case, the United States warships based in Tutuila with the object of attacking Japanese commercial ships bound for Melbourne or Sydney will have no course but to choose the vicinity of the Australian eastern coast.

In that case, the chance of a vigorous attack being launched by the United States will be decreased; the distance between Tutuila and the eastern coast of Australia being more than 2000 nautical miles, the United States will find it more difficult to carry out such activities than she thinks. As a matter of fact, so far as routes in the waters near Japan, the China routes, the South Seas routes, the Indian routes, the East African routes, and the Mediterranean routes are concerned, anything like attack upon them is, in principle, next to impossible.

No matter how brave and daring the United States Fleet may be, it will not be able to threaten the South China Seas or the vicinity of

Singapore, which are more than 5000 nautical miles from Pearl Harbour. But when the United States Fleet is stationed at the Singapore naval base and England (including Australia and Canada) declares war upon Japan, it will be a serious difficulty to Japan.

As soon as war breaks out, the North and South American routes through the Pacific will inevitably be cut.

The single line of 4400 nautical miles connecting San Francisco with Hawaii and Samoa divides the Pacific diagonally into two, thereby completely cutting off from Japan routes reaching to territory east of the South Seas ; this means that Japanese shipping vessels will not be able to move even a step east of longitude 170 W. Although it is thought the routes reaching to the east coast of South America by way of the Indian Ocean and Capetown will be far safer than former routes, it must be remembered they are within the sphere of United States and British influence. It is even more dangerous for Japanese ships, after visiting Santos and Montevideo, to proceed to the Palpa line by way of the long route via Magellan Strait. Inevitably the Japanese ships will meet with the misfortune of being sunk or captured.

2. JAPAN'S WAR OF TRADE DESTRUCTION

What United States trade-routes will Japan attempt to destroy ? It is obvious that as a result of the Asiatic coasts being completely blockaded by Japanese naval power, all the Far Eastern sea-routes of the United States will be interrupted.

Not only the sea-routes to Japan from foreign countries but also those to China from foreign countries, and those from the United States to the Philippines and to French Indo-China, will be simultaneously blocked. At the same time, communications between the United States West Coast and the area west of Singapore will be stopped, thereby compelling United States ships to pass, of necessity, through the Mediterranean Sea and Suez on their way to India. United States ships may plan to proceed to Calcutta from San Francisco by crossing the Pacific in a straight line and entering the Bay of Bengal via Singapore ; but it must be remembered that in the event of war, such convenient sea routes will not be left open.

First of all, the United States ships will reach Panama, taking routes south along the North American coast ; they will then proceed to the Indian Ocean via the Atlantic, the Mediterranean Sea, the Suez Canal, and the Red Sea, finally entering the Bay of Bengal by going round Cape Comorin. In the former case the distance is about 10,000 nautical miles while the latter covers 15,000 miles ; that route is a circuitous one half as long again as the former routes. This will indeed be a painful thing for the United States.

Next, what will become of United States-Australian trade ?

In this respect the United States will suffer from a danger far greater than Japan's. I mentioned before that the distance between Tutuila and the eastern coast of Australia is more than 2000 nautical miles, whereas it is more than 1800 nautical miles from certain islands under Japanese South Sea mandate, such as Ponapé Island in the Carolines, to the eastern coast of Australia. That is to say, the Japanese Fleet, dependent upon bases in the afore-mentioned areas, will be blessed by a scope of activities far greater than that of the United States Fleet which has a base of operation in Tutuila.

A special disadvantage to the United States is the fact that the Japanese-Australian sea routes which are exposed to danger are limited to the eastern coast of Australia, whereas the United States-Australian sea routes exposed to danger are not thus limited.

The line connecting Hawaii to Sydney and Melbourne is only 1300 nautical miles from an island of the Marshall group, that is to say, Jaluit Island ; and the line connecting San Francisco directly to Sydney and Melbourne is only 1500 or 1600 nautical miles from Jaluit Island ; this means that the sphere of activities of the Japanese Fleet, dependent upon Jaluit Island, will cross the Hawaii-Australia line and the San Francisco-Australia line. The percentage of danger is 1 to 10 to Japan, against 50 to 60 to the United States. It is safe to say that United States-Australian trade will thus be impossible.

The next problem is United States trade with the South Seas, but this is almost out of the question.

Let us draw a circle, with a radius of 1500 nautical miles southward, starting from Yap Island ; half of this circle will embrace a great part of the Solomon Islands to the east, New Britain, New Guinea, Surorov,

Celebes, Timor, Flores, Lombok, and Buru, and most of Borneo. Thus it will be difficult to detect even the shadow of a ship flying the Star-Spangled Banner between the coral islands and the area west of them.

If complete interruption or damage of the United States-Far Eastern communications via the Pacific, United States-South Seas communications via the Pacific, and United States-Australian communications via the Pacific is made, the United States will have in the Pacific only the routes connecting her with Canada to the north and with South America to the south.

However, mere prosecution of trade-destruction warfare will never bring the war to an end. If the limitations placed on the United States by Japan's occupation of the Philippines and Guam are maintained defeat for the United States will be indicated.

CHAPTER XIV

RECAPTURE OF THE PHILIPPINES BY THE UNITED STATES

I. THE PHILIPPINE-RECAPTURING FORCES

WILL it be possible for the United States to recapture the Philippines once they are taken by Japan? Let me discuss this.

President Wilson of the United States once remarked to the effect that "Even if Japan occupies the Philippines she will never be able to retain the islands for a long period, for after all, the islands will be retaken by the United States when she resorts to offensive action." As a result of the United States having such a blind confidence in her strength, it seems that everybody is inclined to think that the recapture of the Philippines is not a big problem at all. But if we assume that Japan has occupied the Philippines and Guam, it is expected that she will take advantage of the superb geographical position of these islands, and promptly take steps to strengthen armaments in her South Sea islands. Furthermore, she will launch an attack upon Hawaii and occupy it, with Wake and Midway Islands as her stepping-stones. Then America will not be able to move her hands or feet.

If the United States forces herself to recapture the Philippines, she will have to carry out an expedition to the Western Pacific by mobilizing her entire Fleet. Otherwise, there is fear of the United States Fleet being smashed to pieces by Japanese capital ships. In the second place, in order to rout the Japanese armed forces, whose position has already been strengthened by the occupation of the Philippines, the United States will be obliged to send a large number of soldiers at any cost. What conclusion derives from these two facts? A United States Fleet which dares to carry out so-called trans-oceanic war operations with the object of recapturing the Philippines will consist of its main body—a large mass of warships—and an enormous number of troop-ships laden with a large number of soldiers. This huge fleet will have

to proceed *en masse*, through the midst of the Pacific, followed by an unprecedentedly large troop-ship squadron. Suppose Japan dispatches a force of 80,000 ; this will mean that in order to rout the Japanese Army, the United States will need a force stronger than the Japanese Army.

To transport an army of 100,000 men, a minimum of 1,800,000 tons of ships is necessary, and if we estimate the average tonnage of each ship at 15,000 tons, the total troop-ships needed will be the tremendous number of 120.

That means the United States expeditionary fleet will consist of about 300 ships in all ; and once this fleet is in the heart of the Pacific, it is unthinkable that the Japanese Fleet will let it pass in silence.

2. JAPAN'S DEFENSIVE POSITION

Considering the problem from another angle, Japan is naturally blessed by double defensive walls linked, both inside and outside, by a chain of islands. The inside link consists of the Pescadores Islands, Formosa, all islands to the west and south, the Bonin Islands, and the Kurile Islands, all of which have already been strongly armed for defence. The outside link extends many thousands of nautical miles, embracing the Marshall, Caroline, Marianne, and Pelew Islands, which are scattered like stars across the routes of the United States Navy, either perpendicularly or horizontally. The total number of these islands is more than one thousand. It will be impossible for the United States Fleet to reach its destination, the Philippines, from Hawaii without taking at least 14 days. If, therefore, the afore-mentioned huge United States Fleet is exposed in the middle of the Pacific for more than 10 days, with the necessity of taking its course into the enemy's defensive line, nothing will be so dangerous as this, indeed. For the Japanese surprise-attack fleet there will be no more appetizing prey than this.

Even if the enemy fleet exerts itself in defence by using cruisers, destroyers, submarines, there is no doubt that the Japanese surprise-attack fleet, having already seized the initiative, will freely appear, strike the vital spots of the enemy, and vanish.

If the advance of the United States Fleet is constantly harassed with this kind of attack for 14 days, the formation of the fleet will be disintegrated, and the morale of the soldiers thereby undermined, then even this huge fleet will find itself between the devil and the deep sea and will scream for help.

Furthermore, it will never be possible for the huge United States Fleet, consisting of more than 300 ships, to disappear completely under the cover of night; therefore there will undoubtedly occur the first great night battles on the Equator. The officers of the Japanese Navy will be able to demonstrate their great and unique skill in torpedoing. We are eagerly anticipating the excellent skill and unparalleled courage of our Navy.

In addition, if we imagine the worst case, just when the United States Fleet, extremely exhausted after having undergone a continual, day-and-night defensive struggle, finishes most of its voyage and is about to reach its destination, what will happen if the cream of our capital ships make their appearance in all their power?

No calamity is greater than that of a party completely deprived by its enemy of every possible opportunity of victory. Needless to say, the United States Fleet will fight valiantly, but in consideration of the various circumstances there is no room even for argument that the conditions are very disadvantageous. Especially, if the United States Fleet is once wounded, it will find no place to flee except Hawaii, because it has no other place to flee to. If those ships that should be saved are not saved, the United States Fleet will be obliged to fight defensively. The tragedy which will ensue as a result of the failure of the United States Fleet in its attempt to cross the Pacific can be imagined by recalling the end of the Russian Baltic Fleet in the Sea of Japan.

If the United States Fleet should arrive intact in the Philippines, this does not mean that it will also be successful in recapturing the islands, for there will be the Japanese Army ready to hold out to the last man with valour and loyalty, and in order to smash this Japanese Army, nothing can be done without the help of super-dreadnoughts; moreover, several landing battles will necessarily be staged. On this occasion the Japanese Army, at its powerfully-armed defensive

positions, will greet the United States Navy and Army under very favourable conditions.

Who will win this battle? Japan, or the United States? I should like to leave this question to the judgment of all the people.

Thus, if any plan is made by the United States for the recapture of the Philippines from the hands of Japan, it will prove merely to be a nightmare vision misleading her.

3. OCCUPATION OF THE BONIN ISLANDS BY THE UNITED STATES FLEET

It is often said that the United States will attempt to occupy the Bonin Islands, but so long as it is difficult for her to recapture even the Philippines, anything like an attack upon the Bonins will be equally difficult.

The distance between Hawaii and the Bonin Islands is 3350 nautical miles; the sea routes between them are under the surveillance of all the Marianne Islands from the flank. The distance between the Bonin Islands and Yokosuka naval harbour is only 530 nautical miles, and by means of a single wireless message, the Japanese Fleet stationed at Yokosuka will reach the Bonins within a day and a half. Therefore, Japan will not lose these islands as easily as is generally thought.

Although the armament conditions in the Bonin Islands cannot be described, let us assume that they on these islands are equivalent to those on Guam; then Japan, even after the beginning of war, will have time to complete the arming of the islands. As compared with Guam, which can be taken within a few days of the outbreak of war, the position of the Bonin Islands is, in this respect, much more advantageous.

If the Japanese Fleet reaches the Bonin Islands in 35 hours, it will take the United States Fleet at least 230 hours to get there.

This leisure time of 200 hours, that is, of more than eight days, will be enough to enable Japan to carry out her most pressing and immediate tasks. If the United States Navy has such cool-headedness as to realize that any attempt to recapture the Philippines would prove nothing but futile adventure, there is no doubt that it will also refrain from venturing to attack the Bonin Islands.

If it is impossible for the United States Navy either to recapture the Philippines and Guam or to occupy the Bonin Islands, what kind of course will it take ?

Some people hold the view that in such an event the United States will, in all probability, send a large number of soldiers in an attempt to occupy the Kurile Islands or Hokkaido. How can this be done ? It is not a realistic and feasible task to dispatch a large number of soldiers to Alaska, which is 1000 nautical miles from the mainland of the United States, and then transport them to Japan, which is 2000 nautical miles from there.

If such a reckless attempt is made by the United States, her fleet will at once have to meet the sad calamity of total annihilation. It cannot be said, however, that if the United States makes such an attempt, the Kurile Islands and other northern parts of Japan will be completely safe.

As a means of limiting the activities of the Japanese Fleet the United States will not fail to order a part of her Fleet, stationed at Kyska and Unalaska, to proceed to the vicinity of the Kurile Islands or off the eastern coast of Hokkaido in order to sink Japanese fishing-boats and steamers plying in northern waters or bombard the Ochiai Wireless Telegraph Station, or Nemuro Harbour, both of which are located along the north-eastern coasts of Hokkaido, thereby greatly alarming the Japanese people.

At this time, the United States will undoubtedly resort, of her own initiative, to such measures ; that is, once the United States finds herself powerless to bring Japan to her knees, she will make up her mind to stick to a long-endurance war and wait for the time when Japan will be exhausted by it.

But if the United States-Japanese war becomes a long-endurance war, compared to Japan, the United States will probably become extremely impatient and worried. This means that victory will be firmly in the hands of Japan ; Guam will be taken by Japan, and so will the Philippines ; Japan's position in the Philippines will steadily and daily become sounder and stronger ; she will be able to trade with Europe freely, and will engage in all activities in the Far East far more freely than she had done before the outbreak of war. The Japanese Fleet,

hiding in her own protected and safe harbours and home waters, will laugh at the confusion of the United States Fleet, and Japan's occupation of Guam and the Philippines will hurt the pride of the American people in such a painful way that angry American public opinion will severely denounce the incompetence of the United States Navy. If things come to such a pass, will it be possible for the Commander-in-Chief of the United States Fleet in Pearl Harbour to continue to maintain his presence of mind?

The greatest anguish of the United States Fleet will be due to the fact that no matter how long the war may be extended, the Japanese Fleet will be able to receive sufficient supplies and recuperate itself at its home harbours, whereas the United States Fleet, which would be at these small islands, 2000 nautical miles from the mainland of the United States, will have to bear disadvantages and inconvenience of every kind. Accordingly, this actuality will undoubtedly bring about every day results which will be a source of worry to the United States owing to the inefficiency of the United States Fleet.

Especially is there fear that every motion of the United States Navy will be closely and strictly watched by the Japanese Fleet. Moreover, the position of the Japanese Fleet will be obscure and extreme difficulties will rise, one after another, to confound the strategy of the United States Fleet.

CHAPTER XV

THE SINGAPORE NAVAL BASE AND HONG KONG

I. THE PROBLEM OF THE SINGAPORE NAVAL BASE

CONSIDERING that Anglo-United States military co-ordination with regard to the Pacific problem is gradually taking on concrete shape, it has already become a certainty that England will take part in the United States-Japanese war. Now that the United States Navy has accomplished its long-cherished desire to have Singapore as a naval base, it will be able to enjoy the advantages of the base to its heart's content.

It was in 1819 that Singapore, which was to become the Gibraltar of the Orient and the greatest base of operations for the British Navy there, fell into the hands of England; it was in 1921, the year when the Anglo-Japanese Alliance was abolished, that it was converted into a naval base; and work on the base was formally started in 1934.

Singapore is a small island of the British Straits Settlements, covering an area of only 220 square miles; but the amount of military expenditure spent by England for this place really reaches an astronomical figure. This island used to be a natural swamp, and it can be imagined what difficulties the British must have experienced in converting this swamp into a base. In fact, the way England has squandered money on this project can be compared with throwing money into a swamp. The British Government, however, has pressed work on this base, holding that every penny spent for it will be as sound as a fire-insurance policy.

The reason England attaches such importance to Singapore is that the geographical position of Singapore has, needless to say, unparalleled strategical value.

Ordinarily, there are four districts which the British Empire regards as the key-points of its defence. The first is the British mainland, with London as the centre, as well as its neighbouring seas; the

second, the south-eastern area of the North Atlantic, with Gibraltar as the centre, as well as the Mediterranean ; the third, the Suez Canal and the Red Sea, with Egypt as the centre ; and the fourth, the Far East, with Singapore as the centre.

The first three areas have already been put in jeopardy in connexion with the present European war, while Singapore alone remains as the last unthreatened foothold of the British Empire.

The armament for defence of Singapore shows that the island is thoroughly and minutely manned with army, navy, and air-forces. There are about 7000 soldiers on guard at the fortresses on the island ; they are in charge of 16- or 18-inch guns, each gun with a range of from 20 to 30 miles, as well as of innumerable anti-aircraft guns. The strength of the heavy-gun formations on the island is unsurpassed throughout the world ; it is equalled only by the Panama Canal fortifications. The British air-force in Singapore has more than two squadrons consisting of new Blenheim bombers and Sunderland seaplanes ; the new seaplanes are capable of threatening the China Seas by making a long-endurance flight of over 2000 miles.

In time of peace, Singapore is the main air base between England and the Netherlands Indies on the route connecting the British mainland to India and extending farther to Australia and all the other islands in the Pacific. The importance of the island as a base of air operations can easily be recognized.

Furthermore, the greatest pride of Singapore is the second largest dry-dock in the world ; the dock—1000 feet in length, 130 feet in width, 35 feet in depth—is capable of accommodating easily battleships of the 50,000-ton class. It was completed in February 1938 at the enormous cost of £20,000,000. Besides this there is a huge floating dock which has been sent from the British mainland ; a huge pier 2200 feet in length, which is capable of accommodating several battleships ; coal and oil stations of 1,000,000 tons capacity which are said to be capable of supplying a big fleet for half a year. Indeed, the armaments of Singapore are beyond enumeration. On completion of this huge base it has become possible for the British Fleet to station itself permanently in the Orient.

The United States is in possession only of Guam and the Philippines

as naval bases in the Western Pacific ; neither of them has been capable of use as a base of operations for a big fleet. Now that she has taken over Singapore, she bids fair to become a rival of the unrivalled Japanese Navy. The fact that three-fourths of the lead and three-fifths of the rubber used by the United States for military purposes are imported from British Malaya, will also be a strong point for the United States.

Can Japan smash the United States Fleet stationed in Singapore ? Indeed, this is a big question. For it is impossible for any kind of fleet to smash through Malacca Strait so long as there exists a powerful fleet and fortifications in Singapore. No matter how brave the Japanese Fleet may be, it will not then be possible to strike at the area west of India.

If the Fleet persistently attempts to smash through this area, it will be tantamount to plunging into a death-trap. Anything that is absolutely impossible from a theoretical point of view is also impossible in practice.

But in the southern part of the Western Pacific there are the Banda, Celebes, Sulu, and South China Seas which are contiguous to each other, with a depth of water of more than 2000 fathoms. The sea on the east of the Philippines, particularly, has a depth of water unequalled throughout the world. For example, the Sweia Strait is 5000 fathoms deep, and there are two large sea lanes, 2000 fathoms and 3500 fathoms deep, facing the Indian Ocean south of Sunda Strait.

The gulf of Siam, the Java Sea, and the Pegu estuary are shallow ; shallow water of 100 fathoms usually known as the continental shelf, surrounds the islands round Sumatra, Java, and Borneo, thus forming extremely complicated sea-routes. The climate is mild and the tides, though violent in places, are calm on the whole. The sea-routes are so complicated that anything like a great naval battle will never be staged in these waters.

If war breaks out in these areas, the fighting forces will probably consist of cruisers, smaller ships, and aeroplanes, with a military force of two-thirds native soldiers and one-third Netherlanders ; this force has a fighting strength equivalent to less than 5 per cent. of that of the Anglo-American Fleets, and this kind of fighting strength is

negligible. Beyond this I am not free to make public further details of the military strength.

But while the United States is hesitating, Japan should watch and take into account what the pro-Japanese Burmese and Indian people will do.

2. WHAT WILL BECOME OF HONG KONG?

What will become of Hong Kong? As is well known to everyone, Hong Kong is a small island south-east of Canton, only 400 miles from Formosa, the southernmost outpost of Japan's national defence. For a long period Hong Kong has been famous as a base of operations for British Imperialism in the Far East, but the strength of the British Fleet stationed in that area is really trivial. In fact, this Fleet is too weak to dare a naval battle with the powerful Japanese Fleet. Powerless though the British Fleet may be, if we assume that the fortresses themselves in Hong Kong are really invincible, it is feared that the United States Fleet, which will enter the area of these impregnable fortresses, will prove considerably troublesome to Japan.

It is said that, especially with the object of connecting the small island in front of Kowloon called Wen-Shen-Chou to Hong Kong, a tunnel has been bored through at the bottom of the sea, and that in order to strengthen the defence of Wen-Shen-Chou, eleven emplacements of subterranean batteries have been built there. Besides this, there is an anti-aircraft battery in Kowloon and a subterranean battery on Sheng-ch'i Mountain in the rear of Hong Kong; defensive installations throughout the area of Dunghuo have been reinforced; a new aerodrome to be used exclusively at night has been established at Keitoku, and a naval volunteer corps organized. But the military effect of all these defensive measures is poor.

How many days will Hong Kong be able to resist the Japanese, after all? Some say a week, some say two or three days, or even one day, but they agree Hong Kong will finally be taken by our Army, which will land from Times Bay and Aberdeen Island in the rear.

It is probably impossible to get aid to Hong Kong from England, or to the Philippines from the United States. If defence of Hong Kong is impossible, British power in the Pacific will become nothing but

an empty shell. In such an event, the only thing the Anglo-United States Fleets can do will be to glance into the southern part of Japan. And unless Hong Kong is retained by Britain and the United States, Singapore will be quite useless.

Comparing the sea routes to Japan from Pearl Harbour with those from Singapore, Singapore is about 800 nautical miles nearer than the former ; but from the standpoint of strategic position, the routes from Singapore are far more difficult than the former routes, since the United States Fleet must take one determined course throughout, and must break through the outpost of the powerful Japanese Fleet either west or south of Formosa. By that time it is thought the Japanese Fleet will have already occupied Hong Kong, thus putting the South China Sea under its control. It will not be amiss, therefore, to conclude that it will be quite impossible for a big fleet to advance with impunity.

If we are aware of the fact that the *raison d'être* of Singapore is, after all, nothing but the defence of India and the security of the Indian Ocean, all that will be necessary for Japan will be to resort to the tactics of smashing, one by one, the United States warships emerging from Singapore. For Japan, however, the greatest trouble will be the interruption of the South Sea routes, which will be the heaviest blow delivered to Japan by the co-ordinated Anglo-American strategy. The most urgent problem confronting Japan is to occupy the Dutch Indies as speedily as possible and thus solve the oil problem.

CHAPTER XVI

THE ADVANCE OF THE UNITED STATES FLEET TO HAWAII

I. FIGHTING STRENGTH FOR PACIFIC WAR OPERATIONS

LET me here discuss the advance of the United States Fleet to Hawaii. First of all, a question which arouses our deep interest is : How much battleship tonnage will the United States be able to use for her war operations, when she clashes with Japan ? It may be assumed she will fight Japan with her entire might, but will it be possible for her to neglect her Atlantic defence and concentrate her entire naval power for Western Pacific war operations ?

This is a big question indeed. If the United States can feel perfectly secure after abolishing her Atlantic defence even without stationing a single warship along the entire Pacific Coast, she will be quite all right. In the event, however, that insecurity compels her to leave twenty per cent. of her entire Fleet behind, for her Atlantic defence, this will mean a decrease by twenty per cent. in the naval fighting strength to be used for Western Pacific war operations. And if the United States, while attempting to cross the Pacific, loses thirty per cent. of the fighting strength of that fleet, this means that the actual strength of the entire Fleet will be reduced by forty-four per cent. In such an event, it may be predicted that the United States, in accordance with her long-cherished principle of quick battle and immediate decision, will force upon the Japanese Fleet a decisive battle, and attempt to cut Japan's life-line, thus bringing her to her knees.

It may also be supposed that the United States will, instead of resorting to these tactics, leave behind some of her remaining troops, while the rest of her Fleet will be concentrated at Hawaii, to wait. In this connexion let me conjecture what kind of fleet will be organized by the United States and what will be the strength of such a fleet. It must be borne in mind there is a vast difference between the

existing strength of the United States Navy and that which will come into being with the completion of the plan for a Greater Navy.

1. THE FIGHTING FLOTILLA.—The battleship flotilla; the cruiser flotilla; the aviation flotilla; and the mine-laying flotilla. In addition to these the aviation flotilla of Pearl Harbour will participate.
2. THE SCOUTING FLOTILLA.—The cruiser fighting flotilla of 15,000-ton class; the destroyer flotilla; and the aviation flotilla. In addition to these the aviation corps and training warships in every naval base will participate.
3. THE SUBMARINE FLOTILLA.—The submarine flotilla of 1500-ton class, with some submarine depot ships.
4. THE NAVAL BASE FLOTILLA.—The mine-sweepers, oil-supply ships, food-supply ships, construction ships, trawlers, 'planes, and the Marine corps.

Of these, the fighting fleet which will advance to the Western Pacific will include the fighting flotilla, the scouting flotilla, and the submarine flotilla. The number of ships participating in the battle, if it comprises all in the Navy, will be quite enormous.

2. CONCENTRATION OF THE ENTIRE FLEET AT PEARL HARBOUR

If the United States is able to use a maximum of thirty battleships for her Western Pacific war operations, and forty cruisers of the 15,000-ton class, her fighting power will be superior to Japan's, and Japan will be too inferior and too much at a disadvantage to attempt to fight the United States. More than that, once the United States completes her plan for a Greater Navy, a menace will be felt by Japan. Especially if the United States uses fifty per cent. of her 368 destroyers and fifty per cent. of her 185 submarines, the number of warships available for her operations will be alarming even without including those to be sent to Manila and elsewhere as an Asiatic Fleet.

Of these warships, those belonging to the fighting flotilla will be sent in the direction of Pearl Harbour from the naval bases along the Pacific Coast, and those belonging to the scouting flotilla will be sent

from the Atlantic. On top of this, about 400 commercial ships will be assembled to assist in this war operation. It will take at least one month for a flotilla to complete its fighting preparations and pass through the Panama Canal, and arrive at Pearl Harbour. It will be by no means impossible for Japanese submarines to fall upon the United States Fleet on her way, provided they act promptly and skilfully.

Unless the United States Navy mobilizes its warships as quickly as possible from other directions and advances to Pearl Harbour, it will be quite inevitable for it to sacrifice some of its warships on their way to Pearl Harbour from Panama, San Francisco, and other naval bases, because of the surprise-attack tactics of Japan.

Even if the United States Fleet is fortunate enough to line up at Pearl Harbour, it will encounter an attack by the Japanese surprise-attack fleet before it is able to depart in the direction of the Western Pacific. Also, if the whole United States Fleet comes into and goes out of Pearl Harbour, measures will be taken by the Japanese Navy to inflict losses upon it by laying mines and torpedoes in the vicinity. Therefore it must be prepared for some damage.

If, in the meantime, the Japanese Fleet haunts the Pacific Coast and bombards or threatens the United States merchant marine, the United States will be dealt a heavy blow.

CHAPTER XVII

THE JAPANESE SURPRISE-ATTACK FLEET

I. THE UNITED STATES TRANS-OCEANIC OPERATIONS

THERE is no doubt that in the event of the outbreak of the United States-Japanese war both countries will exert themselves to grasp the best opportunity to strike and rout their enemy in advance, before it has yet completed its preparations. Will it be possible for the United States, in consideration of her national characteristics, to complete preparations for war as rapidly as Japan? The United States possesses an abundance of war resources; she will have no money difficulties whatsoever. But it is highly doubtful how smoothly the recruiting job will go, for in the eyes of the American nation, sacrifice of their bodies for their country would mean only that they were fighting for a small number of United States capitalists; therefore, there is no way of arousing patriotic feelings in Americans. Perhaps the American people will be interested in the war itself, but it is highly doubtful whether they will entertain any sense of responsibility to fulfil their war duties and smash Japan to pieces at any cost. As a matter of fact, existence of such a sense of responsibility in the minds of the American people is regrettably denied by the nature of the Yankee soul, liberalistic and individualistic.

When the United States Navy is troubled by a large number of vacancies even in time of peace, it is a question whether she can recruit the necessary fighting strength in the event of war. Unless the mobilization plan is carried out as favourably as has been hoped, the United States naval authorities, no matter how ferociously they advocate the principle of quick battle and immediate decision, will have to spend at least one month after war is declared in completing the mobilization of the Fleets as well as in making all other preparations to fight Japan. Even if the compulsory law is proclaimed, its results are also a matter of doubt.

It may be no exaggeration to say that more than two months will be needed for all the United States Fleets to be concentrated at Pearl Harbour.

In the meantime, the Japanese Navy will take the initiative by launching an attack upon and occupying the Philippines, and then proceeding to Guam. Then, if Wake, Tutuila, Midway, and other points fall into our hands, almost all the stepping-stones necessary for the advance of the United States Fleets to the Western Pacific will be taken by Japan. In such a case the United States trans-oceanic operations will be confronted with serious difficulty. It will be all the more difficult for her Fleets to advance since Japan will lose no time in repairing and improving these occupied islands and converting them into submarine bases or into bases for other branches of her Navy.

If things turn out as already suggested, Japan will complete the mobilization of all her fighting strength and devise measures to whittle down the United States fighting strength, limiting the activities of the United States Fleets by actual warfare.

For this purpose she will occupy all the islands which bid fair to become bases of operations for the United States Fleets, while the Japanese surprise-attack fleet will launch an attack upon the United States warships so as to cut off United States foreign trade.

2. ACTIVITIES OF THE SURPRISE-ATTACK FLEET

What is the surprise-attack fleet? As in the case of the United States scouting fleet or the French second fleet its main power consists of submarines, and if necessary, cruisers and destroyers are added and even aircraft carriers, if the occasion demands.

In a war such as the United States-Japanese war, which will involve the entire Pacific and occasionally the Atlantic, it is quite impossible to organize a surprise-attack fleet from parts of the submarine squadron or the torpedo squadron of the main fleet; therefore, an independent surprise-attack fleet must be organized separately.

The Japanese submarines of the *Igo* class are excellent for the surprise-attack fleet, and they are also supposed to be attached to the main fleet to participate in the main battle. Therefore, without counting the

submarines attached to the main Fleet, the number of other submarines which will be able to be used in the surprise-attack fleet is . . . vessels of the *Igo* No. 1 type, and . . . vessels of the *Igo* No. 53 or No. 68. In case the above number of submarines of the *Igo* class is not sufficient, it will be impossible to spare more submarines of the same class for the surprise-attack warfare to be staged at a distance ; but, if necessary, submarines of the *Rogo* class will probably be used.

Inasmuch as submarines are extremely complex machines, the degree of damage which can be inflicted upon them is far greater than that upon any other type of warship. And the work imposed upon the crew of a submarine is so heavy and exhaustive that it is said in Europe and America that it will be quite impossible for the crew to continue their work aboard a submarine for more than one month. That is, without sufficient care for the hull and rest for the crew, its effective operation will not be possible. It should be remembered, therefore, that the burden and responsibility of the Japanese submarines will be even greater and heavier.

In the future every submarine will be required to possess elegance of operation and a long cruising range, so that the machine may operate independently in the Western Pacific. At present a Japanese submarine of the *Rogo* class, though lacking somewhat in elegance of operation, has the capacity for a continuous voyage of about ten thousand miles, and under the proper protection of depot ships it will easily traverse the whole Pacific. In other words, it is not necessarily difficult for even the small type of submarine to appear along the Pacific Coast of the United States and render meritorious services to our country.

If the Japanese Navy occupies Midway Island rapidly and converts it into a base of operation for submarines, this island, because of its location about 1160 nautical miles from Hawaii, will be extremely valuable and convenient for launching a surprise-attack.

The number of mine-layers of the *Igo* No. 21 type, to be attached to the surprise-attack fleet, is. . . . These ships, carrying a large number of mines, will scatter in United States harbours and bays as well as in other places to be traversed by United States warships. And if opportune times come, they will attack the enemy fleet and, haunting the

enemy communications lines, destroy enemy commerce and trade. The power of these vessels can by no means be despised.

The main force of the surprise-attack fleet being submarines with a cruiser as their flagship, its necessary requirement is to possess several aeroplanes. Besides the submarine flotilla the fighting corps of the destroyer flotilla, that is, the torpedo fighting corps, will be attached to the surprise-attack fleet, so that it, in co-operation with the submarine corps, may launch a night attack upon the enemy fleet, sinking enemy submarines and also serving on other missions. Thus the efficiency of the surprise-attack fleet will be all the more increased.

Even after the surprise-attack fleet is thus formed and its duty set, no one is in a position to predict what results it will actually obtain; they remain to be seen.

The length of an American sailor's service on board a submarine is about three weeks, whereas it is recognized that a Japanese sailor is capable of an endurance more than three times that of the American. It is thought that this difference of endurance between the navies of the two countries alone will bring a great harvest.

If the Japanese surprise-attack fleet succeeds in sinking several battleships, cruisers, and troop-ships, it will be a serious blow to the United States.

CHAPTER XVIII

THE UNITED STATES FLEET'S EXPEDITION TO JAPAN

I. EXPEDITION TO JAPAN AND THE WHEEL-SHAPED FORMATION

WHEN Japan occupies the Philippines, the United States-Japanese war will perhaps have a triumphant aspect for her, but it is quite premature for anyone to predict victory or defeat by this fact alone.

That is to say, it cannot be said that by occupying the Philippines Japan will hold the key which will determine her victory or defeat.

However, having already lost the Philippines, the United States will have no base from which her Fleet may operate in the Orient ; therefore, the contemplated expedition of her Fleet to Japan will be confronted with serious difficulty.

Since the United States has challenged Japan, she will have to adopt a positive strategy ; otherwise she cannot attain the object of her challenge. In other words, if the Philippines fall into the hands of Japan, it will mean that the United States will have lost half her hope for victory, though she has challenged Japan under the pretext of justice and humanitarianism.

The United States Fleet ought, first of all, to carry out its long-planned expedition to Japan on the basis of the strategy which has carefully and repeatedly been studied and worked out by United States naval authorities since the Russo-Japanese War.

The entire United States Fleet, galvanized by Japan's occupation of the Philippines, will advance to Hawaii and concentrate in the vicinity of Pearl Harbour. The fighting strength of the Fleet is thought to be enormous, though it is difficult to know the exact details about it.

The question is : How many of the ships concentrated in Pearl Harbour will be used in the organization of an expeditionary fleet to Japan ? No matter how confident the United States is in regard to

the Japanese Navy, it will be impossible for her to form an expeditionary fleet the strength of which will be equivalent to that of the Japanese Fleet.

The main force of the existing United States Fleet consists of capital ships, and if it joins the troop-ship squadron, the line of the expeditionary fleet will extend for more than thirty nautical miles. It is customary for a fleet to throw out a scouting line 200 to 500 nautical miles ahead, against a possible surprise attack by the enemy fleet; but in order to make its function more effective, the scouting line should be a minimum of 250 nautical miles in length.

Furthermore, because under normal weather conditions a fleet cannot have a scouting line less than 250 nautical miles in length, a minimum of 10 ships is needed to form the line. Because of the limitation of vision at night, the scouting line must necessarily be supplemented, and thus a minimum of 8 ships will be necessary for the formation of a second scouting line.

But even though these scouting lines are established, nevertheless, because the distance between each of the ships will be more than 12 nautical miles, the enemy light cruisers will be able to steal into the gaps and attack the capital ships of the expeditionary fleet.

In order to cope with this situation the expeditionary fleet will need to put a light-cruiser flotilla in the centre of the first line, and for this purpose there must be a minimum of 8 ships. In other words, the expeditionary fleet will need more than 26 cruisers for this exclusive use. From all these facts, it is possible to have a rough idea of the strategy most likely to be adopted by the United States Navy, as well as of the fighting strength of warships to be dispatched for the contemplated expedition to Japan, though it is beyond conjecture how these will undergo change after the completion of work on a Greater Navy.

In all likelihood, the United States expeditionary fleet will advance in the wheel-shaped formation of which so much has been heard in recent years.

Supposing the dispositions at the head of the wheel-shaped formation consist of 10 cruisers in the first line, 8 in the second line, and 8 in the centre, then this will not be a true wheel-shaped formation, but only a formation for the defence of the wheel-shaped formation.

The true wheel-shaped formation does not include even a single cruiser, with the exception of the two which will serve as flagships for the torpedo flotilla. Supposing a light-cruiser flotilla consisting of 8 ships is located in the centre of the wheel-shaped formation, there will be within the formation more than 10 battleships, 50 destroyers, 10 submarines, and some aircraft carriers, in addition to the light cruisers. This means that the expeditionary fleet will, of course, advance with the battleships and aircraft carriers in the centre, while the destroyers and submarines will form an outer wheel with the cruisers in the van.

2. DISPERSAL OF THE UNITED STATES FLEETS

If the United States is in possession of 32 battleships, it will in truth be a menace to Japan. As has already been mentioned, even if half of her battleships are concentrated in Hawaii, once she is defeated nobody can guarantee that the Japanese Fleet will not attempt to attack the United States mainland. While the entire United States Fleet is advancing towards the Western Pacific, the speedy Japanese Fleet might attack Hawaii and occupy it before the return of the United States Fleet.

Since the United States has a large number of battleships and new cruisers, a proper number will surely be left in Hawaii.

Even if it is planned to put her cruisers of 15,000 tons in the first and second lines of the formation for the voyage of the expeditionary fleet, the United States will find it difficult to leave the defence of the Atlantic, the Panama Canal, the Pacific Coast, and Hawaii entirely to the old-fashioned cruisers and destroyers. In view of this, it is expected that steps will be taken by the United States to dispatch to the battle-area a fighting strength of warships at least equivalent to the existing fighting strength of the Japanese Navy, while the remainder of the fighting strength will be in charge of strict guard and defence of the regions referred to above.

There will not be the slightest difficulty for the United States in defending important places and protecting her troop-ships and the flagships of her torpedo flotilla, which will include several tens of war

vessels. So far as defence is concerned, the United States will be able to use an abundance of new war vessels which even Japan does not have. It will also be possible in theory for the United States to organize a cruiser flotilla of any size she wants to proceed in the centre of the front line of the wheel-shaped formation.

Besides, if destroyers, submarines, and several aircraft carriers are the total fighting strength of the United States expeditionary fleet to Japan, the strength will be fearful indeed.

Even though this expeditionary fleet makes up its mind to carry out a voyage of 3000 nautical miles in order to determine, once and for all, the issue of victory or defeat in the war with the Japanese Fleet, nobody knows what change will, meanwhile, take place in defensive conditions on the United States mainland. There is the fear of an attack's being launched by the Japanese expeditionary force, as well as of uprisings by Mexico and other neutral countries against the United States. For this reason, if the United States attempts to organize an expeditionary fleet stronger than that mentioned above, she should give very serious consideration to the matter.

But if this expeditionary fleet persists in attempting an expedition to Japan accompanied by a large number of troop-ships, there is no doubt that it will first set its course north-east to the island of Midway. This island, being 1016 nautical miles from Hawaii, could be reached within 80 hours at a speed of 15 knots. But in the course of this voyage the fleet will have to follow a zigzag course because of the fear of submarine attack, and will thus approximate 100 hours, or 4 days, to reach Midway from Hawaii.

Then will this kind of zigzag course be safe? If the United States expeditionary fleet advances in a wheel-shaped formation, the ships of the advance guard will be 25 nautical miles from each other; thus there will be sufficient room for enemy submarines to attack and smash the expeditionary fleet, for it is impossible for any warship to detect a submarine unless the former is within $1\frac{1}{2}$ nautical miles of the latter.

Therefore, there is no guarantee whatsoever that the expeditionary fleet will be immune from attack by the Japanese submarine flotilla even on the first day of its departure from Hawaii. To make matters worse, the same night the Japanese destroyer flotilla might launch

an attack upon the United States expeditionary fleet from the flank, inflicting serious losses upon it.

As a matter of fact, the Japanese Navy has so much enthusiasm that the United States Fleet will find itself in danger in this respect.

Moreover, if we assume that the United States expeditionary fleet safely arrives at the island of Midway in 5 days and nights, and departs from the island after spending several days for necessary preparations, there will exist no more useful United States territories in the Pacific.

At this point, the desire of the United States expeditionary fleet will be to cause the Japanese Fleet to come out so as to have a decisive battle with it in the vicinity of United States territory. On the other hand, Japan realizes that it will be advantageous for her to have a naval battle with the enemy fleet in the waters near her own mainland, but not within an area in which it would be easy for United States aeroplanes to attack Japanese territory. This will be exactly the same strategy which was used by the Japanese Fleet at the time of the Russo-Japanese War, when the whereabouts of the Japanese Fleet was shrouded in mystery and silence.

But, because the flotillas of Japanese submarines and destroyers will probably continue their activities by attacking the United States Fleet, the expeditionary fleet may not be able to reach in safety the waters near Japan.

Moreover, once the United States Fleet suffers a brave and daring attack launched by the Japanese surprise-attack fleet, it will change its course, to return back to its homeland or Hawaii, or flee by a circuitous route to Singapore, its base of operations in the Orient. There is no doubt that her fleet will thereupon be dispersed and torn to pieces. What Japan fears is this very dispersal of the United States expeditionary fleet.

3. MOBILIZATION OF THE JAPANESE FLEET

Simultaneously with the receipt of a report that the United States Fleet has been concentrated in Hawaii, in what direction and with what fighting strength will Japan move?

As soon as the United States Fleet departs from Hawaii, perhaps the Japanese Fleet will lose no time in advancing in the direction of the Bonin Islands in order to demolish this Fleet.

If the United States Fleet advances to Kyska Harbour near Alaska, will it attempt to attack the Kurile Islands, eight hundred nautical miles from Kyska, and then advance southward, or will it advance to Midway Island? It will be comparatively easier for the United States Fleet to advance in the direction of the Bonins from Midway so as to have a decisive battle with the Japanese Fleet, than to advance to the Kuriles with the greater danger of attack by Japanese submarines. This operation will lessen the burden on the United States Fleet and enable it to fight with all its might. For this reason it is expected the United States Fleet will necessarily advance in the direction of the Bonins.

In this case, it is quite natural for the Japanese Fleet to be waiting in the Bonins for the arrival of the United States expeditionary fleet, and to attempt to cross swords with the enemy under the most favourable conditions. Also, the Japanese Fleet will resort as much as possible to the tactics of "burning its bridges behind it" by approaching the United States Fleet and cutting all the paths for its retreat before launching an attack upon it.

How much fighting strength will be needed by the Japanese Fleet on this occasion? I should like to assume that the Fleet will consist of 90 per cent of Japan's battleships and new cruisers, 80 per cent of her cruisers and destroyers, and from 80 to 90 per cent of her submarines. The Fleet will be divided into three parts: the first, the second, and the third.

THE FIRST FLEET

The First Flotilla—X battleships.

The Second Flotilla—X battleships.

The Sixth Flotilla—X cruisers of 8500-ton class mounting 6-inch guns.

The First Torpedo Flotilla—X destroyers of 1700-ton class.

The Third Torpedo Flotilla—X destroyers of X-ton class.

The First Submarine Flotilla—X submarines of X-ton class.

The First Air-fighting Flotilla—X aircraft carriers of big and small size.

THE SECOND FLEET

The Third Flotilla—X cruisers of 10,000-ton class.

The Fourth Flotilla—X cruisers of 10,000-ton class.

The Second Torpedo Flotilla—X destroyers of 1700-ton class.

The Fourth Torpedo Flotilla—X destroyers of 1300-ton class.

The Special Submarine Flotilla—X submarines of 2000-ton class.

The Second Submarine Flotilla—X submarines of 1400-ton class.

The Second Air-fighting Flotilla—X aircraft carriers of big and small size.

THE THIRD FLEET

The Fifth Flotilla—X cruisers.

The Seventh Flotilla—X cruisers.

The Fifth Torpedo Flotilla—X destroyers of X-ton class.

The Fourth Submarine Flotilla—X submarines of X-ton class.

Auxiliaries—X aircraft carriers of small size.

To these should be added "submarine destroyers."

CHAPTER XIX

AIR RAIDS BY THE UNITED STATES AIR-FORCE UPON JAPAN, AND ESPIONAGE

I. AIR RAIDS UPON TOKYO BY THE UNITED STATES AIR-FORCE

ASSUMING the United States Fleet advances as far as a point at least 300 nautical miles from Japanese territory, it is not difficult to imagine that it will attempt to bomb the Japanese mainland by means of its aviation squadron.

Everybody prophesies that in the event of a United States-Japanese war, Tokyo will be bombed. If this kind of prophecy materializes, the question is: From where will the United States air-force launch its attack?

First of all, it must be borne in mind that the United States is planning to build aircraft carriers of the 25,000-ton class; six are now under construction and contracts have already been made for twelve others, each of which will be able to accommodate more than 200 planes. It is also rumoured that construction of aviation cruisers is being contemplated. Thus the fighting strength of the United States air-force may become far from despicable. If this air-force appears, suddenly, as the United States mosquito fleet does, it will prove to be a fearful fighting force. Further, if aviation cruisers mounted with 9 6-inch guns and carrying 36 each, with capacity for developing a speed of 33 knots, are added to the United States air-force, and planes are sent out from their landing decks, Japan will find it a most troublesome task to tackle such a powerful fighting force. Any attempt by the United States air-force to bomb Tokyo will be possible only with such armaments.

About 100 United States aeroplanes flying from this type of aviation-cruiser squadron will advance from the north-east with Tokyo as their destination. If things go smoothly, they will take a course along the Tokaido, going as far as Osaka, whence they will turn eastward

to join the United States Fleet. The distance of this flight will be about 1000 miles.

If an aeroplane flies at 120 miles an hour, the round trip will take eight hours; it is not hard to realize the difficulty of such a flight for an aeroplane which is capable of making a speed of 120 miles per hour for 10 hours. Since during this time, in addition, the aviation-cruiser squadron will have changed its position by about 200 nautical miles, it cannot be thought that all the aeroplanes will be able to return safely to the Fleet.

What, then, will be the result of the battle? Of course, just as Japan places much hope in her submarine warfare, America is concentrating her energies for air attack; therefore I believe we can anticipate a serious outcome.

But so long as Japan is already aware that the United States Fleet will launch an expedition against her, and what sea routes this expedition will take, she will make adequate preparations and await its arrival. Therefore, it is not to be expected that the United States air-force will be able to bomb Tokyo as easily as it may think.

For example, during the First World War London was raided from the air by Germany on 104 different occasions, but the actual losses inflicted upon the city were slight. So, even if the United States air-force succeeds in making one air raid upon Tokyo, how much damage will it cause?

Furthermore, aeroplanes and methods of bombing have undergone changes since the First World War, as is witnessed by the present European war and the China Incident.

If the United States air-force carries out death-defying raids upon Tokyo, Tokyo will probably suffer heavy losses. No Japanese citizen has as yet forgotten the horror of the Great Earthquake. If we recall that the terrible fire accompanying the earthquake was many times worse than the earthquake itself, will not the attack of the enemy's planes, carrying many hundreds of incendiary bombs, cause more frightful havoc than the Great Earthquake did, reducing Tokyo to ashes?

Do the Tokyo citizens still remember that an air commander-in-chief of a certain country once remarked that Tokyo could be reduced to ashes in three hours?

There are even some Americans who boast : " We don't care what happens to the Philippines ; but if Tokyo is bombed from the air, the United States-Japanese War will come to an end."

Bombing from the air is done with such accuracy to-day that one bomb is enough to smash even a warship, or a battery. In burning a big city, there is no such thing as hitting or missing the mark.

In the case of a wide city such as Tokyo, with so many wooden buildings, the whole city will become a target for bombing. Once the incendiary bombs drop, they will not stay long without setting fire to something.

In this case, the attacking force will have no need of coming down as low as 3000 or 6000 feet. For before the citizens can locate the enemy's planes, fires will break out one after another in all parts of the city, startling them greatly.

Worst of all, there are poison-gas bombs and liquid poison-gas, which do not need to hit the mark. One cannot help but shudder when he imagines the citizens of Tokyo attacked with poison-gas.

But from another standpoint, things will not go in such a simple way, because Japan, too, has air-forces as well as air-defence headquarters. Defence of the Japanese mainland will be redoubled, with the military " Wild Eagles " taking part.

More than that, a fundamental principle of aviation is that 100 aeroplanes under adverse conditions can be defeated by 1 aeroplane under favourable conditions. It is now recognized that the performance of the latest Japanese aeroplanes is far superior to that of United States aeroplanes, so United States 'planes flying to Japan will be like summer insects flying towards fire.

Of 100 United States 'planes, it is thought that only 20 per cent will be able to appear over Tokyo, and if only 10 per cent of their bombs hit the mark, the losses inflicted upon Tokyo will be negligible.

Without my giving any more reasons, anyone can understand that in view of the number of aeroplanes in possession of the two countries and their performances, a United States air raid upon Tokyo is nothing to be feared. If, however, Soviet Russia flies her 'planes from Vladivostok, it will be a genuine menace to Japan ; but there is no need at all to fear a United States air raid upon the Japanese mainland.

2. AIR RAIDS UPON THE KANSAI DISTRICT

Next let us assume that the United States air-force invades the Kansai district, and imagine what routes will be taken by it. For the most part, the United States 'planes will take the following routes: the northern route from Wakasa Bay of the Japan Sea to Lake Biwa, and along the Yodo River; the western route advancing eastward and looking towards the Inland Sea of Seto; the eastern routes, one heading towards Osaka by way of Lake Biwa from Ise Bay, and another heading westward along the Kansai Railroads; and the southern route advancing towards Osaka Bay from the western Sea of Kishu.

These routes are the most suitable road maps for the attacking 'planes not only during the day but also at night, because of the sea, the Yodo River, and the railroads. Also such places as Ise Bay, the Kishu and Tosa areas, Kitan Strait, and the southern part of Kiushiu need strict precautions as they will serve as a road map for the invaders. The sky being limitless, nobody knows from what other direction enemy 'planes might come.

Of Tokyo and Osaka, which city will be the first to be exposed to attack from the Pacific? Judging from the supposed position of the first sentry line as well as from the distance, there is every indication that if things go very smoothly, Tokyo will see enemy 'planes over the city from 15 to 16 to 20 minutes after hearing the air-raid siren, and Osaka from 20 to 25 or 26 minutes. It will take at least 20 or 30 minutes for the defending planes to fly to the battle area. Thus there is no time to waste, for the citizens of London and Paris, who were trained to escape from raids in 20 minutes, had to take only 16 or 17 minutes, during Germany's air raids upon London.

Since Japan is not provided with any underground anti-raid shelters, what should the citizens do when there is fear of fire attacks and poison-gas attacks? Nothing can be done in a short time. Indeed, this is a question deserving deliberation and study.

We must learn the courageous spirit of the Londoners, who fought desperately in defence of their city in spite of Germany's ferocious

bombing from the air. The successful defence of the Londoners is nothing more than the result of anti-raid drills which had been constantly staged by them.

It is expected that the enemy 'planes will let drop at random innumerable incendiary bombs, in order to cause fires everywhere, and then destroy water reservoirs, armament factories, harbours and bays, gas-tanks, big warehouses and big buildings, and Government office buildings. The next method of bombing will be to drop poison-gas bombs on those places where the citizens, in panic and confusion, are trying to escape or extinguishing fire, thus killing and wounding them. With regard to the places to be bombed, the programme of bombing and its method will have been worked out in detail on the basis of investigation made by enemy spies in time of peace. And in an emergency there is no doubt that spies will detect even the important defensive installations, disclosing them to the enemy bombing the Japanese mainland.

3. AIR RAIDS AND ANTI-ESPIONAGE

If I say the first element of air-raid defence is the prevention of espionage, someone may wonder why.

Richard Lowen, well known for his study of spies, and especially for his famous book entitled *The Spy and the Next War*, classifies the scope of co-operative activities by spies in connexion with air raids somewhat as follows :

A. Bombing the mobilization of enemy forces.

(1) Guidance of air-force by signal.

(2) Bombing and incendiarism by *saboteurs* in concert with air bombing.

B. Bombing enemy air-bases.

(1) Guidance by signal.

(2) Bombing and incendiarism by *saboteurs* in concert with air bombing.

C. Bombing fortresses.

(1) Guidance by signal.

D. Bombing naval bases and harbours and bays.

(1) Guidance by signal.

E. Bombing enemy warships.

(1) On the basis of reports by spies within the area of the enemy position, the air-forces will bomb enemy warships and troop-ships.

F. Bombing cities, traffic intersections, and connecting points of railroads.

(1) Guidance by signal if occasion demands.

(2) Operations to demoralize the fighting spirit of the enemy's non-combatants.

(3) Rumours to be fabricated and spread—to undermine the fighting spirit of the enemy combatants—that their native places have been bombed from the air.

As Lowen's classification has made clear, a signal is the best guidance for the attacking air-forces.

Is it not obvious that the success of the German Army's astounding lightning tactics in the present European war is mainly attributable to the activities of Fifth Columnists? General Ludendorff, the creator of the phrase Fifth Columnists, has written as follows :

In accordance with progress by aeroplanes and the development of the Fifth Column, we will not only drop bombs but also strengthen propaganda measures by dropping printed materials upon the enemy people. Also we should not forget the radio, our mouthpiece, which will propagate all that we want to say.

Reflecting upon Germany's tactics in North Europe, Belgium, and Holland in the present European war, one can see that General Ludendorff's prediction and Lowen's anticipation have become a reality of warfare. Spies received instructions by means of secret wireless and promptly seized all aerodromes, while powerful short waves rushing through the air guided the transport 'planes. For an air raid upon a city, even a spark of light is an effective bombing target. Also it must be remembered that spies will guide the air-force by means of infra-red signal lights, not visible on the ground because of the shadow of chimneys.

The activities of spies are not limited to the time of air raids alone ;

to-day's war involves mobilization of the entire nation. So long as every element of the state participates in war, a slight error in the field of economics and the field of raw materials and production will give rise to serious consequences. Once the enemy undermines these national elements, it will be possible to prevent the outbreak of war, and even if war breaks out, the country undermined by espionage will be unable to oppose its enemy.

For the purpose of demolishing these elements of national defence, the enemy is steadily engaged in espionage, propaganda, and conspiracy even in time of peace. This kind of activity is called secret warfare. Such a country as the United States feels keenly the necessity of resorting to a quick battle for an immediate decision by dint of secret warfare, for she realizes that if she tries to rely upon military warfare alone, it will take a long period and grievously consume her national wealth.

Examples of the secret warfare so far waged by the United States against Japan are in part as follows :

1. At the Washington Conference the United States puffed off the treaty tonnage of the Japanese Navy and succeeded in reducing Japanese armaments unreasonably.
2. By virtue of the immigration law the United States rendered it difficult for Japan to solve her population problem.
3. By introducing into Japan all sorts of internationalism, especially the evils of liberalism, individualism and communism, the United States has caused chaos of thought among the Japanese people.
4. By operating against the development of Japan and by aiding Chiang Kai-shek she has greatly harmed Japan.
5. United States economic embargoes of skills and materials against Japan.
6. Undercover work in the interior of the country in connexion with all kinds of calamities which have recently occurred in Japan, as well as with the shortage of materials.
7. The United States has dexterously misled the Japanese nation by sports, screen, and sex, and has attempted to undermine the spirit of the Japanese people by propagating the idea of democracy.

In addition to these, American spies recently seem to be carrying on intense activities, and in nine cases out of ten they are capable of obtaining secret information by collecting presumptive data scattered around scientific publications. That is to say, they scientifically collect and put into order all kinds of fragmentary information from newspapers, magazines, year-books, statistics, reports, other public documents, pictures and photographs, and thereby command for their use all the information they want. This is not all. The spies distribute themselves or scatter here and there among crowds, organizations, religions, and factories in order to spy out Japan's national secrets.

The objects of destruction by means of espionage are all equipment in possession of individuals, organizations, and the state ; therefore, those in charge of this equipment should always be on the alert so as not to give any chance to enemy spies to engage in any subversive activities. At the same time, we must always maintain an attitude of dignity and determination so as not to be moved by propaganda and conspiracy, and so that in spite of the worst anti-Japanese secret warfare, our country may stand upon a solid foundation.

CHAPTER XX

THE GREAT UNITED STATES-JAPANESE NAVAL BATTLE OF THE PACIFIC

I. THE SINKING OF THE UNITED STATES CAPITAL SHIPS

IN this chapter I will discuss fully the United States-Japanese naval battle in the Pacific.

As soon as news reached Japan that the United States Fleet is being concentrated at Pearl Harbour, the Japanese submarines which will have been already dispatched to Hawaii will patrol the sea routes to be followed by the United States Fleet, and will launch great efforts to sink the United States capital ships and other warships.

But the results of the Japanese submarine activities remain to be seen—that is, how many United States capital ships and cruisers will be sunk, or how much loss the Japanese side will suffer. With this matter put aside for a while, there is no doubt, at least, that the United States Fleet which has departed from Pearl Harbour will encounter a vigorous attack by Japanese submarines before it comes to clash with the Japanese Fleet.

Of course, the United States Fleet will advance in a wheel-shaped formation, but the distance between each ship of the scouting line being 25 nautical miles, the Japanese submarines, which cannot be detected by the enemy beyond a distance of one mile, will be able to act as freely and easily as they want by sneaking through between the ships of the enemy scouting line.

It is said that this wheel-shaped formation of the United States Fleet will develop two scouting lines at night-time, making the distance between each ship 50 miles.

In this event it will be much easier for the Japanese submarines to break through. It is expected that at night eight more cruisers will be put in the centre of the line-up of the Fleet; but night will narrow the scope of action of these cruisers; therefore, it is doubtful

whether they will be able to prevent infiltration of the dexterous Japanese submarines.

Moreover, the advance of any fleet is slowed by wind and waves, and in case of storm, the only medium of communication between the warships is the wireless. Thus, in such an eventuality it will be quite impossible to maintain the wheel-shaped formation intact. Not only that, but each ship will be tossed round by huge waves, thus rendering difficult even the maintenance of contact between the fighting forces and the troop-ships. As for the latter, they will immediately be torn to pieces.

If at this time the Japanese submarines try to break through the scouting line, they will succeed easily and the scouting force will not be able to detect them.

The wheel-shaped formation is merely the formation in which the United States Fleet will advance, and not the formation in which it will fight.

It is said that 10 new cruisers at the head of the wheel-shaped formation will be at a point from 200 to 500 nautical miles from the location of the main fleet. Therefore, in the event Japanese submarines unexpectedly take the United States main fleet by surprise, it will be quite impossible for the cruisers to co-operate in driving them back.

It goes without saying that the main object of the wheel-shaped formation is to nip in the bud such a thing as this; but even if the United States main fleet constitutes a formation with a radius of about 30 nautical miles, and several cruisers are lined up in front of this formation, and in addition more than 10 new cruisers are spread as a scouting line at a point of from 200 to 500 nautical miles in front of this and at the lateral line which will extend 250 nautical miles from right to left, if any submarine is caught in this gross searching net, unless it has advanced identifying its location by wireless, it will be one which has dashed against the scouting net by a fluke. Even if this scouting net catches one Japanese submarine, it will not be the cruisers but the submarine itself that will discover its trouble. Therefore, it will be possible for the submarine to pass through in safety, provided it goes deeper into the water. Also, if the Japanese submarines approach

laterally, from the right and left sides, instead of from the front, they will be able immediately to break through the wheel-shaped formation.

Once it becomes known that the Japanese submarines have come to attack, the United States capital ships and the destroyers surrounding them will immediately start an action in an attempt to repulse the attacking submarines. But the Japanese submarines, before the United States Fleet finishes its battle action, will shoot torpedoes and then take to their heels at full speed.

Without this kind of promptness, the Japanese submarine will be unable to launch a surprise attack upon the enemy fleet by breaking through the enemy sentry line; and even if a surprise attack were possible, the torpedoes, without this promptness, would not be able to hit the warships at which they were aimed.

How many enemy warships can be sunk as a result of this torpedoing operation will depend upon the situation at the time of the action, and also upon the number of submarines to be employed by Japan; therefore it cannot be generalized. But if Japan employs 6 submarines, each submarine will have 6 torpedo tubes, the total number of the tubes aboard the 6 cruisers being 36. And if each tube discharges 2 torpedoes, that means 72 torpedoes will be discharged at one time. Of the torpedoes thus discharged, how many will hit the 12 capital ships? The aiming of torpedoes is accurate at close quarters. Let us suppose that out of six submarines the torpedoes discharged by three miss, and the remainder of the submarines have half of their torpedoes, or 18, hit their targets. Then, since each submarine aims at a single warship, three enemy capital ships will be struck by six torpedoes in their respective abdominal regions. In this case, at least two of the enemy capital ships will be sunk and one of them will be so hopelessly damaged that it will be incapable of further service.

If the war actually develops in this way, will the United States Fleet dare to carry out its expedition to Japan?

In the case of three or five capital ships being lost, the United States Fleet will be reorganized in a way appropriate to the purpose of the expedition; but there will be various inconveniences attending it.

And if the United States, in spite of all these facts, still clings to her

purpose to send an expedition to Japan, we cannot help but think that she has an iron nerve.

As soon as the Japanese Fleet receives word that the United States Fleet has departed from Pearl Harbour, it will at once advance in the direction of the Bonins, with the ultimate object of inducing the United States Fleet to come closer to Japan. On the other hand, the special fighting flotilla consisting of cruising submarines will be ordered to launch an attack upon the United States Fleet after the latter has passed a point more than 2500 nautical miles from Hawaii. This flotilla will be ordered to follow and keep an eye on the United States Fleet from its flank as well as from its rear. At the same time speedy cruisers will be dispatched, their special mission being to maintain close contact with the main Japanese Fleet, communicating to it the status of the submarine activities. The Japanese submarines will finally launch attacks upon the United States Fleet at the time when the latter is exhausted by a long trans-oceanic voyage with a considerable amount of damage suffered owing to wind and waves, and especially at the time when the weather is most proper. By this time the Japanese Fleet will already have formed in the rear of the United States Fleet so that while the United States Fleet, after losing a part of its capital ships by submarine action, is engaged in discussing the advisability of continuing its expedition to Japan, the Japanese Fleet will appear from its rear and attack it.

At this time the United States Fleet will have already been extremely exhausted after having been harassed by a series of submarine surprise attacks, while the crews will be extremely excited; but their excitement will be mainly due to their fear. Therefore, will it not be impossible for them to fight their ships with effectiveness and thoroughness?

In the meantime, if night comes, the Japanese destroyers will attempt a night attack. Once the United States crews are informed of the destroyer attack they will fire guns at random and in confusion, and the Japanese destroyers will thus have to risk danger; but if the Japanese Fleet loses five destroyers, it can be assumed that five of the United States capital ships and 10,000-ton cruisers will be lost.

On top of this, if a United States aircraft carrier of the 33,000-ton class is sent to the bottom of the ocean, the battle fought the next day will be favourable to the Japanese Fleet.

The fighting skill of the Japanese destroyers is unparalleled anywhere in the world. When a clash between fleets occurs, they will repulse the enemy torpedo flotilla or make an onslaught on the enemy main force, making use of the smoke-screen. Remember those Japanese "human bullet" destroyers which during the great Russo-Japanese naval battle made a dash at the enemy battleships and thus succeeded in smashing the bows of the enemy ships. It is impossible for either the United States or the British destroyers to imitate such a brave action. More than that, in night warfare the Japanese destroyers will control the whole field; in fact, they will demonstrate their genuine power by attacking the enemy battleships one after another.

Indeed, the dauntless and daring actions of the Japanese destroyers at this time will be really amazing.

2. ESCAPE OF THE UNITED STATES FLEET

When the United States Fleet suffers a severe defeat, inflicted upon it by the Japanese surprise-attack fleet, it will have to abandon its fantastic plan for an expedition to Japan.

The United States Fleet will wait in terror for daybreak, and then form and start on its return voyage, with its wounded warships, in a state of defeat. But remember that by this time the Japanese Fleet will have already reached a point about 100 nautical miles to the rear of the United States Fleet.

The United States Fleet, which at first advanced as though it were pursuing the Japanese Fleet, now turns round in the direction of its homeland in pitiful flight. But, receiving reports from aeroplanes, it will have to change its direction again at high speed in order to escape the Japanese Fleet.

But this time it will not be able to develop a high speed because there will be quite a number of wounded warships.

In all probability, the maximum speed developed by the United States Fleet will be 16 knots against the 20-knot speed easily developed

by the Japanese Fleet ; that is, there is a difference in speed of 4 knots between the United States and Japanese Fleets.

Furthermore, three Japanese battleships of the *Kirisima* type are capable of developing a speed of more than 26 knots, while more than 10 cruisers mounted with 8-inch guns can make 40 knots. While these high-speed warships are one after another pressing hard the United States Fleet, the cruisers mounted with 8-inch guns will come in to the front of the enemy.

But the position of the United States Fleet at the time will be to the west of the Japanese Fleet, and thus, since it cannot return home without taking the eastern sea routes, it must inevitably clash with the Japanese Fleet.

While the huge fleets of Japan and the United States are hour by hour on the verge of a clash, the air-forces of each will try to bomb each other's ships, thereby presenting a gallant spectacle of air warfare.

Of course, it is impossible to predict which side will win this air battle, but if the United States is pressed hard by the Japanese Fleet, it is obvious that the fighting spirit of the United States air-force will be low ; thus it will not be able to demonstrate even its ordinary skill.

On the contrary, the Japanese air-force will be in the position of victor ; fanned by a spirit to demolish the enemy air-force once and for all, it will show a courage a hundred times higher than ordinarily. No matter how good the United States air-force may be, it will not match in any way the fighting skill of the Japanese air-force, and finally the battle will result in Japan's victory in a ratio of 10-7 or 10-3. That is, if 5 United States warships are sunk, 1 Japanese warship will be heavily damaged ; if America loses 50 aeroplanes, Japan will probably lose 15 [*sic*]. In view of the splendid job the Japanese air-force did at Nomohan, fighting off 65 enemy 'planes with 5 of its own 'planes, it is expected the Japanese air-force, with a burning determination to win, will now do a far more splendid job.

This great air battle will develop as follows : first of all, scouting 'planes will report the situation of the enemy, then "X" torpedo 'planes and bombers will form a squadron and advance under the escort of fighter 'planes ; the function of the fighter 'planes is to prevent attack by enemy torpedo 'planes and bombers and to fight the enemy fighter

'planes escorting the torpedo 'planes and bombers. Therefore, the fighter 'planes have a more important rôle than any other 'planes.

Then the Japanese torpedo 'planes and bombers will break through the United States fighting 'planes and attack the warships, the former shooting torpedoes and the latter dropping bombs.

In the course of this great air battle, the distance between the Japanese and United States fleets will become smaller, and when the two approach to about 33,000 yards of each other, cannonading will be started with the big guns, that is, those guns above 14 inches with an angle of more than 30 degrees.

But 33,000 yards are equivalent to a distance of more than 14 nautical miles, so it is hard to say whether or not the shells will hit the target accurately.

At this time the observation 'planes will be dispatched to observe the results of the cannonading, but if any shell hits the target at a distance of 33,000 yards, it will probably be a fluke. Perhaps the United States Fleet may start cannonading at this distance, but the Japanese Fleet, so long as it suffers no damage from the United States fire, will approach as near as 28,000 yards before starting cannonading.

The reason is that the rate of hitting at such a great distance is almost nil, and even if a cannon-ball hits the target, it has no power to inflict serious damage. More than that, the life of a 14- or 16-inch gun can last only for 200 discharges, and therefore, supposing this gun discharges 80 shells in an hour, it will be useless in two and a half hours.

If the Japanese Fleet has 9 capital ships at the time of its arrival at the point of effective range, there will be 72 14-inch guns and 16 16-inch guns, and with these guns the Japanese Fleet will simultaneously open fire. If at this moment a Japanese capital ship is severely damaged by enemy 'planes, the Japanese will still be in possession of 60 14-inch guns and 16 16-inch guns [*sic*].

On the other hand, the United States Fleet will lose 2 capital ships sunk by Japanese submarines along with one other capital ship severely damaged, while Japanese destroyers will sink one other capital ship along with the loss of one more by air action. In this case, the United States Fleet will have 7 capital ships out of 12, the other 5 being lost,

and her main batteries will be 56 14-inch guns and 16 16-inch guns. The Japanese Fleet numerically will thus be a little superior to the United States Fleet.

How about the hitting rate? At the time of the Russo-Japanese naval battle of 1904 in the Sea of Japan, the Japanese Fleet showed a 32 per cent. rate of hits, while a 14 per cent. hitting rate was shown by the United States Navy at the time of the Santiago naval battle in 1898. Should this rate of hits be also applicable to the United States-Japanese war, victory and defeat have already been determined.

In this connexion, let us assume that the United States Fleet has improved its rate of hits by 5 per cent. ; then it will now have a 21 per cent. rate of hits. If we compare this hitting rate on the part of the United States Fleet with the 21.7 per cent. rate shown by the British Fleet at the Battle of Jutland against the 33.3 per cent. rate shown by Germany, America's is almost equivalent to England's and Japan's to Germany's.

But the rate of all countries is to-day strictly withheld from the public, so nobody knows the truth in regard to this matter. Even if someone knows the truth, he has no freedom to make it public.

If we assume that the United States-Japanese war is to be waged on the basis of the afore-mentioned hitting rate, and that a gun is capable of discharging 60 shells per hour, it is calculated that 297 shells fired by the 16-inch guns of the Japanese Fleet will hit their targets and 1152 shells fired by the 14-inch guns ; whereas of those shells fired by the United States 16-inch guns, 202 will hit their targets, and 706 fired by their 14-inch guns. From this calculation alone, the odds are apparently in favour of the Japanese Fleet. It is true the United States capital ships have a superior capacity for a long voyage, but so far as speed is concerned they are from 15 to 30 per cent. slower than the Japanese capital ships. Once the United States Fleet suffers defeat, it will not be able to escape pursuit by the Japanese Fleet before it is completely annihilated.

The technique of firing naval guns is really complicated. The commander of a warship, standing on the bridge, orders the cannonading ; then the chief gunner at the fire-control station orders the range-finding station and the order-issuing station to be ready to fire. Where the

enemy is and at what angle the firing should be started is known immediately.

As soon as preparation is made, the commander of the warship issues the order to fire. Then, in the case of a battleship, 8 16-inch guns open up fire, booming like thunder.

It is pretty difficult to have this first broadside hit the target, but the target should be hit at any cost. If the first broadside fails, the chief gunner immediately alters the range, commanding the order-issuing station to begin all over again. Accordingly, the order-issuing station gives new orders and then the broadside is carried out a second time, a third time, and so on, each time getting nearer to the target.

The speedy action of the gunners is really an amazing thing; they take only 30 seconds to complete all preparations for firing in the case of a battleship. The United States battleship *Colorado* takes about 35 seconds to complete all preparations for firing; our battleships take 5 seconds less. Even this little difference of 5 seconds is vital in war, as it determines victory or defeat.

In the meantime, the destroyers and submarines will attempt to attack the enemy capital ships, thus presenting a gallant and fierce battle. The cruisers will attempt to repulse their attack, while the air-forces wage a death-defying air battle. Be that as it may, victory or defeat in a naval battle is determined by the capital ships only. In this connexion, it is expected that the curtain of the United States-Japanese Pacific naval battle will be lowered with the loss of more than 10 capital ships by the United States Fleet. At the same time Japan should be prepared to sacrifice at least 2 capital ships.

CHAPTER XXI

JAPAN'S OCCUPATION OF HAWAII AND THE CLOSING OF THE PANAMA CANAL

I. JAPAN'S OCCUPATION OF HAWAII

IF the Japanese Fleet defeats the United States Fleet and delivers so severe a blow that it will not be able to recover, it will probably return to Pearl Harbour. What will it do then? That will depend upon whether America decides to make Hawaii her first line of defence or withdraws her first line to the coast of her mainland at San Francisco.

Hawaii is such an important point that Japan's big problem after defeating the United States Fleet will be how to deal with it. First of all, Japan will have to rule supreme over all public buildings and properties there, not to mention all the other islands in the Pacific. Unless Japan plans to take permanent possession of Hawaii, the United States will not give up her ambitions in the Pacific.

Assuming that the United States, in spite of her naval defeat by Japan, refuses to give up Hawaii, retaining it as her first line of defence, nevertheless her mainland will be in danger; therefore, leaving some battleships at Hawaii, the main force of the United States Fleet will hurry to the mainland to prevent an attack by the Japanese Fleet. If this happens, Japan must at any cost occupy Hawaii.

But if Japan, in spite of her burning feeling of hostility, is unable to adopt effective offensive tactics against Hawaii because of her Fleet's inferiority to the United States Fleet, then she will be unable to take Hawaii, which is two-thirds of the distance to America, even if the United States Fleet is based at San Francisco.

Therefore, Japan should not attempt to attack Hawaii unless it becomes clear that she has the ability to occupy it and maintain her occupation. In all probability, Japan's attempt to attack Hawaii will be made only after the United States Fleet has become inferior to the Japanese Fleet.

If the United States Fleet is defeated by the Japanese Fleet in the Western Pacific, and yet does not surrender, Japan will advance as far as Hawaii to enter the second stage of strategy.

Since America has carried through various kinds of war preparations for the last thirty years, with Japan always in mind as her enemy, it does not seem probable that she will sue for peace as long as her mainland remains intact.

But once the United States Fleet is routed by the Japanese Fleet, this will be tantamount to Japan's victory. In this case the main force of her Fleet will return home to receive thorough repairs in preparation for new naval battles that may follow. Then she will probably move on to the next step in her strategy. The second stage of Japan's strategy consists, first, in attacking Hawaii, and second, in occupying all other United States islands in the Pacific, such as Tutuila, Canton, Wake, Midway, the Aleutians, and any other bases of operations, not to mention Guam.

Japan's attempt to occupy Hawaii will require the co-operation of the Army with the Fleet. Before attacking Hawaii, Japan must occupy Midway Island in order to secure a stepping-stone.

But, after the defeat of the United States Fleet, Midway Island, whose defences are insignificant, will easily fall into the hands of Japan after a single day's bombardment. The fate of Canton and Enderbury Islands will be the same; they are important air-bases for the United States, but will probably end up in just the same way as Midway Island.

Unless Japan occupies Midway, Canton, and Enderbury Islands and any other places which might become suitable bases for United States submarines, the Japanese expeditionary fleet will have to fear being cut off from the rear.

How about Hawaii? In Hawaii there are about 150,000 or 160,000 Japanese subjects, more than half of them being of the so-called second generation.

The problem of what will become of them in case of war has already given rise to clamorous discussion. Some of the Japanese subjects will probably come back to Japan, while a large portion of them, being naturalized citizens, will follow the guidance of the United States Government.

It will, of course, be impossible for the United States Government to send back 150,000 or 160,000 Japanese to their homeland ; therefore steps will probably be taken to intern them under surveillance so as to prevent any disturbances. This would be the most appropriate thing to do. We can judge this from the precedent set by the British Government ; during the present European war, all the German subjects residing in England have been confined on a small island.

However, once news reaches Hawaii that the Japanese Fleet has scored a naval victory over the United States Fleet, it can be thought that the Japanese will suddenly raise a volunteer army, and plan to aid Japan's occupation of Hawaii. Hawaii has a population of about 400,000, of whom 70,000 are Americans, 50,000 or 60,000 Canadians, and 30,000 Chinese. Such being the case, Hawaii will easily fall into the hands of the Japanese, provided the Japanese in Hawaii get together and build a volunteer army ; but this can never be done while the United States Fleet is stationed there.

If a false step is made it might give rise to a regrettable incident such as a great massacre. Further, the Japanese do not have weapons.

But if they are interned and put under strict surveillance, they cannot possibly mobilize. And even if they might succeed in doing so, Hawaii is said to possess a number of regiments of infantry, cavalry, field-artillery, several troops of naval artillery, and an aviation corps with several hundreds of 'planes and more than fifteen flying fields ; and if these forces are doubled in time of war, it will hardly be easy for the Japanese people to fight them. It would be like the story of the praying mantis that tried to stop an automobile.

But it is needless to say that these Japanese subjects in Hawaii will be of great help when a landing is made by our Army.

The Hawaiian Islands consist of Oahu, Hawaii, Maui, Kauai ; Honolulu and Pearl Harbour are located on the Island of Oahu.

This is the Pearl Harbour which will become the base of operations of the United States Fleet when it plans its expedition to Japan. . . .

If the United States Fleet, defeated in a battle with the Japanese Fleet, withdraws in a hurry to Pearl Harbour, those warships still capable of making a voyage will be sent back to the mainland so as not to fall into the hands of Japan when she occupies Hawaii.

Therefore, when the Japanese Fleet, accompanying troop-ships, approaches Hawaii, it will find the Hawaiian waters studded with a few mines and a few damaged and abandoned warships.

Accordingly, the Japanese Army will find it easy to land on Hawaiian soil, although a frontal landing will be avoided because of the existence of extremely powerful fortifications.

The north-western-coast waters of Oahu being shallow and stretching for a distance of about 20 nautical miles, this will be the easiest place for the landing of the Japanese marines. It is believed that to defend this area 50,000 to 60,000 soldiers are required, so that a force of 20,000 will not be sufficient.

The coastline of this island is about 177 miles round, but the coast is very rocky and is very dangerous. No wonder America had to set up her base at Pearl Harbour.

But the landing can never be accomplished without sacrifices. A landing in Hawaii would require an effort several hundred times what would be required of the German Army to land on English soil. But once America has lost her supporting sea-power, should a bombardment be made from the offing, and a suicide landing be made, although a certain degree of sacrifice will be inevitable, the occupation of Hawaii may not be so difficult.

Hawaii being the greatest strategical base of operation for the United States Navy, the existing defensive conditions there appear to be almost impregnable.

In the vicinity of the narrow entrance to Pearl Harbour, there are stationed 10 capital ships, 2 aircraft carriers, 15 cruisers, 50 destroyers, and many submarines, painted blue or black.

The air-forces there have a number of 'planes divided equally between the Navy and the Army. At present there are naval, air, and submarine bases on Oahu Island; there is a well-equipped dry-dock. But in the event the main force of the Fleet is forced to proceed to the Panama Canal, the defence of this island will be left to the Army.

For this purpose, huge coast-gun emplacements have been constructed between the two peaks on the southernmost end of the hills surrounding Pearl Harbour. The whole island is included in their

range ; therefore, the first duty of the Japanese forces will be to demolish these heavy-gun positions.

Also, the Japanese air-force should lose no time in smashing to pieces Wheeler and Hickam Fields and the three other auxiliary aerodromes on Oahu ; otherwise, their existence will be extremely dangerous. Besides these, there are two aerodromes on the island of Hawaii, two on the island of Maui, one on Molokai, two on Kauai, and one planned on the island of Lanai. All these should be completely demolished so as to put an end to the activities of the enemy air-forces.

At Hickam Field are located the 18th Headquarters of the United States air-forces ; therefore Hickam Field should be the first target of Japan's air attack.

In the heavy-gun positions, there are at present more than 20 14-inch guns and 12-inch guns, and more than 10 guns of small calibre. But in wartime, this strength will probably be increased ; therefore our troops would have to make dispositions to meet this situation.

It goes without saying that an army is necessary in addition to the marines. The advance will be made by troop-ship parties and . . . , but according to the occasion, the troop-ships will take refuge in the shadow of an undefended island until a proper time comes as a result of the actions taken by the Navy. Then they will be told to land.

As soon as the Japanese Army has a foothold on Hawaiian soil, the entire Hawaiian Islands will fall within a week ; the other islands are almost defenceless, so these are no problem.

If the Japanese occupy Hawaii, the Japanese interned there will at once be released.

After that they can continue their work in Hawaii ruled over by Japan.

Just as there is no trouble in the maintenance problem of our soldiers in Manchukuo, it will be very easy to feed and clothe our soldiers in Hawaii, where there are many Japanese.

This seems to be a silly point, but if this maintenance were difficult, the effect would by no means be small, for it would be a very poor policy to divert for the purpose of maintenance naval power and troop-ships, which would take more than ten days to make connexions, since it is more than 3400 nautical miles between Hawaii and Japan.

If Hawaii falls into the hands of Japan, the United States will probably ask for an armistice.

Because America is situated only about 2000 nautical miles from Hawaii, with her weakened naval power she will have fear of her mainland being exposed to Japanese bombardments and air raids. Therefore the people on the West Coast of America would not be able to live quietly.

They will insist on stopping the war if there is no hope of winning and if it only menaces the life of the people. If there is no expectation of success, America will have to ask for peace.

But since America worked hard on her great expansion and prepared for the war, if she sees even a thread of hope she may continue to resist. But should she lose her naval power, no matter how much her air power and chemical warfare are developed, they will be useless, and then she might as well surrender at the same time she loses Hawaii.

2. THE CLOSING OF THE PANAMA CANAL

Most of the islands in the Pacific would be in Japan's hands before the defeat of the American Fleet. Although we assume that the Aleutian Islands, Hawaii, and Midway would be left, as I have mentioned before, they will all suffer the fate of being occupied by Japan after the American Fleet is defeated.

And the last problem is : What would become of the Panama Canal ?

Needless to say, it is not an easy task to attack the Panama Canal, which is more than 4600 nautical miles from Hawaii and 8000 nautical miles from Japan. In case, however, Japan dares to attack this canal, it will be done by a small party resorting to a surprise attack. However, there is a possibility that once the Japanese Fleet delivers a knock-out blow on the Panama Canal and closes it, thus cutting the connexion between the Atlantic and the Pacific, it will have a great effect on her strategy. But if the United States Fleet has already advanced into the Pacific and been defeated by the Japanese Fleet, there will be no necessity whatever of Japan's attempting the occupation of the Canal in the second stage of the war.

Of course, it will be a very important decision for Japan whether or

not to occupy the Panama Canal after the war is over ; but actually, even though she does not occupy it, it will be possible for her to get it by means of the peace treaty.

Of course, even if Japan does obtain this Canal, if a day comes when America again fights Japan she will obviously at once attack the Canal. But so long as it remains in the hands of Japan, the United States Fleet will be separated, so that it cannot get together in time of war. Her imperialism will thus be denied the support of a strong navy. Thus, for the first time, the world will be restored to peace by force of arms, and in China we will be able to see established a real Co-prosperity Sphere in the Far East, immune from the intervention of Europe and America.

Besides, Mexico and all the other small countries in Central and South America would be saved from the threats of the United States.

It is necessary for Japan to occupy, if possible, the Panama Canal Zone, and even to administer it after the war ; for future peace will largely depend upon it. But the fortification of the Canal Zone is such that it is not an easy job to occupy it.

The United States is nervous about the defence of the Canal, and it seems as though she were pouring every drop of energy into preparations against any enemy's attempt to close it. Up to last year, however, the Canal was armed with old-fashioned guns and its defensive installations were mostly out of date.

The results of the United States naval manœuvres showed that the Canal is anything but invincible, for it can be taken with a cruiser mounted with 8-inch guns supported by one aircraft carrier. Therefore, though it is hard to attack, that does not mean that it will not fall.

A certain American soldier once spoke to this effect :

If an enemy fleet attacks the Canal in spite of heavy gunfire, and begins to attack and bombard our searchlights and batteries, the defenders will find themselves powerless. If they spread a smoke-screen to obscure the sight of the enemy, this action will rather impair the scouting work of their own air-force and the marksmanship of their own batteries.

Moreover, the present batteries of coast-defence guns are short in

range compared to the main battery of a battleship. The guns have a range of 22,000 yards, while the main battery of a battleship, even of 8-inch guns, will reach a distance of 33,000 yards.

Therefore, a battleship can easily attack a battery while out of the latter's range.

Further, if a bomber from the enemy fleet drops only two or three bombs on the Canal, it cannot escape destruction. Thus, the connexion between the Atlantic and Pacific will naturally be severed, and nothing can be done about it.

Therefore, in order to defend the Panama Canal, what must be done at once is to prepare a powerful fleet to meet the enemy force at sea, rather than to strengthen preparations on land; the air-force, also, must be expanded.

But if the Japanese Fleet waits until the United States ships come out of the Canal one by one into the open sea, and attacks them as they come, the American Fleet will be annihilated before it can constitute its battle formation.

Therefore, if a powerful fleet is stationed here, it must always be on the alert to take its battle formation as soon as it is outside of the harbour. But if it is stationed outside the harbour there is danger of its being attacked by submarines.

Therefore new cruisers and several gunboats as well as some submarines are now arrayed near the Canal Zone, and arrangements have also been made to station permanently at Puerto Rico a powerful air-force consisting of long-distance bombing and scouting planes. Thus the Panama Canal and the air-force are being strengthened.

In time of war entrances to the Canal will probably be mined.

If Japan plans an attack, it will be safer for her to postpone it as long as the remnants of the United States Fleet appear to be able to bring their remaining fighting power to bear.

Unless the occupation of the Panama Canal will decide the outcome of the war, or make much difference in drawing up peace terms, or have an effect upon Japan's position, or upon United States-Japanese post-war relations, it will not be necessary for Japan to risk capturing it. Thus, the attack on the Canal may not be absolutely vital; but

if the United States Fleet is in such a condition that it cannot take the offensive, the attack on the Canal is worth carrying out since it would probably succeed without much sacrifice.

Thus, although occupation of the Canal would result in practical benefits, great danger and effort would be entailed; so that if the profits are no larger than the extent of the sacrifices, the expedition would probably not be worth carrying out unless it were to become vitally necessary. But maybe our brave Navy will carry out the destruction of the Panama Canal with unexpected ease and surprise the Great Powers.

During this stage of the war, if the United States utilizes the Canadian air-bases, and the United States strategical position extends from the State of Washington to Alaska, Japan's fighting line will be doubled. If the United States is defeated by Japan, England, too, will surrender to us. If Japan can punish the United States, the Orient will be converted into a genuine Far Eastern Co-prosperity Sphere and for the first time Japan will see her great ideal realized. Indeed, only the countries which aim at total national defence are the angels of real peace.

CHAPTER XXII

THE JAPAN-GERMANY-ITALY ALLIANCE AND THE UNITED STATES

I. FORMATION OF THE JAPAN-GERMANY-ITALY ALLIANCE

SINCE the beginning of September 1940, negotiations between Japan, Germany, and Italy for the formation of a three-power alliance had been going on continuously in Tokyo until the twenty-sixth of the same month, when the three countries arrived at an agreement satisfactory to each of them and their envoys completed all necessary arrangements with their respective home Governments for the signing of the pact. As a result, the full text of the Three-Power Alliance—to be valid for ten years—in the respective languages of Japan, Germany, and Italy was formally signed by Ambassador Saburu Kurusu of Japan, Foreign Minister Ribbentrop of Germany, and Foreign Minister Count Ciano of Italy, at 8.15 P.M. on the twenty-seventh of September, Tokyo Time (1.15 P.M. Berlin Time) at the official residence of the Führer in Berlin.

An official report from Ambassador Kurusu on the formal conclusion of the Three-Power Alliance having reached the Tokyo Foreign Office at 9 P.M. that day, the Foreign Office at 9.50 P.M. the same day made public "the gist of the Three-Power Alliance," which example was simultaneously followed in Berlin and Rome.

At the same time an Imperial Rescript clarifying the aims of the Japanese Empire and showing the path the Japanese nation should follow was proclaimed, and thus the generosity of the Imperial wishes deeply moved the one hundred million souls of the Japanese Empire.

Needless to say, the entire Japanese nation should respectfully obey the Imperial wishes by clarifying more and more its conception of the National Constitution, in order to overcome the national emergency, and by co-operating, body and soul, in an attempt

to break through all difficulties, thus lessening the worries of the Emperor.

I herewith respectfully reproduce the text of the Imperial Rescript :

IMPERIAL RESCRIPT

The great instruction of our Imperial ancestors is to enhance our great righteousness in every nook and corner, and to transform the Universe into one family. Therefore, I cannot help but call it to mind day and night. The disturbances of the world situation to-day do not know where they should stop ; in fact, there is every indication that calamities will fall upon mankind sooner or later. My deep anxiety to prevent the calamities and restore peace as speedily as possible is such that I have ordered the Imperial Government to consult with the two countries Germany and Italy, whose intentions are identical with those of the Japanese Empire, for co-ordination and co-operation, and I am now deeply pleased with the formation of a treaty between the three countries.

Indeed, it is an unprecedented task to let all the countries of the world know their respective places, and to let the people live in peace ; the realization of this object is really far off. I desire you, my subjects, to clarify more and more your concept of the National Constitution, deeply plan, far-sightedly deliberate, and co-operate with each other, body and soul, in order to surmount the emergency, thereby contributing to the destiny of the Empire coeval with heaven and earth.

Imperial Name

Imperial Seal

September 27, the Fifteenth Year of Showa.

Signed by all the State Ministers

This historical event, the formation of the Three-Power Alliance, is attributable to the decision of the Emperor, who has a clear knowledge of civil and military affairs. Indeed, it is awe-inspiring. The Three-Power Alliance is also indebted to the sound judgment of the excellent leaders of Germany and Italy—Führer Hitler and Il Duce Mussolini.

It goes without saying that the formation of the alliance is the result

of efforts put forth by Foreign Minister Ribbentrop of Germany, Foreign Minister Count Ciano of Italy, Foreign Minister Matsuoka, Mr Shiratori, adviser to the Japanese Foreign Office, Lieutenant-General Oshima, and Ambassador Kurusu.

The gist of the Three-Power Alliance Pact, announced by the Japanese Foreign Office, is as follows :

In recognition of the fact that the Governments of the Japanese Empire, of Germany, and of Italy claim prior attention for the preservation of permanent peace it is the fundamental principle of the treaty to establish and maintain a New Order which will bear fruit of co-existence and co-prosperity for those races who reside within their respective regions both in the Far East and in Europe. Decision has also been made for co-ordination and co-operation with each other by means of mutual efforts based on this purport within the regions referred to. In view of this the Governments of the three signatory countries will spare no pains in co-operating with all other countries the world over which are willing to make similar efforts, thus realizing the ultimate desire of the three countries for world peace. The governments of Japan, Germany, and Italy have therefore concluded the following agreement.

- Clause 1. Japan recognizes and respects the leadership of Germany and Italy in connexion with the establishment of the New Order in Europe.
- Clause 2. Germany and Italy recognize and respect the leadership of Japan in connexion with the establishment of the New Order in the Far East.
- Clause 3. Japan, Germany, and Italy pledge themselves to co-operate in efforts based upon the afore-mentioned policy. Furthermore, in the event any of the three signatory countries is attacked by any country which has not participated in the present European war or the Sino-Japanese dispute, the three countries pledge themselves to give mutual aid by all political, economic, and military means within their power.
- Clause 4. With a view to the enforcement of the present treaty, the meeting of the mixed expert committee consisting of members

to be appointed by the Governments of Japan, Germany, and Italy respectively should be held without delay.

Clause 5. Japan, Germany, and Italy agree that the foregoing clauses of the treaty shall not affect in any way the existing political situation between each of the three signatory countries and the Soviet Union.

Clause 6. The present treaty will go into force simultaneously with its signing, to be valid for ten years from that date; and the three signatory countries shall discuss the revision of the treaty at the demand of one of the signatories in an appropriate time before the term of the treaty expires.

The purpose of this treaty does not call for much explanation. Briefly, Germany and Italy will, without reservation, recognize Japan's establishment of the Co-prosperity Sphere for East Asia, whereas Japan will firmly recognize the rights of Germany and Italy as the leaders in Europe; this is the fundamental principle of the present treaty. It is also stipulated that if any of the three signatory countries is attacked by a third country which is not participating in the present European war or the Sino-Japanese dispute, the three countries will give mutual aid by every political, economic, and military method within their power. This stipulation is not directed at any particular country, and it does not, of course, mean that by this Japan will immediately turn from non-belligerency to belligerency.

That is to say, it does not mean that Japan will immediately participate in the present great European war, for her non-intervention policy remains unchanged to the last. But it is a stern fact that the three-power axis has been strengthened.

It is not difficult to imagine how greatly this new factor will affect both the United States Government and people, particularly at this time when they are busying themselves in giving all-out aid to England and China.

In the event America's participation in the war becomes a fact, the peace on the Atlantic and the Pacific will be broken in a moment, and Japan and the United States will have to plunge into war. Granting this, maybe the United States really has the confidence to rouse herself to action and jump bravely to meet this situation; but then, will not

the Three-Power Alliance be able to demonstrate its strong silent power at this particular time ?

2. AMERICA'S REACTION

How the formation of the Three-Power Alliance took the United States by surprise is really beyond description.

President Roosevelt, having already forecast such an event, had been working out measures to cope with the situation, but he frankly admitted his surprise at the fact that the Alliance had been formed far earlier than he had expected. Judging from the fact that the formation of the Three-Power Alliance startled even the President in this way, the panic which must have stricken others is indeed indescribable. Mr. Sumner Welles, Under-secretary of State, mumbled weakly : " Measures should be worked out to discuss peace with Japan as quickly as possible." Admiral Richardson, Commander-in-Chief of the United States Fleet, admitted, " Because of the shortage of fighting strength, the United States cannot fight Japan, to our regret."

With regard to the issue of America's negotiations for lease of the Singapore Naval Base, the progress of which is claiming a great deal of Japanese attention, the United States assumed an evasive attitude by denying her intention of leasing the base. Furthermore, she claimed that she had no intention of strengthening her Pacific Fleet, either.

Thus United States opinion was divided into two—one faction insisting on carrying out immediately complete economic sanctions against Japan, and the other demanding the prompt cessation of aid to Chiang Kai-shek so as to leave the Orient to the discretion of Japan. On the other hand, another extreme view was that Japan should be extirpated once and for all. In fact, the argument in the United States about this matter really presented an animated spectacle.

Admiral Yarnell declared that " the United States is fully prepared to fight Japan." As a matter of fact, it appears that the United States policy vis-à-vis Japan is to bring pressure to bear upon her, on the basis of a conception that by one more push the United States will be able to do with Japan what she wants, particularly at this time, when Japan is economically exhausted.

That is the reason why the United States, in spite of the fact that she had a chance of readjusting her diplomatic relations with Japan, brought the situation to such a pass that Japan was compelled to make her final resolution. The Three-Power Alliance is nothing but a punishment from heaven on the United States. She has not realized the fact that if she attempts to bring limitless pressure to bear upon anyone, it will be quite natural for the latter eventually to react to that pressure, no matter who he is.

It must be borne in mind that Japan is in possession of an excellent fleet, the honour of which has never been impaired. It will, by no means, be an exaggeration to say that the United States should be held entirely responsible for Japan's resolve to use her treasured fleet.

Premier Prince Konoye has straightforwardly clarified Japan's intention: "If the United States challenges us, we will not decline her challenge; we will fearlessly fight her." And we must not forget this outspoken declaration. This resolution on the part of Japan took the United States aback in such a way that she was completely nonplussed. But once Japan's special position in the Orient is recognized, as has been explicitly stated by Premier Konoye, peace in the Pacific can be expected.

Even if Japan grasps in her hands the leadership of the Orient, the United States will have nothing at all to lose. Notwithstanding this, the United States has arranged her Atlantic Fleet with 125 warships and made clear her intention of bringing into being a two-ocean Navy. Needless to say, this is her defensive measure against the menace of Germany and Italy, and this action is thought to indicate that she is attaching more importance to the menace of the Atlantic than to that of the Pacific. From this it may not be amiss to assume that the United States considers England's defeat inevitable.

In this connexion the United States cannot remain with folded arms, for she realizes that England's defeat will immediately aggravate her own insecurity. Although the United States may not immediately come openly into the war in her aid to England, dispatching her Fleet and her Army to Europe (the fact, however, is that several United States warships are on guard off the coasts of Scotland against German landing operations), it is expected that she will hereafter continue to transport a large quantity of aeroplanes and foodstuffs to England.

A greater help to England than this military support is for the United States to attempt to induce the Soviet Union to fall in line with England. As a matter of fact, conversations between Washington and Moscow for readjustment of their diplomatic relations have been going on through their respective diplomatic channels, the object being perhaps not only to prevent the Soviet Union from participating in the Japan-German-Italian axis, but actually to induce her to throw in her lot with England and the United States.

Undoubtedly if the United States succeeds in her attempt to attract the Soviet Union into her camp, sandwiched as she is between the Eastern and Western Axis powers, she will expect a greater effect from this than from the economic pressure she has exerted against Japan by inducing Mexico to put an embargo upon oil and scrap-iron exports to Japan, along with her boycott of Japanese silk.

It may be noted that Japan, Germany, and Italy, through the Anti-Comintern Pact, concluded an agreement for the prevention of invasion by the Communists; but Premier Konoye has remarked that the readjustment of political and economic matters should be handled quite independently of the problem of the exclusion of Communism. In other words, steps will be taken by the three Axis powers to readjust their diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union, in opposition to England and the United States. Thus, the greatest effect of the Three-Power Alliance is a diplomatic war with Soviet Russia as the centre.

The Soviet Union has merely acknowledged receipt of the notification regarding the Three-Power Alliance; she has refrained from defining her attitude either towards the Alliance or towards England and the United States. It is, however, understood that the Soviet Union is slowly withdrawing her aid to Chiang Kai-shek, as a cry of distress is being heard from the Chungking Government.

Then is it not probable that the problem will hinge upon the Soviet Union? The Soviet Union is an inscrutable country; she cannot escape criticism for being so irrational in her attitude, for she briefly puts aside everything with incomprehensible words. No matter how difficult it may be to grasp where she stands exactly, and no matter how changeable and fickle she may be, she is a factor which will have great effect upon the world conflict. For Japan, her defence in the

North is directly linked with her attempt to construct her Empire in the South. It is a divine rule that when any country launches an invasion towards the north, she shall never win the final victory, no matter who she is. Therefore, the great mission of Japan is to plan her growth by means of defence in the North and attack to the South. It is quite clear to anybody that the attitude of the Soviet Union has the greatest bearing either for good or bad upon the settlement of the China Incident. Is it not, therefore, advisable for Japan to devote herself to solving the enigma of the Soviet Union with regard to her own important State policies?

If the movements of the Soviet Union are subjected to close examination and scrutiny, a characteristic Soviet policy may emerge. Whether the Soviet Union's policy will clash with Japan's plan for the construction of the Far Eastern Co-prosperity Sphere remains to be seen, and is subject to examination by the new Japanese Ambassador Tatekawa. If the result proves to be an obstacle in Japan's path, this is a matter to be dealt with as the occasion arises.

Since the problems arising from the Three-Power Alliance involve not only England and the United States, but also the Soviet Union, as has already been mentioned, there is no doubt that the diplomatic movements between the United States and the Soviet Union cannot, hereafter, be overlooked.

Since the outbreak of the second European war in September 1939, United States-Soviet relations have been a strange phenomenon.

That is to say, the Soviet Union in August 1939 concluded a non-aggression pact with Germany, thus reversing her policy vis-à-vis the democratic countries. At the same time, she followed the example set by Germany in advancing her army in the eastern half of Poland, and then employed the remainder of her strength in converting three Baltic countries into protectorates, even launching an attack upon Finland. This action on the part of the Soviet Union aggravated American public opinion towards the Soviet Union until the anger of the people reached its zenith.

This anti-Soviet ill-feeling was reflected in clamorous insistence by people in general on rupturing diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union and recalling the United States Ambassador from Moscow.

Further, the Finnish Relief Committee, with Mr Hoover as chairman and with many other distinguished persons, both official and private, as members, has been brought into being, its purpose being to raise funds for the aid to Finland throughout the country.

In Congress a resolution for withdrawing United States recognition of the Soviet Union, together with a bill for curtailing the salary of the United States Ambassador to the Soviet Union, were introduced. Also, the United States Government, by influence on the civilian companies concerned, finally put into execution a moral embargo upon aeroplanes and their accessories and upon petrol.

Notwithstanding the fact that the Soviet Union concluded a truce with Finland after four months of war, Secretary of State Hull of the United States declared that United States policy would not be affected in any way by the conclusion of the Soviet-Finland dispute.

Towards such an anti-Soviet feeling on the part of the United States, the Soviet Union showed on the whole an attitude of indifference. But so far as the United States moral embargo was concerned, the Soviet Union, realizing the direct effect it would have upon her economic structure, held a series of conversations with Secretary of State Hull on this matter through her Ambassador Oumansky. Mr Molotoff, Chairman of the Foreign Affairs People's Commissariat of the Soviet Union, at the Soviet supreme council held to discuss United States-Soviet diplomatic relations just prior to the Oumansky-Hull parley, expressed the hope that the United States Government would lift the moral embargo.

The above facts show that the United States and the Soviet Union are, politically and economically, in a relationship of mutual dependence; thus, because of this relationship, there is no reason to think that they will find themselves sharply at loggerheads. In fact, it is not thought the relations between the two countries will become worse than they are.

More than that, the United States, since the formation of the Three-Power Alliance, has been carrying on manœuvres to make the Soviet Union assume benevolent neutrality by lifting her moral embargo. Such being the case, Japan should watch out. Is it not reasonable to conclude that the Soviet Union and the United States are, step by step, falling into a situation of mutual dependency?

However, the Soviet Union is watching the world situation with disinterestedness, and is on the alert so as not to be entangled herself either in the World War or in the Three-Power Alliance.

3. THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE ALLIANCE

The Japan-Germany-Italy tripartite treaty is of paramount significance in consideration of its primary characteristic, which is different from that of any alliance treaty of its kind heretofore concluded. It is that Japan recognizes and respects the leadership of Germany and Italy in connexion with the construction of the New Order in Europe ; and that Germany and Italy recognize and respect Japan's leadership in connexion with the construction of the New Order in the Far East ; and, at the same time, that the three powers have pledged themselves to co-operate with each other in this connexion. From this standpoint, the present treaty is an epoch-making one.

Interpreted broadly, the alliance is nothing but a combination of these countries making a pledge for a specified joint action. From this standpoint, it is similar, in nature, to the Holy Alliance of 1815 which exacted a mutual pledge for the conduct of both internal administration and diplomacy according to Christian principles. Speaking from the strictest interpretation, the present tripartite treaty is a treaty which stipulates mutual responsibility for military aid on a specified occasion ; therefore, the treaty is divided into three parts, according to the occasions for aid : 1. " A defensive alliance." 2. " An offensive alliance." 3. " An offensive and defensive alliance."

The history of the world is full of examples of alliance treaties, the most notable of them being the Anglo-Japanese Alliance treaties of 1902, 1905, and 1911 ; the Germany-Italy-Austria Triple Alliance which was concluded in 1882 and renewed later several times ; and the Franco-Russian Alliance treaty of 1899.

Even after the First World War, the following alliance treaties were concluded : The Polish-Rumanian agreement of 1922 ; the Franco-Belgian treaty of 1920 ; the Franco-Soviet mutual co-operation treaty of 1935 ; the Anglo-Polish treaty of 1935 [*sic*] ; and the Anglo-French treaty of 1935 ; and there were many more.

Some treaties are aimed at specified third countries and some at unspecified countries on special occasions.

For example, the German-Austrian treaty of 1879 was aimed at a specified country—Russia; whereas the Anglo-Japanese alliance was aimed at no specified country, with the stipulation that the signatory countries would extend aid to one another in the event a specified interest of either of them was encroached upon by a third country. The present Japan-Germany-Italy Three-Power Alliance belongs to the latter category.

The aid stipulated in the treaty usually means mutual military aid. To be more technical, the nature of the aid stipulated is that the signatory countries extend help with their entire navies and armies or with either their armies or their navies.

However, there is an occasion for which the treaty stipulates either military aid or diplomatic support. There is another occasion for which the treaty provides military or economic support.

Since the Japan-Germany-Italy Alliance has pledged itself to extend mutual aid by all military, political, and economic methods available, it is by nature a very powerful compact for mutual aid. This treaty clearly stipulates the occasions for aid: “. . . in the event any of the three signatory countries is attacked by a third country which has not participated in the present European war or in the Sino-Japanese dispute.” If, therefore, the United States again antagonizes any of the signatory countries, she will be dealt a heavy blow by Japan, Germany, and Italy. In view of this, the present treaty embraces provisions which will most seriously affect the United States.

It is not too much to say that these three great world powers will devote themselves, hand in hand, for ten years to come to the construction of a new world and a New Order (in other words, they are dedicated to a great reconstruction of the world). Against this glittering future of the Three-Power Alliance, the United States is now demonstrating symptoms of nervousness, as is shown by her steps to put her naval reservists on the active list, as well as by Secretary of the Navy Knox's speech in which he declared that the United States is ready to fight. As a result there is something nervous and ominous prevailing over both the Pacific and the Atlantic.

Perhaps the United States may have sufficient prospects of victory in Atlantic and Pacific war operations ; but she must bear in mind that so long as our naval flags, symbolic of the Rising Sun and of the No. 1 country of the world, are fluttering solemnly over the Pacific, and submarines and pocket battleships flying the Hitler Swastika are rampant over the Atlantic, and the Italian colours of green, white, and red, signifying sincerity, purity, loyalty, and youth, are shining over all the oceans of the world, will not the important statements of the United States and her anti-Japanese economic warfare be meaningless ?

The effect the Three-Power Alliance has had upon England is also serious, and her wrath resembles the pouring of boiling water into her heart. Thus England, as a measure for vengeance, immediately reopened the Burma Road, declaring that she would continue her aid to Chiang Kai-shek.

England, who forced herself to maintain such an unfriendly attitude towards Japan, prepared for a conflict, but there is no room to doubt that the United States has firmly assured her of her aid. Then does it mean that both England and the United States have already concluded a military agreement for joint defence of the Southern Pacific comprising Hong Kong, Malaya, the Dutch East Indies, Australia, and New Zealand ?

If this is so, then, from our eyes, too, it can be said that something which was expected to come, came.

But it will be a great mistake on the part of England and the United States if they think that because of this Japan will change her resolution and determination. If Japan is challenged by anyone, she cannot help but rise to her feet and meet the challenge. In the event the anti-Japanese antagonism of the United States and England goes from bad to worse, Japan will have no alternative but to go to war in self-defence.

The United States has already issued secret instructions to all of her subjects residing in the Far East to return home. At this time, when the situation seems to be worsening, it will be wise for the United States to become aware of the fact that Japan is taking into consideration the worst eventuality which can confront her.

